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The thesis asks two crucial questions, (a) what are the normative frameworks available 
for protecting the rights and status of a person migrating due to climate change related 
hydro-metrological changes? (b) why is there a non-uniformity and inadequacy in the 
deliverance of assistance from the state? To address these questions, I have analysed 
the perception, framing and assistance a climate change migrant receives from the state 
of Assam in India, while also explaining the reasons for the differential nature and 
deficits in protection. 
Based on interviews with senior bureaucratic officials (elite actors), group-discussions, 
field surveys, and engagements at the block and village level, the thesis makes three 
critical arguments. First, the sub-national government perceive climate-induced 
migrations as a developmental issue. Second, the way in which climate change 
migration is framed as a developmental issue by elite actors does not correspond with 
how the issue is understood by street-level bureaucratic actors. Instead, the routine 
judgements and discretions exercised by street-level actors are complexly tied to the 
political and social circumstances of local areas. Finally, while it is known that socio-
political and demographic factors (such as gender, membership of a social group, and 
religion) contribute to forced forms of migration, the thesis argues that these 
demographic factors also adversely affect the performance of the programs meant to 
reduce climate vulnerabilities. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Prologue 
Forced displacement due to the changes in physical environment has been one of the 
significant motivation behind the international environmental negotiations since the 
1970s (Brown, 1976; Jacobson, 1988; Tolba, 1989; United Nations Environmental 
Programme, 1982; Keeble, 1988; Nilsson, 2004; El-Hinnawi, 1985). While there are 
still concerns about discerning the complex causal linkages between climate change 
and migration (Black, 2001; Hulme, 2008; Gray & Bilsborrow, 2013; Hugo, 2011; 
United Nations Task Team on Social Dimensions of Climate Change, 2011), there is 
an increasingly ‘strong consensus’ amongst the scientific community that climate 
change is impacting mobility flows across the world (Adger, et al., 2014; Foresight, 
2011). The Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (hereinafter IPCC) has 
identified human migration as the single greatest impact of global warming in its very 
first Assessment report and continues to develop sound scientific knowledge on the 
linkages between climate change and human mobility (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, 1990; 1995; 2007; 2007b; 2013).  
Due to the inequitable nature of climate change, there is a rational basis for expecting 
that the management of climate migration would need some form of multi-party global 
cooperation (Giovanni, et al., 2016; Bettini, 2017). Accordingly, a large body of 
literature and advocacy material on climate change migration governance engages with 
the international and regional responsibility to recognise climate migrants as a 
category for determining immigrant/asylum status (Athambawa, 2014; Harvey, 2002; 
Brindal, 2007; Biermann & Boas, 2010; Dreher & Voyer, 2015). Kälin and Schrepfer 
(2012) have pointed out that there has been an overemphasis on the common but 
differential responsibility principle (hereinafter CBDR Principle) in distributing the 
economic burden, including the burden of protecting those who migrate due to climate 
change. Although the strategy of CBDR is a critical tool for climate negotiations, it 
has not been conducive towards attracting an international consensus for protection. 
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Meanwhile, a growing number of people displaced due to natural disasters continue to 
be in legal limbo. Kalin maintains that we need to shift our focus to national 
engagements and analyse how to cover the needs of those migrating from a human 
rights perspective. However, we know very little about national and sub-national 
engagement with climate migration and this is where the current thesis becomes highly 
relevant (Kälin & Schrepfer, 2012).  
In this thesis, I have analysed the perception, framing and assistance that climate 
change migrants receive from the state of Assam in India, while also explaining the 
reasons for the differential nature and deficits in protection. The thesis is thus part 
exploratory and part explanatory and asks two crucial questions: First, what are the 
normative frameworks available for protecting the rights and status of people 
migrating due to climate change related hydro-metrological changes? In answering 
this question, I establish four policy paradigms (thematic areas) based on international 
policy recommendations and the central government’s perception of climate change 
migration. Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis look at specific programmes and analyse 
their delivery in the state of Assam.  
The second question answered in this thesis is why the delivery of assistance by the 
state is inadequate and non-uniform? The concern can be dismissed by stating that the 
inadequacy is due to the absence of a convention on climate refugees. However, I 
would come to show that this is far from true, the governments at the National or Sub-
national level do not see a climate change migrant falling in a legal vacuum. Instead, 
the governments are persistently questioning the need for having an international 
agreement to manage, what is mainly internal mobility. Yet despite a robust sympathy 
and innovativeness from the point of governance towards people migrating due to 
climate change, the state protection is inadequate and non-uniform, and it raises the 
question – why there is an inadequacy? For answering this question, I engage with 
three variables – institutional perception, political stimulus, and demography and 
explain why there is a differential delivery of the programmes identified in chapters 4 
and 5.  
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Based on interviews with senior state and central government officials, group-
discussions, and engagements at the block and village level, this thesis makes three 
critical arguments. First, the sub-national government perceives climate-induced 
migration as profoundly related to the broader developmental and welfare agenda of 
the state. In doing so, the elite actors in the state of Assam do not see the lack of an 
international agreement or specific national strategy on climate migration as an 
administrative vacuum.  
The second argument presented in the thesis is that the street-bureaucratic actors do 
not share the perception and framing adopted by the elite officers of the state. At the 
street-level of policy implementation, the tasks can be bifurcated into broad categories 
of procedural action, service delivery and evaluation. The implementation of a 
program requires a chain action from the procedural act of enumeration of 
beneficiaries (or survey of land data) towards the provision of benefits (service 
delivery) towards evaluating program progress/penetration. However, it is not 
necessary that every street-level actor in the chain of responsibility understands how 
their action (or inaction) can influence the level of protection and support that a climate 
change migrant would effectively receive from the state. For example, an actor who is 
engaged with a clerical task such as Land survey would not necessarily see their action 
of enumerating land-data to have any bearing on the task of the Development Officer 
in charge of enumerating beneficiaries for a land-compensation project. Instead, the 
routine actions are complexly independent, while being interdependent, leading to a 
systematic production of absurdity, either due to the paucity of action or the deliberate 
inaction in sub-national governmental departments.   
Finally, the thesis, questions the systematic production of marginality by analysing the 
programmes that are meant to reduce vulnerability. I have come to the conclusion that 
the demographic factors that contribute to an increased susceptibility to forced 
displacement also continue to negatively influence the performance of the relevant 
schemes, thus resulting in an inadequate and non-present state. 
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1.1 Background  
In 2011, I was a part of the Nansen Conference inaugurated by HRH Princess Matte-
Marie of Norway at the Peace Palace in Oslo. The conference chairs and attendees 
included highly prominent diplomats, policymakers, and academics.1 The Nansen 
Conference was an acknowledgement of the humanism of the famous explorer and 
humanitarian Fridtjof Nansen, who was the pioneer of the international surrogate 
protection system for displaced persons. It was a reminder to the international 
community that managing displacement due to environmental change requires a more 
profound commitment towards migrant communities.  
The conference resulted in the Nansen Initiative – an inter-governmental consultative 
process led by Norway and Switzerland – to initiate a policy dialogue on climate 
change migration. The agenda of the initiative was to adopt principles on 
environmental mobility that have similar functional advice as the Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement. During the conference, it came as a surprise to me that the 
Indian government had not sent a delegation of diplomats or policy experts despite the 
high-profile nature of the conference. In the past few years, while the Nansen Initiative 
has undertaken several regional consultations in all the primary geographical areas, 
including South-Asia the Indian government has remained absent from this process.  
The continued absence of India is intriguing for several reasons. (a) India faced one of 
the worst scenarios of internal displacement due to natural hazards in 2016 alone. An 
estimated 2.3 million people were freshly displaced due to hydro-metrological 
disasters (EM-DAT, n.d.). (b) India has a high dependence on ecosystem services, 
which makes it highly vulnerable to climate change and forced displacement scenarios 
(O’Brien, et al., 2004; Brenkert & Malone, 2005). (c) India shares a wide migration-
corridor with Bangladesh, which is described as a climate migration hotspot (Lu X, et 
al., 2016). (d) Finally, studies have identified group-based resource conflicts occurring 
                                                             
1 The conference was hosted by Jonas Gahr Støre Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Norway) and Erik Solheim Minister 
of the Environment and International Development (Norway). The sessions were chaired by prominent policy 
actors like Kristalina I. Georgieva, European Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and 
Crisis Response, Rajendra K Pachauri, Chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and 
António Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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in regions of India due to environmental migration and the resultant demographic 
changes (Slettebak, 2013; Kumar, 2017; Panda, 2015).  
On the other hand, India, with a population of 1.3 billion, is one of the most prominent 
countries in the climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter UNFCCC). The development pathways 
adopted by the country will substantially alter the global carbon mitigation target. In 
the words of India’s long-standing climate change negotiator and retired diplomat, 
Shyam Saran, ‘India’s choices have the potential to destroy its own economy or the 
whole world.’2 Due to India’s increasing carbon emissions, an international academic 
and policy fixation on the question of energy security and energy pathways in India is 
palpable.  
At the same time, two-thirds of the Indian population still resides in its villages which 
are heavily dependent on ecosystem services; thus, the choices that India has are in 
fact limited. It can either ignore the global concern and continue developing its 
business as usual scenario, increasing its massive carbon footprint, which would 
adversely affect the ecosystem all across the world (including India’s own fragile 
ecosystem). It could assume low-energy pathways, which might be conducive to 
stabilising the country’s energy footprint but might not be sufficient to achieve the 
short-term developmental targets. Alternatively, it could ignore most of its vulnerable 
poor population in a bid to reduce its carbon emissions and assume the moral high 
ground in climate negotiations. Whichever path it chooses, it is perceptible that the 
people in India will continue to move out of the fragile ecosystem either to adapt or to 
survive.  
My thesis is concerned with the movement of people due to climate change related 
chronic disasters and how governments are currently responding to it. Knowledge of 
the present situation is essential to evaluate the policy options and guide future 
scenarios. 
                                                             
2 In a private conversation with Mr. Shyam Saran at Indian Institute of Science, during a talk organised by the 
Centre for Sustainable Energies in 2009. 
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1.2 Research Gaps  
The research on climate change migration has evolved from the security study 
narrative surrounding national security (White, 2011; Homer-Dixon, 1994) to a more 
nuanced perspective of human security and adaptation (Bhattacharyya & Werz, 2012; 
Campbell, et al., 2007; Elliott, 2010; Bettini, 2013). Its conceptualisation as a form of 
climate change adaptation strategy has further been critiqued for its neoliberal roots 
(Felli, 2013), for obscuring the attempts at climate change mitigation (Methmann & 
Oels, 2015), and for undermining the question of justice and humanitarianism 
(Giovanni, et al., 2016). 
However, the literature on the governance of climate change related migrations is 
sparse and compartmentalised into isolated pockets of international relationship 
scholarship (Betts, 2012). The scholarship in the area can be traced to studies analysing 
the existing international normative standards (Biermann & Boas, 2008; Hugo, 2010; 
Warner, 2010; Kalin, 2012; McAdam, 2011; Mcinerney-Lankford, et al., 2011) and 
those engaging with changes in functionality of the international organisations such as 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereinafter UNHCR), International 
Organization for Migration (hereinafter IOM) and United Nations Development 
Program (hereinafter UNDP) (Hall, 2011; Nash, 2017; Giovanni, et al., 2016). There 
is hardly any scholarship analysing the national and sub-national policies on climate 
related mobility. This gap is regrettable as migration governance is inherently political; 
it involves states and sub-state actors conferring rights to (or recognising the rights of) 
the migrants.  
The current thesis contributes towards filling this gap in the literature by analysing the 
complex and multi-level dynamics of the governmental response given to people 
migrating due to climate-change related disasters. 
1.3 Choosing Assam 
I chose the state of Assam in the North-East region of India to understand the 
institutional, political and social dynamics in protecting climate change migrants. 
Assam is an intriguing state. It has often been described in the security studies 
literature as a region facing conflict due to resource constraints caused by 
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environmentally motivated migration (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Reuveny, 2007; Swain, 
1996; Suhrke, 1997). While it cannot be authoritatively suggested that Assam is, in 
fact, a classic example of climate change migration leading to conflict, it is known that 
the ethnically motivated conflicts in the state are recurrent and have a fluid agenda. 
The political and social narrative attached to these conflicts identifies religion, tribes, 
nationality, cross-border movements and resource scarcity, as underlying reasons 
(Aggarwal, 1999; Baruah, 1999; Baruah, 1986; Hazarika, 1993; Darnell & Parikh, 
1988; Barbora, 2008; Baruah, 2003).  
Assam in its current situation shows a very high vulnerability to climate change 
(Ravindranath, et al., 2011). In the 2011, Ravindranath et al. analysed the grid-level 
vulnerability of the entire north-east of India and concluded that every district in 
Assam shows a high to very high current vulnerability to climate change primarily due 
to its dependence on ecosystem services for livelihood. It is also known that the state 
of Assam shows a high index of inter-state mobility and out-migration. In the 2011 
census, the state reported a 53% increase in net out-migration. The mobility depicted 
by the 2011 census considered cyclic and permanent relocations for economic reasons 
(Rajan & Bhagat, 2017; Census India, 2011). The state also witness massive amount 
of temporary forced displacement due to annual floods, and long-term displacement 
patterns caused by the flood erosion and ethnically motivated conflicts (Assam State 
Disaster Management Authority, 2015; Assam State Disaster Management Authority, 
2012; EM-DAT, n.d.; Das, et al., 2005). Additionally, the state of Assam shares an 
international border with the Republic of Bangladesh which is ascribed in as a ‘climate 
migration hot-spot’. And the narrative of disaster migration in the state very much tie 
into the fuzzy political notion of illegal border migration from Bangladesh.  
In the backdrop of this information, Assam – a border states – with its demographic 
plurality, geographical sensitivity, economic vulnerability, and administrative 
complexity becomes a highly fascinating area to study how governments respond and 
govern climate change related migrations.  
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1.4 Conceptualising Climate Change Migration 
The phrases climate change migration, climate migration, climate mobility and 
displacement due to climate change or displacement due to hydro-metrological 
disasters are used in a colloquial sense throughout the thesis. The purpose of the thesis 
is not to establish a causal relationship between climate change and migration or to 
challenge any existing theory on climate migration as a form of displacement or 
adaptation. Instead, the focus is on understanding how the bureaucratic actors 
governing an ecosystem with a high current vulnerability to climate change 
conceptualise, frame and respond to various patterns of migration that can be loosely 
associated with changing weather patterns.  
The thesis treats climate change migration as a ‘wicked problem’ (discussed in more 
details in section 2.3 of this thesis). I accept that the actors in my area of inquiry can 
define and understand the problematic in multiple ways. For the current thesis the 
bureaucratic view on migration as a result of climate change is more critical than a 
definitive scientific study establishing the climate change and migration linkage. It is 
accepted that this framing could be an informal internalisation of international 
concerns about climate change migration, or even a form of escapism to disperse the 
responsibility of massive displacement during hydro-metrological disasters by 
blaming it on the global warming.  Nevertheless, the perception and belief that an elite 
officer holds with respect to the role climate change plays in influencing hydro-
metrological cycles and in exacerbating migration is essential to discern the policy 
choices that the government may adopt. 
Climate migration is thus defined in this thesis as patterns of movement witnessed in 
the state of Assam along the Brahmaputra Valley. These movements can be adaptive 
or for survival; they can be cyclic, permanent or temporary; they can be out of the state 
or within the state territory; and they can be voluntary or forced. However, in all cases 
they are intrinsically related to the morphology and flooding pattern of the 
Brahmaputra river.  
 
22 Governance of Climate Change Related Migrations in Assam (India) 
1.5 Aims and Objectives 
The research asks two crucial questions. First, how does the sub-national government 
perceive and frame climate-change related migration? This perception and framing is 
essential to understand the choice of policies, methods and governance tools that the 
sub-national actors prioritise when dealing with complex issues like climate change 
migration.  
Climate change and migration have a complex and questionable nexus (Nicholson, 
2014; White, 2011) that cannot be disentangled from a non-exhaustive list of other 
factors such as unequal access to resources, gender inequality, colonial history, 
structural indifferences, political economy, etc. (Baldwin, 2012; Baldwin, 2017). The 
entanglement of climate change induced migration with historical, social, structural, 
physical, economic and cultural aspects of societies makes it a wicked problem for 
governance. It creates difficulties in creating simplified narratives and definitive causal 
connections necessary for a uniform governance policy (Rittel & Webber, 1973). 
Instead it allows the elite actors of the state bureaucracy to play a vital role in setting 
varied and differential policy agenda to respond to people migrating due to climate 
change. These agendas, however, are profoundly influenced by the personal beliefs 
and priorities of the senior bureaucratic officers (Mintrom & Norman, 2009; 
Satzewich, 2007; Olsson & Hysing, 2012).  
It thus becomes necessary to understand how the elite actors in the region define, 
understand and frame the problem. Their understanding of climate migration provides 
the setting in which to focus on how the government is currently responding to the 
people and communities already migrating due to climatic change. This question is 
answered by way of elite interviews, and by analysing the place for climate migration 
in the multi-level climate policy of India and the State of Assam. Four policy areas are 
identified and matched with the government schemes and special programmes that the 
elite actors consider useful in mitigating forced displacement, enabling voluntary 
adaptive movement, and providing relief compensation to households that are forced 
to relocate. I define the policy areas in the thesis as: (a) enabling policies, (b) mitigating 
policies, (c) relief policies, and (d) compensatory policies. The enabling and mitigation 
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policies focus on economic, social and structural adaptation to climate change. The 
schemes matched with these policy areas for the current thesis are the Fundamental 
rights to freedom of movement and residence under Article 19 of the Constitution of 
India, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 2005, and structural 
enhancement policies adopted by the Central government of India from time to time 
to reduce flood vulnerability in the state.  Under the relief and compensatory policy 
thematic areas, I engage with the Disaster Management Act of 2005, the Flood 
Operational Relief Manual of 1976 (for the state of Assam), Indira Awas Yojana 
(Central government scheme), and the Chief Minister’s Special Assistance Fund (State 
of Assam policy). These programmes are analysed in regard to their potential 
normative synergies and implementation output to understand the adequacy of the 
protection response.  
The second question answered in the thesis explains why there is an uneven response 
to people migrating due to climate change. Often policies do not translate into 
implementation, and the results of welfare schemes remain skewed. Researchers have 
always remained curious about the factors that lead to implementation gaps.  
In climate change research, there is a welcome growth in scholarship on the 
implementation of climate change adaptation models recently (Dupuis & Knoepfel, 
2013). As migration is, to an extent, also a form of adaptation strategy, these works 
are well worth mentioning. Keskitalo (2010) has suggested that political engagement 
concerning climate change adaptation lacks concrete actions and instead focuses more 
on formulating guidelines, or funding climate impact research. Thus, creating facades 
of governance and governing bodies with no real responsible function towards the 
communities needing support. Similarly, Biesbroek et al. (2013; 2010) and Ford et al. 
(2011) remark that while adaptation has appeared on the political agenda in many 
countries, implementation has rarely occurred, making the adaptation models little 
more than empty shells, and resulting in an implementation deficit.  
However, this construction of adaptation fails to account for the complex nature of 
policy-making and policy implementation (Wellstead, et al., 2013). Adger et al. (2007) 
examined the barriers that limit adaptation policy and identified several factors, 
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notably, the uncertainty of the available scientific knowledge, which prevents decision 
making (Wilby & Dessai, 2010); the fragility of ecosystems, which creates non-certain 
forms of policy intervention (Hulme, 2005); the lack of economic resources (Figaj, 
2010); the weakness of state institutions, which are unable to design and implement 
public adaptation policy (Keller, et al., 2008; Yohe, et al., 2006); and social limits that 
might prevent adaptation responses in specific contexts (Kragt, et al., 2013; Mertz, et 
al., 2009; Adger, et al., 2009).  
Influenced by this literature, I have identified three variables for analysis – institutions, 
political stimuli, and the demography of the areas which are at the margin of 
geographical fragility.  
1.6 Arguments  
Through this thesis I make three arguments; first, the sub-national government 
perceives climate-induced migration as deeply related to the broader developmental 
and welfare agenda of the state. In doing so, the elite actors in the state of Assam do 
not see the lack of an international agreement or specific national strategy on climate 
migration as an administrative vacuum. The elite actors in the state identify climate 
change as a reason for increased migration, and also a constraint to achieving welfare 
policy targets in a timely manner. The assumption of climate change as a constraint is 
not backed by any scientific evidence but is instead based on the experience of erratic 
flooding pattern since 2008. The deficit in achieving policy target (especially in the 
recent past) does instigate some of the state actors to view climate migration through 
a humanitarian lens. However, at the same time the state does not strictly construct 
migration as a humanitarian crisis or views a migrant as worthy of undisputed state 
pity. 
The second argument in the thesis is that the street-bureaucratic actors do not share 
the perception and framing adopted by the elite officers of the state. The routine action 
of administration such as land-data survey and enumeration of citizens into register 
data, can adversely affect people who are forced to relocate by determining the status 
of their rights viz-a-viz the state. However, the front-line actors who are responsible 
for completion of these daily task of administration do not always see how their action 
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(or inaction) can influence the level of support a climate-change migrant can receive. 
Particularly in the scenarios where the synergies between the specific task of a street-
level actor, a government scheme and a potential benefit for migration management is 
hidden, the street-level bureaucrats would overlook such connection. And instead 
stumble towards making a discretion to delegate in the name of the ‘due process’. On 
the other hand, the individual task of the street-level actors may be conventional thus 
being contradictory, to the newly framed elite agenda leading to an incessant 
production of absurdity at the street level of bureaucratic action.  
It is often pointed out in public policy research that the acceptance of organisations as 
a mechanical entity performing a mandated task fails to explain the reasons for non-
uniformity in implementation (Lipsky, 2010).  As Eugene Bardach once observed, 
‘even the most robust policy would tend to go awry. The classic symptoms of 
underperformance, delay, and escalating costs are bound to appear’ (Bardach, 1977). 
In the managerial literature, much importance is attributed to leadership style and 
perceptions of the elite actors in organisations (Behn, 1989; Meier & O'Toole, 2002; 
Denhardt, 1993; Riccucci & Saidel, 1997). However, most of these studies are limited 
to an analysis of agenda implementation in private-sector organisations, where 
employers are not constrained by bureaucratic civil service rules and regulations. In 
the public sector, the perception and framing of the elite bureaucratic actors has mixed 
results on policy implementation and outcomes. For example, Robert Behn (1989) 
showed positive implementation result at a macro-level when the goals and synergies 
were clearly identified and communicated by the agency leaders.  
A few earlier studies have argued that bureaucracies discourage individual 
performance and are inherently inept in achieving welfare goals (Heclo, 1977; 
Kaufman, 1981). These studies have highlighted the complex nature of front-line 
actors in bureaucratic systems and have argued that the Street-level bureaucratic actors 
are not affected by either the elite perception or management practices (Lipsky, 2010). 
The empirical research, although limited, supports this conclusion and suggests that 
front-line practices are mostly stagnant in time and unable to accommodate changing 
circumstances (Meyers & Dillon, 1999; Meyers & Vorsanger, 2007; Riccucci, 2005). 
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Jodi Sandfort (2000), in her work, has shown that the collective beliefs or schemas of 
the front-line staff have a powerful influence on implementation.  
The final argument made in this thesis questions the systematic production of 
marginality. By analysing the programmes that are meant to reduce vulnerability, I 
have come to the conclusion, that the demographic factors that contribute to an 
increased susceptibility to forced migration also continue to negatively influence the 
performance of the relevant schemes, resulting in an inadequate and non-present state. 
In chapter 8 of this thesis, I revisit the performance of the schemes in the most fragile 
geographic regions of Assam – the river-islands (termed char or chor in vernacular 
language). I analyse the performance of developmental and welfare programs in the 
light of the demographic composition and social vulnerability of these areas to 
highlight the continuation of victimisation and presence of forced mobility in these 
islands.  
1.7 Thesis Outline 
The thesis is divided into nine further chapters. Chapter 2 of the thesis reviews the 
literature on climate change induced migration. I treat climate change migration as a 
wicked administrative problem and outline the synergies between the policies on 
adaptation, risk-reduction, and migration governance. I look at the question of 
governance from the standpoint of public policy and administrative operationalisation, 
an area that has not been explored so far and that to me seems fundamental for creating 
any future sound policy on climate change induced migration.  
In Chapter 3 I discuss the research methodology adopted for this study. This is also 
where I introduce the reader to nuances of the administration in the State of Assam. 
The chapter begins by identifying the research questions and specific policy context 
within which these questions will be answered. The policy context itself is a brief 
overview of the answer to one of the contextual sub-questions – What is the 
framework? I categorise policy into three thematic areas – Enabling Policies, Response 
Policies and Compensatory Policies before discussing my independent variables – 
institutional ability, demography and politics. The chapter then introduces the reader 
to the eight select districts of Assam where this study was conducted and outlines the 
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methodology used for gathering and analysing the data. Finally, there is the question 
of ethics while working in a conflict-prone region, the discussion of which concludes 
this chapter.  
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of the thesis give the descriptive detail of the policy and 
institutional framework in place in the state of Assam.  
Chapter 4 is divided into two thematic areas: ‘enabling policy’ and ‘mitigating 
policy’. Each thematic area is explored in regard to its legal premise and operational 
premise, and the synergy it has with the governance of climate change migration. The 
chapter utilises the data on D-voters, landholdings and the performance of the 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme to evaluate the 
state’s effort in protecting the constitutionally guaranteed right to movement and 
settlement for communities living in vulnerable areas. The D-voter data, which is 
highly securitised, concerns the sub-national perception of migrants as ‘illegal 
Bangladeshi nationals’ and the relation a migrating person or their family can hold 
with the state. The chapter discusses how the functioning of the D-voter list 
undermines the fundamental enabling right towards freedom of movement and 
residence, thus, restricting choices for adaptation. The land-holding data in the chapter 
provides an overview of ownership rights and residential rights in the state, while the 
MGNREGA data demonstrates the complexity in regard to livelihood diversification 
at the district level.  
Chapter 5 adopts a similar framework and analyses the operationalisation of the relief 
policies and compensatory policies. The chapter uses data on relief supply and 
compensation to highlight the insufficiency of the process.  These two chapters provide 
an answer to the contextual sub-questions of this thesis, i.e., what is the institutional 
framework available in the state of Assam to respond to climate-change induced 
migration? And, How does the state of Assam respond to climate change migration? 
Chapter 6 examines the influence of sub-national institutions on the governance of 
climate migration. The chapter considers the element of bureaucratic perception and 
problem framing at the sub-national level. It argues that it is not necessary for the sub-
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national government to frame the problem in precisely the same manner as the central 
government. The variation in framing leads to a variation in the delivery of 
programmes. A further layer of complexity is added by the perception of the street-
level actors. It is also shown in this chapter that the street-actors do not associate 
climate change migration with the welfare programmes that they have to routinely 
deliver.  
Chapter 7 analyses the impact of politics on the perceptions and actions of the street 
level actors. In this chapter, I engage with the proposition of citizenship and belonging, 
which determines the protection the state offers to migrants. The question whether a 
migrant is perceived as a citizen or an illegal settler is intensely tied to the political 
narrative of the state. And in turn the identity politics within the state complexly 
influence the protection outcome a climate migrant would receive from the 
government.  
In Chapter 8, I return to analysing the perception of the state of certain classes of 
people as more vulnerable to forced migration and entrapment, and I attempt a limited 
analysis of how the state’s view of religion, ethnic minorities and gender impacts the 
protection outcome in geographical areas that are physically more vulnerable and often 
occupied by minority communities.  
Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter, here I further the idea of climate change 
victimisation. I reflect upon the similarity of factors that influence an inadequate 
response towards climate change migration, and the factors that constitute 
vulnerability to climate change in the first place. The chapter also provides a set of 
recommendations which were shared with the state of Assam to help strengthen their 
current administrative response towards climate change related migrations. The final 
part of the chapter sums up the contribution of this thesis while ruminating on its 
shortcomings and future avenues for research. 
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Chapter 2 Understanding Climate Migrations and its 
Governance Paradigm 
In the past few years, there has been a tremendous increase in research on climate-
change induced migration across several disciplines, including security studies, 
migration studies, human geography, and law (Zetter & Morrissey, 2014; Warner, et 
al., 2013; Black, et al., 2008; Warner, 2011; McAdam, 2012). This development in 
systematic inquiry into the nature of climate change related migrations has prompted 
high-level policy outcomes at the international level. For example, in 2010, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted Article 14(f) in its 
Cancun Adaptation Framework, with the aim to encourage member states to 
‘formulate measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation 
regarding climate change-induced displacement, migration and planned relocation at 
the national, regional and international levels where appropriate’ (1/CP.16 para 14(f) 
in UNFCCC 2010). Similarly, the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (2011) and 
the Warsaw Mechanism for Loss and Damage (2013), led to the creation of an internal 
Task Force on Displacement as part of the UNFCCC Executive Committee on 
Adaptation (Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 49).3 The Taskforce, which started its 
operationalisation in 2017, aim to recommend integrated approaches to avert, 
minimise and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.4 
However, these developments have been on an international governance level and 
there is little knowledge about how the governments who are at the forefront of 
climate-change related migration and displacement respond to the problem nationally 
and sub-nationally. In the following chapter, I will analyse the existing literature on 
climate change-related migration and scrutinize the various governance approaches, 
which are proposed in order to appropriately respond to climate change related 
                                                             
3 Report of Conference of Party on its 21st Session held at Paris, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, dated 29th January 
2016. Available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf#page=8  
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migrations. To determine the paradigm of my inquiry, I break the existing research 
into process narrative and context narrative.  
For this thesis the process narrative is the literature that helps understand what climate 
change migration is and who climate change migrants are. This narrative stem from 
human geography and vulnerability studies. The process narrative determines the 
causal linkage between climate-change and migration by relying on observational 
research and household level data on migrant decision making over temporal and 
spatial measurement scales. The process narrative aims to identify and define what 
climate change migration is and who the climate change migrants are.  
The context narrative, in the thesis, examines the ‘normative frameworks’5 that 
regulate migration. It helps us to understand the legal and institutional context within 
which climate change mobility is governed. Context narrative therefore, focuses on 
how climate-change induced migrations must be governed. The context narrative does 
not provide any grand theory on climate change migration nexus. Instead, the context 
narrative borrows the definitional elements of the process narrative and identifies the 
international, national and sub-national policy areas within which mobility issues 
could be managed in future.  
The third part of this chapter will introduce the reader to ‘wicked problems’. Some of 
the most difficult policy problems of the modern era have been described as complex, 
intractable, open-ended and 'wicked'. The thesis considers climate change migration 
as a wicked administrative problem due to its multiple causalities, interlinkages with 
other social and economic aspects of development, and the solution complexity. In the 
section 2.3 I reflect on how the acceptability of climate change migration as a wicked 
problem allows thinking beyond the limited definitional premise of the process and 
context narrative. This allows greater reflexity and understanding of the perceptions, 
value-judgements and organizational strategies of those at the frontline of response.   
                                                             
5 The phrase normative framework is used here in as a legal connotation to indicate the statutory legal 
frameworks, legal principles, laws and statutory norms which govern migration at national, international and 
regional levels.  
 
31 Understanding Climate Migrations and its Governance Paradigm 
Section 2.4 highlight India's sensitivity to climate change-related migration and 
discuss the Indian central government’s position. The section considers how the 
government of India perceives and frames the governance space to respond to climate-
change related mobility within its borders. Using the analogy of wicked problem from 
the earlier section, in 2.4 I specifically identify how administrators in India 
increasingly associate internal migrations to hydrometeorological changes which are 
exacerbated by climate change.  
The fifth part of this chapter discuss the state of Assam, which borders the Republic 
of Bangladesh. The process narrative literature often refer Bangladesh as a Climate-
migration Hotspot. Borrowing from this assumption the context narrative suggest an 
increased flow of cross-border migration from Bangladesh towards north-eastern 
regions of India which would eventually lead to exacerbation of the existing ethnic 
violence in the region (Shrivastava & Heinen, 2005; Suhrke, 1997; Reuveny, 2007; 
Swain, 1996). In section 2.5 I analyse the studies concerning climate vulnerability of 
Assam and the influence of such vulnerability on internal migration. I also scrutinize 
the literature on cross-border international migrations occurring in the region and their 
influence on migration governance narratives.    
In section 2.6, I evaluate the dynamics of the multi-level climate governance in India, 
pointing to the lopsided concern with mitigation and energy efficiency. I note once 
again that this attachment to energy security has devoid India from a meaningful 
discussion on how it governs and protects the right of those who are forced to migrate 
due to climate change. And in the absence of a scholarship one has to look at other 
disciplines for understanding how the Indian government perform and respond to 
urgent and everyday crisis. For this purpose I use the recent ethnographic material 
elaborating the operationalisation of street-level bureaucracy in India. The 
ethnographic accounts provide a rich narrative of everyday mundaneness, it allows the 
reader to grasp the nuances and identify structural gaps which result in policy and 
project failures. And hence discussion of this work becomes vital to understand what 
it is and how it works. It then leaves me with the question of why it is what it is, and 
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why it works the way it does – both of which I humbly try to answer through my own 
research.  
2.1: Process Narrative: Climate Change Migration Nexus 
The neoclassical theories of migration place economics and development at the heart 
of the migrant decision-making process. The variations in the environmental 
conditions are considered minor influences that are not significant in most of the 20th-
century migration studies literature (Salvatore, 1981; Todaro, 1969; Vishwanath, 
1991; Johnson & Stark, 1991). Piguet (2013) views the absence of ecological 
consideration in determining migration decisions an imposition of the Western-centric 
idea of technological progress. The economic progress in the liberal and neo-liberal 
approaches to development is independent of environmental constraints. Therefore, 
ecosystem dependence and environmentally motivated displacements are considered 
primitive form of migration.  
However, the literature on security studies during the late 1980s, views environmental 
dilapidation as a direct causal variable for migration (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Mathews, 
1989; Campbell, et al., 2007). Myers and Kent (1995) in their book Environmental 
Exodus suggested that billions of people may become ‘refugees’ by 2020 due to 
environmental degradation across the world. Most of these numeric predictions are 
however too simplistic, and exaggerated to arouse a sense of alarm using a Malthusian 
dependence paradigm.  
Two different perspectives thus appear in the research on climate change migration. 
The minimalist view, which is based on the neoliberal and structuralist paradigm, sees 
environmental change as one of the many factors contributing to migration, and the 
maximalist view, which is based on a neo-Malthusian-security studies premise, which 
considers environmental changes to be a direct causal factor in migration and 
displacement. The maximalists extract the environmental variable from a cluster of 
other causal factors and provide a hyperbolic projection of the number of expected 
future environmental refugees who will act as a security threat to the global west 
(Lonergan, 1998; Mathews, 1989; Reuveny, 2007; Jacobson, 1988).  These studies 
create a sense of alarm and are partly responsible for pushing the climate change 
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migration agenda into the climate change negotiations paradigm (Elliott, 2010; Boas, 
2014). The security narrative acts as a bargaining tool in international negotiations, 
and several developing as well as developed countries employ it to negotiate a space 
for binding obligations (Boas, 2014). 
The minimalists, by contrast, view the environment as a contextual factor, which 
manifests itself along with other factors that are responsible for migration decisions 
(Bohra-Mishra & Massey, 2011; Warner, et al., 2012; Black, et al., 2008; Foresight, 
2011). The minimalist deductions regarding climate mobility has increasing influence 
on the present normative policy paradigm. The substantial and procedural responses 
to migrations due to hydro-metrological disasters is guided by the minimalist views. 
The minimalists, through a multi-causal approach, identify the role of climate change 
in influencing household migration decisions, and in the process, expose the social and 
structural vulnerabilities along with migrants' individual choices in determining 
mobility patterns.  
A surge in observational studies using minimalist approaches over the last decade has 
led to a general academic consensus that climate change induced migration is a 
complex manifestation of geographic, economic, social, cultural, and political 
processes (Adger, et al., 2014; Jager & Kok, 2007; Black, et al., 2008; Foresight, 
2011). There is little evidence to suggest that migrants perceive climate change as a 
direct causal factor in their relocation (Campbell, 2010). Climate change risks are 
aggregated at the household level, and families consider economic factors ahead of 
environmental factors in their migratory decisions (Faist & Alscher, 2009, pp. 22-25). 
Families engage extensively in in-suit adaptation within their places of habitual 
residence before choosing to migrate (Foresight, 2011).  
Communities in geographically vulnerable areas persistently undertake cyclic labour 
migration to urban centres as a means of gathering economic resources. In the process, 
they develop strategies to live with re-occurring disasters. (Poncelet, 2009, p. 3; Adger, 
1999; Findlay & Geddes, 2011). Households send one or more of their able-bodied 
members on a temporary or cyclical basis to diversify their family livelihood options 
while also maintaining ties with their homeland (Bohra-Mishra & Massey, 2011; 
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Warner, et al., 2012; Laczko & Aghazarm, 2009). These cyclic migrations assist 
migrant sending families to adapt to their changing environment although they may 
not radically improve their living conditions (de Haan, 2000, p. 14). Well-managed 
cyclic migrations among communities living in seasonal flood-prone and drought-
prone areas provide steady remittance funding for local development.6 Furthermore, 
they help to establish and maintain a social network that is resourceful in assisting 
other community members to migrate in case of need (Faist, 2000). Studies have also 
shown that migrations are short-distance and localised within national boundaries 
(Irianni, et al., 2009, pp. 13-17) or follow an existing migration corridor.  
In the case of displacement caused by the sudden onset of a disaster, victims migrate 
over a short distance to the nearest safe area and choose to stay with family and friends 
(Hugo, 2008; Bardsley & Hugo, 2010; Castles, et al., 2014). Once the disaster recedes, 
they prefer to return and rebuild their lives in their place of habitual residence (Yun & 
Waldorf, 2016; Button & Oliver-Smith, 2008; Perch-Nielsen, et al., 2008).  
Thus, the manner in which climate change migrations are perceived will influence the 
policy response towards it. If a government views climate migration as a mono-causal 
event from a maximalist perspective, they would tend to adopt a Malthusian and 
security-centric policy paradigm. Whereas if the government’s view climate migration 
as a multi-causal event, it would exhibit a minimalist complex understanding of inter-
linkages between climate-change, development, and migration. 
Table 1: Issue Location based on Causal Relation 
Process 
narrative 




Migration as direct impact of climate change-
related disasters which can lead to group-based 






Migration as aggregation of individual choices, 





                                                             
6 Recently the State of Assam Disaster Management Authority mobilised its resources to recognise the role of 
remittance from cyclic migration in improving the household living conditions, to formally include remittance 
income as a strategy for the state plan on adaptation.  
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It is well worth noting that the compelling imagery of ‘swarms of migrants’ invoke the 
citizenry's deepest fears regarding incoming migrants, especially in the developed 
world, which is increasingly securing its borders against all form of migration (White, 
2011). However, how appropriate is this formation in context of climate migrations? 
In the light of the observational research, scholars have highlighted that nations need 
to reassess their views on climate change migration and distance themselves from the 
national security narrative (Elliott, 2010). As most of the environmentally motivated 
migration from the vulnerable areas are short-distance and within national borders 
(Findlay & Geddes, 2011). For example, in India, every year approximately 20 million 
people migrate from disaster-prone rural areas to urban centre which offer better 
livelihood opportunities (Deshingkar, 2006). Similarly, in the case of migration due to 
sudden onset disasters, it is seen that communities migrate only temporarily to safer 
locations and return as soon as the disaster recedes to rebuild their lives. In regions 
where there are repeat disasters and lack of governmental support in rebuilding post-
disasters, communities do engage in permanent relocation as a long-term strategy. For 
example, in the case of the communities in New Orleans, affected by Hurricane 
Katrina, it was observed that marginalised groups constituted the majority of 
permanent out-migrants from the city (Squires & Hartman, 2006; Tacoli, 2009). 
However, the cases of permanent relocation is also geographically restricted and 
households chose to migrate within their own country.   
2.2: Context Narrative: Responding to Climate Change Migration 
The development in policy literature on climate change migration was prompted by 
the national security context following the development in the securitization literature 
discussed above. However, over the years human security aspect of climate migration 
has become highly prominent with the growth in understanding on climate migration 
pattern. Legal scholars, writing on climate migration, have long held the opinion that 
the universal international norms for respecting human rights provide a compelling 
rights paradigm to ensure protection and support for those displaced due to an 
imminent natural disaster. For example McAdam (2011; 2012), in her work on 
complementary protection under international law, strongly suggests the availability 
of jus cogens norms, including the right to protection and preservation of the right to 
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life and dignity, the norm regarding statelessness, and the principle of non-refoulment, 
which puts a legal responsibility on nations to respond to displaced people.  Similarly, 
Kalin (2012) holds the opinion that even when there is an absence of a focused 
international agreement on the status of climate change migrants, the national 
governments are not absolved from their responsibility to protect people displaced 
within their national borders. Soft-instruments such as the Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement provide practical advice to governments to mitigate and respond 
to instances of forced displacement, including development project related 
displacement (Cohen, 2013). 
However, the modalities of the protection regime are subject to several compelling and 
often competing narratives. Due to the inequitable nature of climate change it is 
vehemently argued that the responsibility to protect climate migration should be shared 
internationally in an equitable and ethical manner. Most legal scholars use a common 
but differential responsibility principle to suggest creation of new international 
response and protection mechanism under the UNFCCC. While few other uses the 
premise of ethics and moral justice to rationalise an extended interpretation of the 
humanitarian regime to provide refugee-like status to a climate change migrant.  
However, as most of the climate change migration is internal it is necessary that a 
dialogue should be initiated at the national and sub-national levels of governance. 
International consultative processes like Nansen Initiative tries to engage with national 
governments at a regional level and recommends strengthening existing human rights 
mechanisms, while simultaneously intensifying development measures to mitigate and 
manage climate displacements as part of the national welfare strategies (Kälin, 2012; 
Nansen Initiative, 2011). The human rights discourse and the development discourse 
while complimentary have differential rights- connotation. The human rights discourse 
bestows the citizen with a right against the state (government) and makes it a 
mandatory requirement for the state to provide protection of the human rights which 
would be violated in case of displacement. Human rights regime as I would discuss in 
the succeeding sub-section is available to everyone and anyone who is displaced. On 
the other hand, the developmental discourse has no specific legal expectation, instead 
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it is merely a directive principle for state policy. It encourages state to adopt a 
progressive development pathway with the expectation that state would give due care 
in developing environmentally fragile areas. However, more often the developmental 
state is limited to the Urban centres and stimulates out-migration from fragile rural 
areas to more prosper cities.   
2.2.1 Human Rights Discourse 
All displaced persons, whether internal or international, are entitled to the fundamental 
human rights. The reason for displacement or indeed the nature or duration of the 
displacement is immaterial. These rights include the right to life (Art 6, ICCPR; Art 6 
UNCRC); the right to adequate food (Art 11 ICESCR; Art 14 CEDAW; Art 5 CERD); 
the right to water (Arts 11 and 12 ICESCR; Art 14 CEDAW; Art 28 CRPD; Art 24 
CRC); the right to health (Art 12 ICESCR); and the right to shelter (Art 11 ICESCR). 
It has been argued in some places that the right to movement is also a fundamental 
human right, recognised under Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Mcinerney-Lankford, et al., 2011; Zetter, 2011). However, the national 
legislative systems of democratic countries usually provide the guaranteed right to 
freedom of movement only to the citizens and recognised aliens. Thus, undocumented 
migrants or those unable to prove their citizenship status are at a higher risk due to a 
restricted right to movement (Connell, 2015). It begets the question if the rights of 
undocumented aliens and non-citizens are recognised in the case of sudden 
displacement, such as that caused due to floods, cyclones, sea-surges, earthquakes or 
landslides? McAdam (2011) has used the principle of non-refoulment to show that the 
right to the protection of life is an international legal obligation and thus governments 
must respond to people who are fleeing disaster in order to survive. Thus, in the 
absence of a targeted framework at the international or national level for the protection 
of climate change migrants, the human rights framework and the constitutionally 
instituted fundamental rights remain relevant.  
In the Indian context, upholding the international legal norms is considered sacrosanct 
by the judicial system. By virtue of Article 32 of the Constitution of India the Indian 
judiciary is, within its constitutional limits to use the international law, as an 
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authoritative source of legal rights and obligations (Government of India, 1950). As I 
will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 4, the Constitution of India, the Supreme court 
decisions on the scope of the right to life and the international human rights norm 
provide a broad ambit for the narrative framework within which freedom of 
movement, development and compensation for loss of property are ad judicable. These 
legal prescriptions apply to a person displaced due to climate change in a similar 
manner as it would apply to a person displaced due to internal violence or development 
related projects. 
It should be noted briefly that the judicial decision in the Olga Tellis Case7 laid the 
foundation for livelihood to be considered an integral part of the right to life in India 
creating a necessary obligation for the state to provide employment to its citizens. 
Similarly, in Francis Mullin vs. Union Territory of Delhi8 the apex court held that the 
right to adequate shelter was part of the right to life. The fundamental rights framework 
and the legal prescriptions in India sufficiently internalise the international legal norms 
and can provide complementary protection for environmental displacement.  
However, it has been seen that climate change will disproportionately affect those who 
are already at the margins of society (Stern, 2007). Therefore, a pro-active mechanism 
related to disaster risk reduction is an essential element for the mitigation of disaster-
induced forced displacement. Although it is not discernible whether either the human 
rights approach, inclusive of the development approach, or the targeted disaster risk 
reduction policy will in any way reduce the instance of out-migration from 
geographically vulnerable areas, it is argued that the focus should be on the reduction 
of forced and involuntary forms of migration while promoting voluntary migration as 
part of an adaptation strategy.  
2.2.2 Development Discourse 
In the development discourse, disaster risk reduction (DDR) policies are well-
established development strategies that address all forms of hazards at the grass-root 
level (Wisner, et al., 2004). DRR is defined by the UNISDR as ‘the concept and 
                                                             
7 Olga Tellis and Ors. Versus Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., 1985 SCC (3) 545. 
8 Francis C Mullin Versus Administrator Union Territory of Delhi, 981 AIR 746, 1981 SCR (2) 516 
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practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage 
the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, 
lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the 
environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events’ (United Nations Office 
for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2009). DRR policies and strategies view disasters as 
socio-economic and political in origin, reflecting a school of thought established in the 
1970s (Torry, 1978; Hewitt, 1983; Lewis, 1999; Wisner, et al., 2004; Gaillard, et al., 
2007).  
DRR strategist consider the broader social, political, environmental and economic 
environments in which a hazard is situated (Alexander, 2000; Weichselgartner & 
Obersteiner, 2002). The DRR strategies are built around a community’s ability to 
reduce their own disaster risk, and specifically identify those directly impacted by 
hazards (Wisner, et al., 2004). Grassroots strategies are conjoined with top-down 
policies to ensure sustainability of the project (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; White, 
et al., 2005; Fraser, et al., 2006).  
Disaster risk reduction strategies have formed part of the mainstream policies in India 
for over a decade. After the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the Central government of 
India formally adopted targeted legislation – the Disaster Management Act of 2005 – 
with a clear aim of mitigating disaster risks and reducing disaster vulnerability. The 
act has been internalised vertically throughout the governance apparatus in India. 
Thereby it is mandatory for the level of governance to have a clear outline of their 
respective roles in preventing, mitigating and responding to disasters. In the state of 
Assam, this policy has been thoroughly internalised and a disaster management 
authority has been constituted at every district level since 2013.  
I will discuss the structure of these formations in more detail in Chapter 4 and Chapter 
7. However, it should be briefly mentioned here that the state of Assam treats disaster 
management as a critical policy of governance in the state. The Chief Secretary of 
Assam has been a driving force in creating the State Disaster Management Authority 
and ensuring that all the vertical and horizontal departments of Assam incorporate 
disaster management policies for foreseeable hazard situations. For Assam, these 
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foreseeable situations are floods, cyclone winds (locally known as Bordisella), 
earthquakes, landslides, wild-fires and ethnic violence. The Disaster Management Plan 
of the state is a comprehensive document that earmarks the expected response of each 
government agency vertically as well as horizontally. The Districts and cities within 
the state have their own disaster management plans, and most of the village panchayats 
have formulated localised plans with the assistance of the State Disaster Management 
Authority at the time of writing of this thesis. 
However, there has been some reluctance in regard to combining disaster management 
with climate change adaptation strategies. The disaster management as a thematic issue 
of action was formulated in the 1970s and by the time the initial negotiations under the 
UNFCCC process started, disaster management had already been refined in terms of 
the actions, procedures and expected outcomes. Therefore, it has been challenging to 
integrate the distinct sets of actors and institutions at the different levels of structural 
development (Schipper & Pelling, 2006). However, in Assam, the government has 
adopted an ‘all hazards – all agencies approach’, which allows agencies to plan their 
disaster management and climate change adaptation approaches holistically.  
The second problem, which is more relevant to the current thesis, is that disaster 
management strategies are not sufficient to respond to slow-onset climate change 
migration. While the process can be integrated with adaptation to reduce forced 
mobility and provide immediate assistance to those displaced in a situation of hazard, 
it cannot predict or manage gradual displacements, or indeed provide compensation 
for loss of habitat. Therefore, it becomes necessary to integrate disaster management 
approaches with human rights approaches and some form of nationally available 
compensation mechanism. The combination of these policies would act to reduce 
instances of forced mobility, ensure the right to freedom of movement out of a fragile 
ecosystem and provide compensation to people who suffer loss of land and livelihood 
due to climate change-related threats. However, whether a government would utilise 
these synergies between the human rights values, disaster risk reduction strategies and 
climate change migration depend a lot on the way in which migration is conceived by 
national and sub-national entities. As discussed in section 2.1 if a government views 
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climate change migration as a security issue it is more likely to invest in border 
management practices and bipartisan agreements that explicitly target climate change 
refugees. On the other hand, when a country views climate change induced migration 
as a multi-causal developmental issue, the governance system acts to rationalise 
migration as part of the broader welfare and development discourse.  
A downside of treating mobility as part of the development discourse is that the 
prospect of abandonment of the migration governance discourse is high. In the 
development discourse, there are a multitude of synergies that need to be considered 
and these synergies can often compete. The way in which national and sub-national 
actors frame the migration agenda dictates the value placed on different and often 
competing developmental discourses. Referring to Table 1 in section 2.1 of this chapter 
we can expand the government responses based on how they perceive climate 
migration. For example, if Climate Migration is a security issue the state would tend 
to invest in border protection mechanism whereas if the state view climate migration 
as a human security issue they would instead invest in the developmental discourse. 
Table 2 provides an overview of the issue location and policy responses that a 
government may adopt.  
Table 2: Policy formation based on issue location 
Issue location  Explanation Policy response 
Climate 
Migration as a 
Security Issue 
Host country perceive climate 
change migration as a border 
security concern 
Strengthening border protection  
Migrant-sending countries see 
climate change migration as a 
reflection of the threat of 
territorial loss due to sea-level 
rise 
Bipartisan agreement to receive 
migrants entered with 
neighbouring countries 
Climate 
Migration as a 
Human Security 
Issue 
International migration is 
perceived as a development 
deficit in home countries 
Host country provide 
development aid to the migrant 
countries in a bid to reduce 
migrations 
Internal migration is perceived as 
a development deficit 
Governments strategies 
development in geographically 
vulnerable areas in a bid to 
reduce instances of out-migration 
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At this point it is important to reiterate that the debate on climate change migration 
governance is concentrated primarily at an international consultative level. It is not at 
all clear how the sub-national governments are responding to existing climate change 
related migrations and how the international negotiations would in fact translate into 
functional administrative policies at the national and sub-national level. There is a 
considerable gap in the literature regarding administrative responses to those who 
move. There are a few recent studies that have aimed at analysing the response 
operationalisation and changes within the international organizations such as UNHCR, 
IOM and OCHA. However, no such attempts are made at the local level and the sub-
national administration’s perspective is mostly missing from the literature on climate 
change migration.  
The lack of involvement from public policy scholars has led to a patchy understanding 
of the incoherent governmental response towards migrants. While we know that the 
current migration system is flawed due to substantial implementation gaps, we do not 
know why those gaps are there. The general observation is that there is a binary 
relationship between ‘non-precise’ policies and ‘non-working governments’ and thus 
it is necessary to create precise policies and new institutions to respond to the climate 
migration crisis (Biermann & Boas, 2008; Warner, 2011). However, the creation of 
new norms or new institutions does not innately alter the circumstances within which 
the administrative apparatus of governments react. In fact, the new policies are 
implemented through the already existing old institutions and networks of officials 
which are often rigidly set in a pattern of behaviour (Lipsky, 2010). Thus, 
understanding the organisations and their perceptions of climate migration is necessary 
first step towards achieving a positive protection outcome.  
2.3: Administration of Complex Issues 
In the public policy complex, open-ended and intractable problems are ‘wicked 
problems’. These are the areas where both the nature of the problem and the preferred 
solution lie in a fluid space, requiring continuous reconsideration. Pressman and 
Wildavsky (1984) argue that success in solving wicked problems is an elusive notion, 
as the required levels of information, goal-clarity and coordination are not achievable. 
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The problem, as well as its solutions, lie in a shifty domain; and the technical 
approaches overlook the values, perspectives and lived experiences of the stakeholders 
involved in the interventions (Rein, 1976; Schon & Rein, 1995). From the discussion 
on the process and context narrative above, we can see that climate change migration 
is one such wicked problem whose nature and possible solution are not conclusively 
known. The framing of climate change migration is done differently by different 
actors, and despite the visual impact of disasters on human displacement the 
correlation with climate change is not straightforward.   
Rittel and Webber (1973), while discussing the solution to a wicked problem, highlight 
that modern nations are too pluralistic to achieve a clear and agreed solution. Unlike 
the relatively ‘tame’ or ‘benign’ problems of science, which are definable and 
verifiable, the emerging issues in social science are ill-defined and interlinked and rely 
on political judgement and administrative perceptions. Rittle and Webber (1973) 
elaborate on ten characteristics of a wicked problem that may be present in different 
combinations and cause the problem to be wicked. Several scholars have found these 
features to be helpful in explaining the difficulties that arise in the areas of urban 
planning social policy, and environmental and natural resource policy (Allen & Gould, 
1986; Freeman, 2000; Head, 2008). In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the ones 
that are most relevant to climate change related migration. 
The first test of a wicked problem is that the definition and scope of the problem itself 
are contested. In the process narrative of this thesis (section 2.1), I reflected upon the 
nature of climate change migration as a highly contested premise. Most researchers 
have come to accept that climate change induced migration is a multi-causal issue, 
there is no scientific parameters that can determine whether the migration is forced or 
voluntary. Even when a person living in a fragile ecosystem chooses to migrate 
voluntarily, such a decision stems from economic compulsion and a lack of resources 
needed for adaptation and survival (Black, et al., 2008; Bardsley & Hugo, 2010).  
The second test of a wicked problem is that there is no definitive solution (Rittel & 
Webber, 1973). In the context narrative of this thesis (Section 2.2), I discussed how 
the international dialogue on climate change migration is shifting from a security 
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narrative to a development one. There is no readily available consensus on the nature 
of international responsibility towards climate change migrants; or indeed a consensus 
as to what level of administration (international, regional, national or sub-national) 
should frame and implement a protection policy for climate migrants. 
The third test for the wicked problem is that the solutions to wicked problems are not 
true-or-false, but rather good-or-bad (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Unlike in the case of 
poverty reduction policies, where the measurability of poverty can determine the 
soundness of a policy in case of climate change migrants there is no quantitative 
measurement. It is not possible to adopt measurable targets of how many climate 
change migrants must be protected. In this scenario, the only plausible paradigm is a 
qualitative awareness of the stakeholder opinions regarding what is a good or a lousy 
protection measure. The fourth connected characteristic of the wicked problem is that 
there is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem (Rittel & 
Webber, 1973). In case of protection of climate change migration there is no 
immediate or ultimate target, for number of people needing protection and thus there 
cannot be an immediate or ultimate measurable solution.   
The question that naturally arises is, how should these problems be governed?  What 
are the factors that assist in better governance? What are the factors that lead to a deficit 
in governance? If at all, are these factors readily identifiable?  
Typically, the solutions to wicked problems require a trade-off between competing 
values, flexibility, reflexivity, a multi-departmental approach, collaboration and 
resource sharing for success (Kooiman, 1993; Durant & Legge, 2006). The different 
ways in which a wicked problem can be framed strongly determine the treatment and 
solution. The preferred solutions tend to be shaped by the way in which the problems 
are framed or constructed, including the way that leaders and stakeholders mobilise 
values (Fischer, 2003; Jerneck & Olsson, 2011; Schlager, et al., 2011; Peters, 2005). 
For example, if the issue of climate change migration is communicated as a national 
security issue, the relevant policy response will be to identify those groups which are 
‘outsiders’ and enact policies regulating movement of such groups along the 
international borders. Whereas if climate migration is identified as a development issue 
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the policy may lean towards strengthening human security aspects, by adopting 
welfare measures and adaptation laws for increasing resilience to climate change.   
However, it is also seen that the institutions tend to be incremental in implementing 
(and adapting to) a new policy approach (Jones, et al., 1997; Dimitrakopoulos, 2001). 
To minimise shocks and regularise the new policy into the institutional behaviour in a 
seamless manner the organisations try to match their problem-perception to the social 
and political atmosphere of a region (Kaplan, 2008; Hayward, 1976; Norrander, 2000). 
This phenomenon recognises the political ideologies and promotes competitive 
pluralism amongst stakeholders (Bohman, 1998; Wood, 2006).  Bohman, in his 
conceptualisation of deliberative administration, highlights the benefits of free and 
equal participation of all stakeholders, substantial political and procedural equality, 
including equal opportunities to participate in deliberation, to choose the methods of 
decision-making, and to set the agenda (Bohman, p. 16). However, the vast differences 
in social, cultural, and normative perspectives often lead to collective puzzlement and 
no progress (Heclo, 1994, p. 305). Head (2008) has therefore argued that some wicked 
problems can only be solved by a significant shift in attitude and behaviour among 
stakeholders.  
So far, only the process literature on climate change migration (section 2.1) has 
recognised the nested complexity and wickedness in identifying climate change 
migrant. The literature on normative frameworks and institutional responses to climate 
change migration is rudimentary and does not acknowledge the wickedness and multi-
level administrative complexity that migration governance entails. For the existing 
normative literature (context narrative discussed in section 2.2), the national 
governments are the primary stakeholders, and international recognition of climate 
migrants as a category of asylum seekers is the zenith for humanitarian law and legal 
ethics in a warming world.  
Thus, this thesis becomes relevant for its contribution in taking the discussion further 
by deliberating how the profound and complex sub-national governance systems 
influence the level of protection a climate change migrant could receive from its state.   
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2.4: The Indian Paradox: The Elephant in the Room 
At this point, I would like to reflect on the Indian government’s perception of climate 
change migration. Every year millions of people are displaced due to hydro-
metrological disasters, primarily in the states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Assam (EM-
DAT, n.d.). However, unlike the neighbouring countries of Bangladesh, Maldives and 
Nepal, India’s participation in the academic or policy debate on climate change 
migration has been insignificant. The Indian government has not raised the issue of 
climate change migration at the UNFCCC, it has not engaged with the high-level 
consultative process under the Nansen Initiative;9 and it has not held any on-record 
conversation with either the International Organisation for Migration, United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees, Office of Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs, or 
International Labour Organisation.10  
Ingrid Boas discusses India's absence from the international discussion on climate 
change migration in her doctoral work. She asserts that while the Indian government 
is not occupied with the concern of cross-border migration, it does consider internal 
climate migration as an issue of human and livelihood security (Boas, 2014). Boas, in 
her work, reports that the Indian officials consider the securitisation of climate change 
migration to be a western construct. Climate migration debate are thus not motivated 
by the issue of human or migrant well-being but instead are used as a tool in the 
divisive politics of negotiations at the UNFCCC. India feels cajoled into assuming 
binding mitigation responsibility due to its geographical proximity to potential 
migrant-sending nations, like Bangladesh and Maldives (Boas, 2014).  
My interview with the Joint Secretary to the Ministry of Environment and the chief 
UNFCCC negotiator of India, Mr Ravi Shankar Prasad, reveals a similar position. The 
Ministry of Environment and Climate Change in India does not consider migration to 
be an environmental issue, but rather an internal human security agenda. And when 
asked to identify the appropriate ministry, references were made to the local state 
                                                             
9 In a private email communication with Professor Walter Kalin, who chaired the Nansen Initiative, I was 
informed that the invitation to engage in the South-Asian consultations had been sent to the Ministries in India, 
but no response was received.  
10 These UN organisations are at the forefront of the climate change migration debate due to their experience in 
handling varied forms of forced and voluntary migration.  
 
47 Understanding Climate Migrations and its Governance Paradigm 
government, and the Ministry of Rural Development (Jt. Sec. Ravi Shankar Prasad, 
2016).  
Despite having a significant international migration corridor with Bangladesh, the 
central government of India does not treat climate change migration from Bangladesh 
as a security threat. In its bilateral agreement with Bangladesh, the issue of ‘irregular 
immigration’ is a trifling political narrative; it is never wholly denied nor fully 
accepted by the Central Government of India. Instead the focus of India-Bangladesh 
relationship is the partnership in the Bay of Bengal and the geopolitical connection to 
the ASEAN region (Kumar, 2018; Ministry of External Affairs, India, 2016; 
Chatterjee, 2016). India has also assumed the role of a development-partner of 
Bangladesh. And for the Ministry of Defence in India, international security concerns 
on India-Bangladesh border are triggered by the rise of Islamic extremism in 
Bangladesh, not by environmental migration (Ministry of Defense, India, 2017).  
On the other hand, India classifies internal migration caused by slow-onset 
environmental stress as a livelihood issue, while that caused by sudden-onset disasters 
as a humanitarian relief issue. In Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis I will discuss the 
detailed provisions of initiatives adopted by the Central government of India, namely 
the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, The Disaster 
Management Act of 2005 and The Indira Awas Yojana (IAY – Rural Housing 
Scheme). These schemes were legislated with the intention of providing guaranteed 
livelihood opportunities, mitigating and managing disasters, and providing affordable 
housing. The policy documents do not have any direct mention of governing (or 
responding to) climate migrations. However, the administrative documentation and 
rules of procedure within these policies, prioritize ‘flood-victims’, ‘erosion-affected 
families’, ‘landless households’, etc for implementation. Furthermore, the government 
of India and the state of Assam have accepted explicitly in its national communication 
to the UNFCCC secretariat (2nd National Communication, 2012) and in the interviews 
conducted during this research, the synergies the above stated programs have with 
managing climate induced mobility (Jt. Sec. Ravi Shankar Prasad, 2016; Jt. Sec. Jishnu 
Baruha, 2016; Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi, 2016). 
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The state in India believes that a climate change migrant is a dynamic actor who, and 
as an Indian citizen, has the freedom of movement, residence and gainful employment. 
‘Targeted schemes like MGNREGA and IAY are to assist rural communities and those 
below the poverty line to (enable them to) overcome their vulnerability to natural 
hazards, including climate change-related hazards. We (the state) have always been 
aware of the vulnerability... today it is climate change, before it was water pollution… 
common people in the country depend on the ecosystem, even today, so if it gets 
affected, people get affected… we (the state) try to help within its means’ (Chief 
Minister Tarun Gogoi, 2016). 
Based on my initial assessment of the Indian state it appears that the state recognises 
several layers of migration. There is the voluntary adaptive migrant who is a dynamic 
actor and require minimal support from the state. The state as a paternalist entity would 
assume the enabling role and provide welfare support in case such is asked from the 
citizen. Then there is the question of visible forced displacement of the people 
migrating due to floods or earthquakes or draughts. These migrants are survival 
migrants – victim of circumstances – and the state holds a benevolent duty to protect. 
Thus, the process of relief becomes relevant in managing forced migrations. Then there 
are displacements caused due to loss of land and permanent damage to place of 
habitation post-disaster. These migrations are permanent and they require support 
beyond temporary relief. Here the state expects its administrators to use ingenious 
approach to prioritise those who have suffered losses and are rendered homeless or 
landless. And finally there are those who are trapped in their ecosystem and can not 
afford to move out of their misery. These are invisible people whom the state is 
genuinely worried about but finds challenging to help either due to political or 
economic constraints.  
The table 3 provides an overview of legislative policies relevant to each layer of 
migration within India. These policies are not exhaustive but relevant for the current 
thesis. For example the current research does not take into account the Kisan Bima 
Yojana (Agricultural Insurance Scheme) and thus, misses out on a financial 
opportunity which allows Indian farmers to be dynamic actors instead of victims of 
their circumstance.However, it is also well worth stating that while Kisan Bima Yojana 
has been in circulation since the very beginning of Indian democracy its penetration 
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into villages has always been shoddy. And despite a growing body of research which 
support strengthening the crop and farmer insurance schemes there is a lack of 
stakeholder interest from the farmers, the state as well as private entities to implement 
the schemes.  
Table 3: Policy intervention based on Migration type 




Households living in 
fragile ecosystem employ 
various form of cyclic, 
and permanent migrations 
to diversify livelihood 
options 
Livelihood security Art. 19 Constitution 




Temporary relocation due 





CM Relief Fund 
Permanent displacement 
due to loss of habitat 
Compensation for 
loss and damage 
State level policy on 
compensation 
Evacuation Temporary assisted 
migration out of disaster 
zone for trapped 
population 
Relief  State and Central 
level policy on 
assistance 
Entrapment Households are trapped in 
a collapsing ecosystem 
with no economic 
resource to move out of 
their fragile ecosystem 
Assisted and Planned 
Relocation   
 







have the power to 
initiate the 
relocation process 
under the Land 




2.5: Differential Dilemma of Assam State 
As climate change impacts are non-uniform, some states in India are more 
at risk due to their high vulnerability to climate change. Ravindranath et 
al. (2011) conducted a village-level analysis of the vulnerability of the 
north-east of India. It is the only available comprehensive study that has 
determined the vulnerability, through ecosystem dependence and 
economic capacity, in the region. The study concludes that the state of 
Assam has a high to very high overall current vulnerability towards shifts 
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in weather patterns throughout all the districts, except for the districts of 
Cachar and Karim Ganj in the Barak Valley, where the overall current 
vulnerability to climate change is low. The severity of their vulnerability 
is due to the states’ high dependence on the ecosystem, including the 
dependence on forests for produce and on monsoon rains, for agricultural 
activities (Map 1 below). 
Map 3: Current overall vulnerability in the State of Assam  
 
Scale: very low (0) to very high (5) 
Source: Ravindranath et al., 2011 
Subsequently, several recent studies have highlighted the climate vulnerability of 
Assam, by highlighting the impact of climate change on its hydro-metrological cycles 
and flood pattern (Das, et al., 2009; Bhatt, et al., 2013), and analysing the effect of 
environment on the socio-economic conditions of Assam (Watmough, et al., 2013; 
Watmough, et al., 2016). While these studies have not consider migration scenarios it 
can be seen that cyclic migrations due to socio-economic conditions (which are 
 
51 Understanding Climate Migrations and its Governance Paradigm 
complexly linked to environmental changes) is unusually high in Assam (Rajan & 
Bhagat, 2017).  
The 1991 census of India provides details of migrations occurring due to natural 
calamities like floods and droughts and places Assam as the state with the most 
displacements within India. While the national average was 5 in every 1000 people, 
the state of Assam had a displacement rate of 51 individuals in every 1000. The 
subsequent census in 2001 does not provide data on migration due to natural 
calamities, and the complete set of 2011 data on migration (D-series) had not yet been 
released at the time of writing this thesis. The 2001 data for the state of Assam, 
however, shows that 3% of the population born in Assam have moved elsewhere in 
India, while 25% of the people born in Assam have migrated within the state.11 The 
state census series of 2001 classifies the primary reason for migration as ‘other’ 
(39.5%) and marriage (37%). Purely economic migration relating to work/employment 
and business accounts for only 7%.12 
Migration classified as ‘other’ in 2001 census is primarily a combination of 
displacements due to natural disaster and those due to group-identity violence (Deputy 
Commissioner Kamrup (M), 2016). It is also worth reminding that the linkage between 
environmental disasters and migrations are complexly constructed in the State. The 
security study uses the state of Assam as an example of region that have group-based 
violence due to environmental collapse (Swain, 1996; Reuveny, 2007).  There is a 
strong political narrative that most of these migrations were in fact triggered by 
resource marginalisation and the forced environmental degradation of areas habituated 
by Bengali Hindus in the Sylhet region of Bangladesh (Van Schendel, 2004). Those 
who  migrated are identified as illegal settlers in India, whose status as Indian citizens 
is questionable. I will discuss this in more detail in chapter 7. However, to briefly 
summarise here, the political parties in Assam strongly associate the term migration 
with alleged ‘illegal Bangladeshi’ migration, which has resulted in a change in the 
                                                             
11 Calculated from census series table D1- migrant population enumeration based on place of birth. Census data 
2001, available at http://www.censusindia.gov.in/DigitalLibrary/MFTableSeries.aspx  
12 Calculated from D-series data, table D3- Migrants by Place of Last Residence, Duration of Residence and 
Reason for Migration. Census Data 2001, available at 
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/DigitalLibrary/MFTableSeries.aspx  
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state’s political demography. In the security studies literature, Assam is projected as a 
state facing conflict, due to resource-driven group conflicts and the problems of 
environmental disasters, like flood erosion, which only add fuel to this conflict. 
 While there is no reliable documentary evidence13 to suggest that migrations in Assam 
are from Bangladesh, this cannot be dismissed entirely, as Bangladesh and India do 
share one of the most significant international migration corridors (Al Faruque, 2013; 
Kumar, 2006; Ghosh, 2016).  Recalling the earlier discussions in section 2.3 of this 
chapter, migrations in Assam are a wicked problem, the solution to which is highly 
contested. Owing to the difficulty in determining a uniform definition for a wicked 
problem it is likely that the perceptions of the central government may not completely 
align with the perceptions of the state government or its functionaries. Also recalling 
the limited discussion in section 2.4, the central government of India perceives the 
problem of migration to be a developmental issue and thus that is the primary direction 
that the sub-national state government must adopt. However, this study has found that 
the understanding of the state of Assam regarding climate change migration has layers 
of developmental, political and security issues.  
As I will be discussing in more details in the later chapters, the Assam Movement 
forms the political landscape of the state. The Movement which was charged by the 
issues of identity and belonging saw Bengali-speaking ethnic and religious minorities 
as outsiders and a threat to Assamese language and culture (Van Schendel, 2004; 
Misra, 1987). The decade of 1980s when the Movement was at its prime there were 
violent disruptions, massacres, accession demands for a free Assam, and imposition of 
President rule in the state (Barpujari, 2011; George, 1994). The Movement led to 
Assam Acord of 1985 which was a peace agreement between the Indian Central 
Government and the leaders of Assam Movement (GoI, 1985; Choudhury, 1985). The 
promises made in the Accord led to formation of Autonomous Territorial Councils in 
tribal dominated districts, enactment of Immigration Detention (and Deportation) Act 
                                                             
13 In Chapter 7 of this thesis I have questioned the systematic flaws in determining ‘illegal foreigners’ who have 
allegedly migrated from Bangladesh. Considering the structural faults and procedural errors, it cannot be 
authoritatively said that people are migrating illegally across India-Bangladesh border. At the same time, the fact 
that the border had non-existent physical barriers until 2012 also make it one of the most fluid border-regions in 
the world.   
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and a continued discounting on issues of citizenship, identity and belonging in the state 
(Baruah, 2009; Singh, 1984; Roy & Singh, 2009; Nath, 2003). 
Over the years the identity struggles have become more fluid on religious and ethnic 
lines in deciding of who is an ‘outsider’. In Chapter 7 of my thesis I would be 
discussing the irregularity in determination of citizenship rights and how it impacts 
communities right to move out of fragile ecosystems. It is well-worth mentioning here 
that up till 2016 the existing migration narrative in the state oscillated between blaming 
the ‘ethnic Bengali’ to blaming the ‘Bengali Muslims’ for the state’s deficiencies in 
governance. However, in May 2016, just after the completion of the fieldwork for this 
stud, the Hindu nationalist party – Bhartiya Janata Party – came into power in Assam 
and this political shift can reflect negatively towards the protection response provided 
to Muslim minorities, irrespective of their Bengali or Assamese ethnicity.  
2.6: Multi-Level Climate Governance and Place for Climate 
Migration Policy 
In the last few years there has been a rapid increase in the number of scientific studies 
undertaking the vulnerability assessment of several states in India. These studies have 
highlighted that a continued high dependence on environment for food and livelihood 
activities make India particularly vulnerable to climate variability and changes 
(Brenkert & Malone, 2005). The Data-sets on migration due  to natural hazards puts 
India as one of the most displaced country with almost 2.3 million people displaced 
every year due to disasters (International Displacement Monitoring Center, 2017; 
International Displacement Monitoring Center, 2017a; EM-DAT, n.d.). 
Despite India’s record of disaster induced displacement and sensitivity to climate 
change, climate change related migration or disaster induced displacement is not 
directly confronted in the National Climate Change Action Plan. The plan, which was 
adopted in 2008, does not mention migration, displacement or mobility governance 
but instead lays out eight action areas with a focus on energy security and vulnerability 
reduction while promoting sustainable habitats and forestry management practices 
(Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change, 2008). This absence of a direct 
reference to mobility in the National Climate Action Plan is in line with the senior 
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bureaucratic attitude that migration is a developmental issue (discussed in section 2.4). 
Similarly, in its Second National Communication to UNFCCC in April 2012, the 
Indian government considered increased climate change related mobility to be the 
result of the developmental deficit, and a manifestation of the existing economic 
vulnerability in rural areas (Ministry of Forest, 2012, p. 169). 
It is well worth noting here that the academic debate on climate change in Indian 
context is irregularly focused on the question of energy security. As I stated in my 
introductory chapter, the fact that India has a substantial collective carbon footprint 
and significantly high climate vulnerability owing to its small per-capita emission, 
makes Indian policy on climate change a battle-ground for developmental trade-off 
and competing mitigation priorities (Atteridge, et al., 2012; Dubash, 2013; Vihma, 
2011). There is a considerable concern about India’s developmental trajectory and the 
impact it may have on the global climate budget leading to a robust international 
pressure for pursuing a low-carbon growth (Raghunandan, 2012; Thaker & 
Leiserowitz, 2014). This focus on sustainable growth has made India’s energy sector 
and the policies on energy security as crucial area of policy concern. Subsequently, a 
rich cohort of academic and policy literature evaluating India’s energy landscape and 
the potential for low-energy sustainable growth is available (Sathaye, et al., 2006; 
Revi, 2008; Ravindranath, et al., 2009; Ravindranath, et al., 2011). These studies focus 
on energy-pathways, multi-level energy governance and the need to further understand 
the role of sub-national and non-state actors in India’s sustainable energy growth 
(Jorgensen, et al., 2015; Beermann, et al., 2016; Jorgensen, et al., 2015). At the same 
time the concerns regarding vulnerability, security and mobility are clustered together 
in writings on adaptation, resilience development and mainstreaming climate 
vulnerability into the national policy agenda (Ravindranath, et al., 2012; O’Brien, et 
al., 2004).  
In the event of no uniform national or state policy on climate migration, the primary 
burden of managing climate change mobility falls on multiple vertically and 
horizontally placed institutional actors in charge of developmental and disaster risk 
reduction programs. I say development and disaster risk reduction plans because the 
Central Indian government frames the issue of climate change migration as something 
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‘within the governance scope of existing developmental and disaster risk reduction’ 
strategies (Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi, 2016; Jt. Sec. Ravi Shankar Prasad, 2016). 
While the academic scholars in the field of climate change have not yet come to 
evaluate the operationalisation of these development programs, there is a rich body of 
work in the form of bureaucratic and regional ethnographies which informs us about 
the execution of the developmental programs in the sub-national setting.  
Two noteworthy work on Indian state ethnography emerged at the time I was 
developing my work. Akhil Gupta released his book ‘Red Tape ‘detailing his 
ethnographic adventures from Bidoli district of Uttar Pradesh (Gupta, 2012); And 
Nayanika Mathur converted her ethnographical study of sub-national bureaucracy in 
the state of Himachal Pradesh into a book monograph titled Paper Tiger (Mathur, 
2016).   
Gupta starts his work on the premise that the Government of India has a genuine desire 
to eradicate poverty (Gupta, 2012, p. 6). Based on the enormous institutional and 
budgetary commitments to poverty reduction strategies in India he suggests that in 
practice there is anything but a condemnation of the poor to a bare life status.  This 
starting proposition of Gupta has strongly influenced my own methodological choice 
of accepting that the State in India is concerned about climate migrations although they 
may project this concern in varied choice of words and definitional forms which do 
not entirely correspond to the typologies adopted by the international academics 
discussing climate migration. I do not see why the government of India would not like 
to assist masses of people and summarily reject their status as victims of climate 
change. At the same time, I am also skeptical about the nature and uniformity of 
protection received by those who migrate due to climate change.  
However, as Gupta notes in his interpretation of the concept of homo scare (Agamben, 
1998), despite states efforts, millions are still condemned to perpetual poverty. Gupta 
describes this phenomenon as – structural violence – where the State despite its own 
intention to provide a meaningful political and social participation to its citizens in 
effect condemns them to continued poverty and early death. Through the book, Gupta 
narrates a rich account of democratic functioning in India, and how these are inflected 
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by location, gender, caste and class in the ordinary and everyday street-level 
administration. He gives a descriptive account of the purpose of government forms, 
the filing systems, and the entire process of listening, translating and transforming 
what the poor say.  Gupta takes the onus of responsibility away from the individual 
bureaucratic actor within the state and rationalises the absence (or bare presence) of 
the state by accepting the logic of dispersed-responsibility. Gupta’s argument here 
relies on the lack of internal coherence and agencyfication within the administration, 
he treats the bureaucracy as a disaggregated array of institutions that operate at 
different levels, in multiple locations, and with diverse agendas. And because of its 
disaggregated quality, any perspective on the state is necessarily partial (Gupta, 2012). 
Therefore, it becomes relevant to study governance in India at a localised level where 
one can gather some semblance of wholeness from an otherwise disaggregated partial 
state.  
In a similar vein, Mathur in her ethnographic rendition of street-level bureaucracy in 
India reminds us that the reality of laws is hostage not only to specialisation (such as 
assigning specific agendas) but also to banalisation (such as everyday paper filing). 
Mathur evaluates the operationalisation of two of the government’s ‘sophisticated’ and 
‘specialised’ schemes – the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Guarantee Act of 2005 
and the Wildlife Protection Act of 1972 and highlights the distinction between the 
‘State life of Law’ and the ‘real life of law’. The book brings forward the argument 
that a new, sophisticated, and specialised legal system (in this case MGNREGA) may 
not actually deliver the expectations pinned upon it by its upholders. And it is 
ultimately the street-level translation and synchronisation of the new legal instrument 
amidst the existing legal and social norms, which will determine the success of a law 
(Mathur, 2016).  
While the ethnographic examination of government and government institutions at a 
multi-level of governance is an opulent academic field, such studies have not yet found 
its way in understanding governance response to climate change. This is, as I 
mentioned before mainly because of a feeling that there ‘must be’ an international 
commitment towards movement which respects the principles of ‘equity’ and 
‘common but differential responsibility’. However, while obsessing for international 
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cooperation, the focus on the reality of protection and sub-national translations of the 
laws and legal systems is lost. The current work as I would come to show is a step 
towards finding these translations. While not being an ethnographer I could not boast 
the work to be a bureaucratic ethnography, it does provide a necessary starting point 
of evaluating state’s perception, presence and translations in geographical spaces 
which are highly vulnerable to climate change. 
2.7: Research Gaps 
India is one of the most internally displaced countries (International Displacement 
Monitoring Center, 2017a) and has a considerable stake in terms of climate change 
migration. The IDMC estimates that annually close to 2.3 million people are displaced 
in India due to disasters. Although these numbers are only estimations, it does 
highlight the enormity of the problem. But we know very little about how India 
perceives let alone manages the mobility of its citizens. It is quite evident that most of 
the discussions on climate change migration governance is fragmented, ill-defined and 
focused towards building international norms of protection. The attempts to involve 
national governments have been limited, for example, the Nansen Initiative (which is 
the only regional high-level consultative process) misses out on inputs from essential 
countries like China, India and the USA which are not partners in the discussions.  
On the other hand, climate change literature on India is heavily concentrated towards 
the discussion on energy security and sustainable energy growth of the nation. The 
limited academic discussion on India’s response to climate mobility, and Indian 
government’s attitude towards migration in the UNFCCC climate negotiation process 
gives a broad picture that Indian government at the Center favors a multi-causal 
perception of climate displacements and views the issue as one following within its 
development and disaster risk reduction goals (Section 2.4). However, beyond this 
limited bird’s eye view of the central government mentality we know nothing about 
how the sub-national government respond to climate migrations already manifesting 
in their jurisdictions.  
Three areas come up for analysis: (a) how do the senior bureaucrats working at the 
sub-national level frame the issue? The framing of the problem is essential in choosing 
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the most appropriate policies from the wide range of policies available. As stated 
earlier, the government of India frames climate change displacement as a development 
issue. However, to synergise development policies with the response to climate change 
migration, the framing at the central level needs to be communicated and deliberated 
at the state level. The senior bureaucratic officers employed by the Indian central 
government are responsible for implementing the national policy agenda. Their 
perception of climate change and climate change related displacement is thus essential 
to understand how the state responds. (b) The second area for analysis is, how does the 
sub-national political behaviour impact the institutional behaviour on the issue? 
Responses to wicked problems are affected by value judgements and political 
ideologies exert a strong influence over the value judgements of a society. Therefore, 
some problems are so complex that their solution may require a complete shift in 
political and social perceptions. (c) And finally, what role does the demography, the 
primary stakeholder, play in this whole process? Do those who are at the margins of 
development and most affected by climate change have a choice to make voluntary 
decisions? Or to change the political course? Or to influence the institution and senior 
bureaucracy that are instituted to serve them.  
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Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
Studies in the field of climate migration, climate vulnerability, climate change 
adaptation and disaster risk reduction emphasise the need to overcome the knowledge 
gap regarding how governments function and what factors contribute to a 
comprehensive and positive response (Warner, et al., 2012; Jäger, et al., 2009, p. 70; 
Foresight, 2011). However, the knowledge about the institutional handling of this issue 
is limited and lack engagement with the public policy institutions at the national and 
sub-national level. My thesis is a step towards filling this knowledge gap. By engaging 
with bureaucratic officers and senior political leaders who are at the forefront of 
response needed by climate change migrants I bring pioneering methodologies and 
operational strategies to the pool of knowledge. I further evaluate these strategies for 
their effective implementable and replicable function and I identify problem areas 
which lead to protection gaps.  
3.1: Research Approach 
At the beginning of this thesis, I broadly defined Climate change migration as distress 
or adaptive migration caused by hydro-metrological events that are exacerbated due to 
climate change. These migrations can be temporary, cyclic or permanent and can 
involve a short or long distance. During the field work and subsequently while writing 
up I treated climate change migration as a wicked problem that requires constant 
deliberation about the nature of the problem and the appropriate solution, within a 
space that is perpetually negotiated between competing paradigms. The treatment of 
climate migration as a wicked problem allowed a more open approach towards 
accepting bureaucratic formulation and perception of the issue at hand. It allowed me 
to move beyond the definitional aspect of climate change and migration linkage and 
accept sub-national terminology, understanding and perception of the problem. For 
example, the term migrant having a negative political connotation in Assam pushes 
the governments to use a colloquial expression such as ‘flood-victims’ (Bard Pidit in 
Hindi) or untenured farmer (Kachhi Maati Kisaan)  to describe families displaced due 
to flood and flood-erosion. At the same time, the approach also presented the 
dichotomy of accepting someone as ‘poor helpless victim of displacement’ while 
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asserting at the same time ‘the dynamic nature of the migrant community’, often within 
the same administrative complex.  
As the concern of the thesis is to analyse climate migration governance from a public 
policy perspective and examine why there are inconsistent protection outcomes, the 
first step is to identify a clear research question. For the present study, the research 
question is: What factors influence the variations in the protection offered by the 
government to climate change migrants? The primary question can be unpacked into 
sub-questions that seek to answer (1) the technical question – what are the strategies 
adopted by governmental institutions to respond to climate change-induced migration? 
- and (2) the analytical question – why is there a difference in the degree of protection 
offered to climate change migrants? These questions contribute towards deepening and 
widening of the existing discourse on climate change induced migration by focusing 
on how the governments respond to existing cases of climate migration. 
3.2: Geographical description of the study site  
Of the reasons explained in section 1.3 and 2.5 earlier I choose Assam as the area for 
my field inquiry. Within Assam there are two river basins – the Brahmaputra River 
basin and the Baska river basin. I choose the Brahmaputra river basin due to its 
morphology, geographical vulnerability and higher plurality of demographic and 
political interests. Brahmaputra is a sedimentary basin that has unstable banks and high 
episodes of river braiding.14 The river morphology is characterised by a shallow basin 
with plenty of tectonic activity and frequent formation of river islands. The river 
islands though highly fragile are also very fertile in nature and are inhabited by a 
floating population. Some of the larger river islands like Majuli and Bhashayani Char 
have survived over decades and have housed permanent settlers in their centres. The 
people living on the river banks and island banks regularly migrate to nearby village 
centres for safety during the floods or to diversify their livelihood opportunities.   
                                                             
14 River braiding is a natural characteristic of some rivers that have lots of small channels and continually split and 
join. These are called braided rivers. Braided rivers are wide but shallow and are formed on fairly steep slopes with 
easily erodible river banks. 
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District Selection 
District is the smallest comprehensive unit of administration in India. Districts are 
divided into Revenue circles (for purpose of revenue collection), Developmental 
Blocks (for purpose of project implementation), Panchayat (to democratize decision 
making and implementation agenda), and Sadar (for the purpose of civil adjudication). 
The revenue circles, blocks and panchayats are usually overlapping and inconsistant 
in their jurisdictional boundaries. For example two revenue circles may share certain 
villages under a Panchayat or Developmental Block. Or an Anchalik Panchayat can 
be spread across two different (at times partial) development blocks. However, a 
district is a consistant jurisdictional entity with supervisory and managerial power of 
all the revenue circles, blocks, panchayats and sadar divisions within its geographical 
boundary (GoI, n.d.; Administrative Reform Commission of India, 2009). The districts 
are headed by District Commissioners (also called Deputy Commissioners in some 
states).15 The District Commissioners (hereinafter DC) are members of either the State 
Civil Service (elevated usually towards the end of their State Civil Service career to 
the position of Deputy Commissioner) or they are recruited throught Indian 
Admisinitrative Service(IAS) cohort and elevated in their 3rd or 4th year of service as 
Deputy Commissioner. The State selection cadre is open only to the citizens who have 
a domicile in the state, and thus state cadre Deputy commissioners are usually those 
born and raised in the state. While the Deputy Commissioners appointed through the 
IAS cohort can be an Indian citizen from any state of India. The Deputy commissioners 
are incharge of planning, monitoring, supervision and adjudication of developmental 
policies. They are also responsible for delegated decision making by framing rules, 
procedures, and by-laws in delivering legislative mandates (Constitution of India, Art. 
253-264). 
I selected eight districts based on multiple criteria such as geographical and 
demographic parity, religious and ethnic distribution across the State. The district 
selection was also influenced by the personal profiles of the deputy commissioner of 
the districts. The intention was to maintain a parity between administrative division 
                                                             
15 Increasingly Deputy Commissioners are being referred to as Chief Executive Officer, especially in connection 
to new institutional projects like Smart Cities or Digital India project.  
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governed by officers appointed through the all India Administrative Service (IAS) 
cohort and those promoted from the State Civil Service Cohort. This was done to 
understand if the IAS officers exhibit a pan-Indian outlook against a (assumed) state-
centred outlook of the state personals. The table below provides an overview of 
selected districts.  
Two changes were made during the field work from the initial plan - The district of 
Barpet was replaced by Chirrang due to the non-availability of the D.C. in Barpeta and 
the district of Bongaigaon was added (as the 8th district) due to internal migration of 
the Rajbangsi Assamese community from Chirrang to Bongaigaon. An administrative 
change occurred during the field work. The Revenue circle of South Salmara in Dhubri 
District was converted into a full district of South Salmara-Manikchar vide notification 
no. GAG (B) 27/2005/262 of 15th January 2016. And Majuli which was a revenue 
circle of Jorhat district during the time of this field work was also converted into full 
district on 16th August 2016 by notification no. GAG (B) 27/2005/PWI/59. However, 
due to administrative overlap in creation of a new district and its operationalisation the 
changes do not cause a deviation in the result.  
All the selected districts exhibit different levels of flood vulnerability and resilience 
capacities. In the remainder of this section I reflect upon the aggregated flood 
vulnerability and inundation of the eight selected districts by using flood vulnerability 
maps generated from Bhuvan GIS software using Flood Hazard data for the State of 
Assam. The Bhuvan software provides a pre-populated map data which was collected 
and aggregated by the National Remote Sensing Centre of the Indian Space Research 
Organisation. I combine the aggregated map data with qualitative explanation of the 
district vulnerability recorded during my own survey of the districts. 
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Dhemaji Mr. Victor Carpenter. 
Elevated to DC office 
from State Cadre. 
Originally from 
Khasi Garo hill 
region of Assam 
State.  
Retired from service 
in 2017 





Jorhat Mr. Vishal Solanki, 
IAS. From 
Maharashtra State 
assigned to Assam 
cadre. Mr. Solanki 
was transferred as 
Secretary to the Chief 
Minister in 2016 and 
in 2017 his request 
for deputation in 
home state of 
Maharashtra was 
approved 
1.09 96 2 2 13 
Assamese, 
Hindi 




In 2016 was 
transferred on a 
lateral position in 
state secretariat. In 
2017 was allowed 
deputation in Union 
Territory Cadre on 
marriage grounds 




























IAS. Originally from 








Chirrang Mr. Rupak 
Majumdar, ACS. 
Originally from 
Assam. In 2016 was 
transferred to 
secretarial position in 
Dispur 
0.48 67 23 10 37 
Assamese, 
Bodo 
Bongaigaon Mr. Bishwajith Pegu, 
IAS. Originally from 
Dhemaji district of 
Assam.  




Goalpara Mr. VKV Srinivasan, 
IAS. Originally from 
Andhra Pradesh. On 
Deputation to Central 
Ministry of Health 
since 2016 




Dhubri Mr. Nazirul Islam, 
ACS. Originally from 
lower Assam region. 
In 2017 retired from 
service 




Source: Census, 2011; Department of Personnel, GoI 
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Legend explanation for the maps 
The flood hazard atlas aggregates satellite data over a period of 18 year (1998 to 2015) 
by extracting flood inundation imagery and layering them together to provide an 
aggregated image. Each layer represents maximum inundation caused in a one-year 
period. Based on the returning period of flood and internal variability of the flood 
inundation a hazard index was created which maps the whole state into five flood zones 
– very low, low intensity, moderate, high and very high intensity (National Remote 
Sensing Center, ISRO, 2016). The following table provides a detail of Flood hazard 
classification as used in the flood hazard maps: 
Table 5: Flood Hazard Classification 
Vulnerability Number of years the area was subjected to flood inundation between 
1998 and 2015 
Very low 1 – 4 times (in a period of 18 years) 
Low 5 – 8 times 
Moderate 9 – 12 times 
High 13 – 15 times 
Very High 16 – 18 times (almost every year) 
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Dhemaji 
The district of Dhemaji exhibit a zone I flood ranking. 46% of the total land area in the 
district is susceptible to frequent episodes of flood. Chang ghar (raised houses) are built 
on bamboo silts throughout the district as a response towards annual inundation. 
Traditional housing architecture of the district is known to enhance the flood resilience of 
the inhabitants. The following map represent the aggregated flood vulnerability of 
Dhemaji. It is worth noting that there is one national highway and a wide-gauge train line 
connecting Dhemaji to the rest of Assam. The national highway no. 52 passes through 
Gogamukh in northern part of the Subansari river; the state highway 22 joins Dhemaji 
district to Jorhat via the Majuli island. And the train line passes through the middle of the 
Subansari river as shown in the map. Both the highways and the rail-route are highly prone 
to flood inundation, flood damage, and erosion that limits the accessibility to Dhemaji.   
Map 4: Aggregated Flood Vulnerability Index, Dhemaji 
 
        
 
In terms of absolute aggregated vulnerability of the district the Assam Flood Atlas has 
estimated 36 villages with a high to very high flood vulnerability, 63 villages are classified 
Gogamukh (neighbouring 
Subansari river)  
Highway 22, entering from Majuli 
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as moderate flood hazard risk, and 159 villages exhibit a low to very low vulnerability on 
flood hazard. The Map 2b shows the total flood inundation in Dhemaji District during 
peak flood. 
Map 4b: Flood Inundation Map, Dhemaji 
 
Source Map 4 and 4b: Flood Hazard Atlas of Assam, 2016 (Maps are not to scale) 
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Jorhat 
The district of Jorhat is one of the oldest trading metropolis centre in the north-east of 
India. The district is structurally more advanced compared to other districts of Assam and 
boast a thriving education and cultural scene. Jorhat has also been home to few of the 
famous north-eastern political thinkers, freedom fighters, poets, and artist. The (now 
previous) Chief Minister of the State (Governing from 2002-2016) Shri Tarun Gogoi is 
from Jorhat and represents the Titabar constituency in the district. While the current Chief 
Minister Sarbanand Sonowal also hails from the Majuli island which was until 2017 a part 
of Jorhat District.  Despite its flood vulnerability, Jorhat due to its continued importance 
as a trading centre is one of the migrant-receiving region in this study. The map below 
depicts the aggregated vulnerability of the district  
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The Flood Hazard Atlas of 2011, list 109 villages lying in a high to very high Flood 
vulnerability index. A key concern for the Jorhat area is the complete inundation of Majuli 
Island (A UNESCO site) and related erosion leading to loss of territory, biodiversity and 
culture. Majuli Island has over 65 fully functional Sutaras (old-style cultural houses 
representing different ethnic communities), it is estimated that at the current rate of 
inundation and erosion 43 of the historic Sutaras can be wiped out of their existence 
causing a loss of history and culture. The second major concern of the district is the 
continued survival of biodiversity in the Kaziranga National Park which is a reserved 
forest area. The map below exhibits peak flood inundation in the district.  
Map 5b: Total Inundation Map, Jorhat 
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Morigaon 
District of Morigaon is one of the most severely effected districts in Assam with 1/3rd of 
the total land area of the district falling into high to very high flood vulnerability index. 
Flood erosion in the Lahorighat Revenue Circle in the district has affected approximately 
108 villages leading to a critical problem of forced displacement and unauthorized land-
grabbing in the district and its surrounding regions.  
Map 6: Aggregated Flood Vulnerability, Morigaon District  
  
The National Highway connecting Marigaon to Kamrup Metro is a spectacle of illegal 
land-occupation by households which were displaced due to erosion and found little to no 
state assistance in relocation. The Map 4b below shows the extent of peak inundation in 
the district.  
Map 6b: Annual Flood Inundation, Morigaon 
 
Source Map 6 and 6b: Flood Hazard Atlas, Assam 2016 
 
71 Research Methodology 
Kamrup Metro 
Kamrup Metro is primarily an Urban district hosting the Guwahati Municipal Corporation 
(the only designated Municipality in Assam), the state capital at Dispur, and an upcoming 
Smart City under the phase I of the Smart City Development Plan of the Indian Central 
Government. Being Urban in nature the district serves as a migrant host district for not 
only intra-district migrations within Assam but also for incoming migrants from 
neighbouring states of Arunachal, Meghalaya, Tripura and Nagaland. The flood atlas has 
zoned most of Kamrup Metro as falling either in high vulnerability or low vulnerability. 
This is mainly because of poor drainage system that is unable to cope with the incessant 
rain and occasional river run-off during the monsoon season.  
Map 7: Aggregated Flood Vulnerability, Kamrup Metro District 
 
         
Map 7b: Annual Flood Inundation, Kamrup Metro 
 
Source Maps 7 and 7b: Flood Hazard Atlas of Assam, 2016 
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Chirrang 
Chirang is one of the few districts in Assam without a very high flood vulnerability 
zonation. The district was selected for this study due to its geographical and political 
nuances. It shares a significant international border with the Kingdom of Bhutan in the 
north and it is part of the Bodoland Territorial Area District (BTDA) along with the 
districts of Baska, Udalgiri, Barpeta and Kokrajhar. The district was selected in place of 
Barpeta (where the DC was unavailable) to understand the political dynamic autonomous 
tribal movements play in effecting the level of protection a sub-state administration can 
provide to migrants. Hence it is directly relevant to understand how political factors weigh-
in on decision making of the executive body. The administrative subject is Chirang is 
shared between BTDA and the District Commissioner’s Office. The BAC handles the 
revenue and land management, while the DC officer is in charge of implementing state 
and central government plan agendas.  
The district despite an elaborate system of river tributaries, does not reflect high flood 
vulnerability but instead shows out-migrations motivated by the ethnic conflicts and lack 
of livelihood opportunities.  
Map 8: Aggregated Flood Vulnerability, Chirrang District 
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The following map shows the flood inundation during peak flood. As can be seen 
inundation in Chirrang is not as extensive as in other districts of Assam, this is because of 
the hill top-ology which allows easy run-away of the rain water during monsoon season.  
Map 8b: Flood Inundation, Chirrang District 
 
Source Maps 8 and 8b: Flood Hazard Atlas for Assam, 2016 
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Bongaigaon 
District of Bongaigaon was a later addition to the list of districts selected for this study. 
The addition was partly influenced by the decision to replace Barpeta and study Chirrang 
instead. Bongaigaon like Kamrup Metro and Jorhat host a large urban population. Due to 
oil refining process of Indian Oil and Bharat Petroleum Limited situated in the district, 
there is a wide base of refinery jobs in Bongaigaon town. The district is primarily a migrant 
receiving district especially for migrants arriving from Chirang district. The ethnic 
violence in BTAD in 2012 followed by incessant floods in the same year, led to 
displacement of communities in Chirrang which are camped in rehabilitation shelters 
located in Bongaigaon district (Deputy Commissioner Bongaigaon, 2016; Also see sec. 
4.1.3 pg 103-105 of the thesis). In terms of flood vulnerability in Bongaigaon there are 
pockets of high to very highly vulnerable villages, in Boitamari and Srijangram Revenue 
Circles situated across the Brahmaputra river.  
Map 9: Aggregated Flood Vulnerability, Bongaigaon District 
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The vulnerability is particularly high for the river island villages (char villages) which 
face complete submergence during peak flood. However, due to the presence of relatively 
elaborate and well-maintained highway system (necessitated by the transportation need of 
the crude oil refineries in the region) there is a continued possibility to move in and out of 
the district during disasters.  
Map 9b: Flood Inundation Map, Bongaigaon 
 
Source Map 9 and 9b: Flood Hazard Atlas of Assam, 2016 
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Goalpara 
Goalpara like Jorhat is one of the old districts with a continued political and trade 
significance. The district shares an inter-state border with the state of Meghalaya and 
witness mixed migrations motivated due to lack of employment and those motivated by 
ethnic conflicts from within the district and from the Kasi Garo Hill region of Meghalaya. 
All the revenue circles exhibit pockets of high to very high flood vulnerability.   
Map 10: Aggregated Flood Vulnerability, Goalpara District 
 
         
The district has a mixed ethnic and religious composition, a relatively high index of 
ethnically motivated violence. The violence in the district also have an inter-state spill-
over effect with the State of Meghalaya. The Deputy Commissioner of the state consider 
the violence to be primarily motivated due to land-rights and un-resolved issues of 
territoriality during the division of Assam and Meghalaya states in 1972 (Deputy 
Commissioner Goalpara, 2016).   
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There are 154 villages classified as having high to very high flood vulnerability and the 
peak flood inundation map exhibit near complete submergence in the eastern region.  
Map 10b: Flood Inundation Map, Goalpara 
 
Source Map 10 and 10b: Flood Hazard Atlas of Assam, 2016 
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Dhubri 
Dhubri is a historically, politically and strategically important district in Assam. In British 
India the district housed one of the busiest port after Calcutta, a military use airport base 
(during the world war II) and a medium gauge railway line connecting north-eastern 
provinces to Calcutta. Post-independence Dhubri became strategically important due to its 
international border with East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Historically Dhubri has 
received waves of in-coming migrants during partition of East and West Bengal, partition 
of India and later during Bangladesh Independence movement. Since 2012 the border 
between Dhubri and Bangladesh is completely guarded through erecting of fences, 
installation of flood-lights and a large presence of Central Reserve Police Force and 
Border Security Forces. It remains to be an important trading route between India and 
Bangladesh. The National Highway 31 connects the state of Assam to the rest of India via 
Dhubri. The only other district connecting Assam to rest of India is Kokrajhar which reals 
under episodes of insurgency and separatist movement, thus elevating the relative strategic 
importance of Dhubri.  
Due to a large presence of riverine islands in the lower Brahmaputra valley the district is 
particularly vulnerable to floods. Especially the revenue circle of South Salmara and 
Manikchar (now re constituted into a new district) show heightened susceptibility to flood 
and flood erosion. There are 202 villages classified as falling in the high to very high flood 
vulnerability zone. Majority of these villages are riverine islands (char villages). The peak 
flood inundation map reveals complete submergence of both north and south-banks while 
also highlighting the presence of few large river islands which continue to survive due to 
their elevation.  
Dhubri also allegedly continue to experience international human trafficking and illegal 
migrations due to a riverine border with Bangladesh which remains to be unfenced. The 
relatively high Muslim and Bengali speaking population of the district further strengthen 
the narrative of illegal migration flows. The river islands in Dhurbi are susceptible to 
floating away across the international border and require structural measures to avoid loss 
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Map 11: Aggregated Flood Vulnerability, Dhubri District 
 
Map 11b: Flood Inundation Map, Dhubri 
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3.3: Contextual frameworks  
There are four thematic areas in which the response to chronic flood disasters and 
disaster-induced migration and displacement is evaluated in this thesis – Enabling 
Policies, Mitigating Policies, Relief Policies and Compensatory Policies. Under each 
of these thematic policy areas, there is either central or state level legislation that 
provides an overall mandate for administration. For example, in the case of enabling 
policies, there is the constitutional mandate, which obligates the state to respect and 
protect citizens' right to voluntary movement and residence within the Indian borders. 
In contrast, legislation such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act places a positive responsibility on the state to generate 100 days of 
guaranteed employment for every person demanding work in rural India, thereby 
allowing in-suit adaptation and reducing the need for rural-urban relocation. In the 
mitigating policies, the general five-year plan document has been the source of 
administrative guidelines for affirmative state action for building water management 
infrastructure that will help mitigate flood disasters and prevent forced displacement 
due to flood erosion. The policy context of Relief analyses the deliverance of the Flood 
Relief Policy (drawn from the Flood Relief Manual of the State of Assam) and the 
Disaster Management Policy (drawn from the Disaster Management Act). The Relief 
policies are needed to provide urgent humanitarian response to those who are displaced 
due to flood-inundation and would require temporary shelter and support during the 
duration of the disaster. And finally, the section on Compensation Policy would cover 
the Chief Minister’s Special Assistance Fund for the Erosion Affected Families, and 
the Indira Awas Yojana Scheme of the Central government of India. Both these 
policies focus towards providing compensation and assistance to households which 
have lost their lands due to flood-erosion and have thus become homeless (or land-
less).  
Table 6 provides an overview of the policies analysed in this thesis, their arrangement 
in the thematic areas and their perceived synergy with climate migration governance. 
Several factors such as the bureaucratic perception, institutional capacity, political 
pressures, and demography can influence the outcomes of these policies. In section 2.2 
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and 2.3 of this thesis, I discussed how the existing barriers to climate adaptation, 
disaster risk reduction, and the framing of climate change migration could substantially 
affect the response a climate change migrant can expect from the state.  
Table 6: Existing synergies with Climate Change Migration Governance 
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For this study, I adopted three independent variables that may have a substantial impact 
on the policy outcomes. I define them as Institutional Perception, Political stimulus 
and Demography. 
Figure 1: Variables to influence protection response 
 
3.4: Variable Explanation 
The dependent variable for this study is the protection response offered to climate 
change migrants. It is worth remembering that climate change migration, being a 
wicked problem, can never have a complete solution. Due to the contested nature of 
climate change migration and the general inability to decide who is a climate change 
migrant, the solutions can only be determined as a progressive approach towards 
resolving the wicked problem (section 2.3). To influence the outcome of the response, 
three variables are employed for the analysis. 
Institutional perception: The institution in this thesis refers to the executive branch 
of the government that implements legislated policies and agendas. Public institutions 
especially bureaucracies are characterised by a high degree of resilience towards 
change (Scott, 1996). The neo-classical theory of institutional organisation views 
institutional actors to have a very limited agency in deciding organisational agenda 
and implementation strategy (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Astley & Van de Ven, 1983). 
The institutional practices, particularly of everyday governance are unvaried and result 
in an organisation morphism through space and time (Meyer, et al., 1983; Scott & 
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Such conception of lack of agency of organisation actors and banality of public 
administration, however, became problematic when institutional theorists started 
tackling the issue of institutional change (Westenholz, et al., 2006; Toboso, 2001; 
Helmsing, 2013; Kuks, 2004). Institutional theorists have highlighted the role that 
individual actors play in institutional change. Lawrence and Roy (2006), deal with the 
relationship between agency and institution and suggest that actors can purposively 
behave either to maintain or to transform existing institutions. The new perspective in 
institutional theory considers institutional actors to be creative, autonomous, pro-
active, and self-directed (Yorozu, 2017; Sarma, 2013; Phillips & Lawrence, 2012; 
Smets, et al., 2017; Maletzky, 2017). The new institutionalism research demonstrates 
that policies are adopted, and institutions are created (or revamped) when elite actors 
with sufficient resources see an opportunity to realise interests that they value highly 
(DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio, 1988a; Battilana, et al., 2009). The importance of 
personal value and agency is also shown to be highly relevant in stages of ‘Agenda 
setting’ and ‘Agenda framing’ (Princen, 2011; Dery, 2000; Jones & Baumgartner, 
2004; Peake, 2001; Gandy, 2015; Colombini, et al., 2016; Howard, 2015). For a 
problem to attract policy solution, it is necessary that the elite actors must view the 
problem as one they rank highly on their public policy concern matrix. In this context 
institutional perception of climate change related migration becomes relevant.   
Institutional perception as a variable in the study reflects the attitude and concern elite 
officers of Indian bureaucracy attach to climate change related movements. How they 
understand it, and how they define it.  Falling back on my discussion in chapter 2, I 
stated that I treat climate change migration as a wicked problem, which means that 
there can be multiple perceptions, definitions and framing and that these perceptions, 
understandings and framing will directly reflect the policy agenda undertaken to 
manage climate change related migration. Based on available literature and initial 
interviews with the Central government actors it also came to light that the Central 
government of India views climate change migration as a development issue. But do 
the sub-state actors share the same definition of climate change migration, and equate 
it to a developmental problem? Or does the state government which is a border state 
and embroiled in controversies of managing illegal cross-border migration attach 
 
84 Governance of Climate Change Related Migrations in Assam (India) 
security narrative to climate change migration? And above all how does the framing 
of elite actors influence the policy choices they make to protect those forced to migrate 
due to climate change related disasters.   
 
My second independent variable is the Political Stimulus. It is naïve to believe that 
administration acts in a political vacuum; despite the separation of powers and a robust 
sense of accountability regarding the constitutional mandate of non-discrimination, 
administrative actors are susceptible to political narratives. The influence of the 
political narrative on the value judgements of administrators is often treated as a 
paradox of bounded rationality, where the actor is influenced in their thought and 
action by the larger social and political circumstances they work in.  
The organisational theory of governance treats street-level actors as mechanically 
functional beings who are fully capable of efficiently and objectively delivering the 
policy agenda framed by the elite bureaucracy, and broken down into specific routine 
tasks, I have reason to believe that this is not true. Borrowing from the theory regarding 
street-level actors in policy deliverance, I want to understand if the deliverance of 
policy components by the street-level actors is in fact objective, or if it is influenced 
by a bounded sense of rationality (Skidd, 1992; Ortega & Braun, 2011; Katsikopoulos, 
2014; Puranam, et al., 2015).  
Migration policies in India and especially in Assam are strongly affected by the 
political narrative surrounding religion and ethnicity. Religion plays an important part 
in guaranteeing the rights and protection of the people and can not only determine the 
response towards their protection needs but can also provide an overview of who is 
vulnerable to displacement.  
At the national level, India takes pride in being a land of diversity and cherishes its 
ethnic plurality. At the state level, there have been increased instances of ethnic clashes 
and violence against minority groups. States in the north-east of India have witnessed 
ethnic conflict since the pre-independence days over land-use rights and forestry 
rights. It is likely that the district administrators will be more willing to provide support 
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and resettlement to people belonging to major ethnic groups or those who are at the 
frontline of ethnic politics.  
Since government entities cannot discriminate on the grounds of religion, the 
government adopts a formal façade of equality in its dealings. However, looking 
beyond this façade is possible by way of analytical reasoning and critical thinking. The 
influence of the variable is triangulated in the study by adopting multiple and 
corroborative data sources. The next section on the research design explains the data 
sources used in this study.  
Finally, demography is an independent variable. It can be seen in earlier studies on 
social vulnerability to climate change and migration due to climate change that specific 
groups of people like Hispanics, blacks, the aged, women and children are more likely 
to be trapped in a collapsed eco-system. Demographic factors are essential in 
determining the vulnerability of a population occupying a delicate or disaster-prone 
area. The demography of the victims also strongly impacts on how the institution 
perceives an issue, how it functions, and how seriously it takes its outcomes. 
Demographic groups that are unlikely to unite and rely on their rights are more likely 
to face adverse and restrictive migration policies.  
3.5: Research Design  
This study adopted an inductive research model based on a responsive interviewing 
technique. The reason for using an inductive research method was the necessity arising 
from the gap in the literature. There is an absence of existing knowledge or theory on 
how climate-change migration is managed at the local level, particularly in India. The 
novelty of this study and the absence of theory allowed for creative freedom in 
discovering what we do not know. Scepticism towards qualitative inductive research 
of this kind often arises because it may not scientifically present the evidence, it can 
be too vague and it might involve a case of cherry picking to build arguments. I 
acknowledge that conducting research where there is no previous research or grounded 
theory in the study area can be a daunting task, as it provides a vast research space 
where the researcher may often feel lost and unfocused. However, as Corley & Gioia 
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(2011) point out in support of such a method, ‘advances in knowledge that are too 
strongly rooted in what we already know delimit what we can know’.  
I started with the premise that people working in the state government organisation are 
‘knowledgeable agents’- they know what they are doing and can explain their 
thoughts, intentions and actions (Gioia, et al., 2013). The interviews were however 
carefully guided to cover all of the contextual elements. It is an inherent assumption 
in the responsive interviewing technique that the participants develop subjective 
meanings of their experiences; these meanings are varied and multiple. This allowed 
me to develop a broad understanding of the complexity of the participants' views rather 
than narrowing the meanings down into a few categories or ideas (Creswell, 2013; 
Rubin & Rubin, 2011). There was no need to specify the problem and look at it through 
a binary causal lens; as stated earlier I treated climate change migration as a wicked 
problem and thus the multiplicity of reasons leading to migration were what made the 
problem wicked.  
I also engaged in group discussions with the migrating community and surveyed some 
of the vulnerable and erosion-prone areas across the state to pursue an objective 
assessment of the problem in hand. A few of the interviews were repeated to iterate 
the findings from the field and develop a deeper understanding of the interviewees' 
subjective points of view. Such qualitative interviews are also termed topical 
interviews, and such topical studies help to explore what, when, how, why or with 
what consequences something happened. The objective here was to work out a 
coherent explanation by piecing together what different people have said while 
recognising that each person might have their construction of events.  
The districts are the principal administrative units; thus they were the primary 
stakeholders for this study. The districts are supervised by Deputy Commissioners 
(D.C.), and the D.C. office is the smallest complete unit of administration in the State. 
Each D.C. has general responsibility for a wide portfolio, which includes the 
maintenance of law and order, the administration of jails, supervising land revenue 
administration including the maintenance of land records, the collection of land 
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revenue, acting as Revenue officer in cases of disputes arising out of land records, and 
the management of public lands and properties.  
The D.C. oversees development activities including forming policy and implementing 
strategies on public health, education, social welfare, the welfare of backward classes 
and minorities. He coordinates various secretarial departments to deliver special 
economic programmes of the central government aimed at reducing poverty, creating 
empowerment, livelihood diversification and delivering social security measures to the 
citizens. In his role as a regulator, the D.C. mandates the regulation and distribution of 
food and civil supplies, and essential commodities, including price regulation. He 
oversees excise and prohibition matters, matters relating to stamps and registration, 
the ceiling and regulation of urban land, the maintenance of vacant land, government 
loans and schemes for land and agricultural improvement.  
The D.C. is responsible for election and citizenship matters, including voter 
registration, commissioning of the election process, ensuring fair elections and the 
declaration of results. The D.C. is also responsible for the supervision and proper 
functioning of local urban bodies and the implementation of various developmental 
and anti-poverty measures in urban areas; his role also extends to formulating grants 
for urban centre development.  
In situations of disaster, the D.C. acts as the head of the District Disaster Management 
Authority and oversees the formulation of disaster management strategies and 
coordinates relief and rehabilitation activities by involving various departments. Apart 
from these obvious agendas, the D.C. is also in charge of other matters that are not 
defined under any statue of law, including coordinating the treasury, supervising 
district budgets, over-seeing land acquisition matters, and acting as a focal point for 
public grievances. 
The Deputy Commissioners are appointed through the Union Public Service cohort of 
Administrative Officers, which makes them Central government employees rather 
than State government employees, and the process of their appointment, promotion 
and termination of services is guided by the Constitutional provisions under Art. 312 
 
88 Governance of Climate Change Related Migrations in Assam (India) 
to 320 of the Constitution of India. This arrangement ensures a separation of power at 
the state level and guarantees political non-interference and non-partisan behaviour 
within their administrative work. Since the reform of the civil services in India, the 
Deputy Commissioner holds office for a minimum tenure of 3 years, after which they 
can be transferred to the same or a higher rank within the state or to a deputation to the 
Central government service.  
The Deputy Commissioners, due to their role in formulating, managing and 
implementing developmental policies, were the key participants in this study. The role 
of the D.C. office is crucial in providing opportunities for adaptation (enabling 
policies), coordinating and assisting other departments in regard to structural measures 
for risk reduction (mitigatory policies), adopting and implementing relief strategies 
(relief policies), settling land compensation claims, approving rehabilitation grants and 
allotting loss and damage compensation (compensatory policies).  
Data Collection 
The participants (interviewees) for the research study were selected to represent those 
who are authorised to make decisions, adopt functional policies, prioritise executive 
agendas and implement strategies. For this reason, in every selected district I reached 
out to the Deputy Commissioner and used the snowball technique to identify and 
familiarise myself with other responsible officers.  
A semi-structured approach was adopted keeping the research context in mind. Due to 
the inherent flexibility of the responsive interview technique, I kept myself open to 
accommodate new information, adapt to the actual experiences that the interviewees 
involved, and adjust to unexpected situations and deal with irrelevant information. A 
non-confrontational style of interviewing was maintained, which encouraged the 
interviewee to talk, so that the latter felt comfortable and not alienated. Channels for 
clarification or re-interviewing were kept open where necessary. I thoroughly 
recognised that each interviewee as well as myself as the researcher had a distinct set 
of experiences, a different construction of the meaning of those experiences, and 
different areas of expertise. Self-reflection and clarification acted as a useful tool in 
overcoming my own bias and seeing the real picture.  
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Table 7: List of Interviews 
Name Designation No./type of Interviews 
Tarun Gogoi Chief Minister of Assam Personal interview 
 V. K Piepersenia Chief Secretary 2 Personal interviews 
Dr M Angamuthu D.C. Kamrup M 2 Personal interviews, 
clarifications through WhatsApp 
 Rajesh Kumar D.C. Morigaon Personal interview 
 Vishal Solanki D.C. Jorhat Brief interview 
 Victor Carpenter D.C. Dhemaji 3 personal interviews 
 VKV Srinivasan D.C. Goalpara Personal interview 
 AK Majumdar D.C. Chirang Personal interview 
 Nazirul Islam D.C. Dhubri 2 Personal interview 1 telephonic 
conversation 
 Sushil Kumar Pegu D.C. Bongaigaon Personal interview 
Ms Nandita Hazarika Chief Project Officer, ASDMA Personal interviews 
 Kaushav Talukdar PO, DDMA, Kamrup M Personal interview 
Ms. Minakshi Das PO, DDMA, Morigaon Personal interview 
 Pran Kishan Gogoi PO, DDMA, Jorhat Personal interview 
 Lohit Gogoi PO, DDMA, Dhemaji 2 personal interviews 
KC  Chowdhary PO, DDMA, Chirrang 2 Personal interviews,  
clarification through WhatsApp 
Ananta Samanta, PO DDMA, Bongaigaon Personal interview, field visit 
Moferjal Sarkar PO DDMA, Dhubri Personal interview 
 Jishnu Barua Jt. Sect. (on Deputation from 
Assam Cadre) 
Personal interview, 1 telephonic 
conversations 
Ravi Shankar Prasad Joint Secretary, Ministry of 
Environment (on Deputation) 
Personal interview 
Prof. Rajen Saikia Retd. Principal Nagaon College 3 Personal interviews 
Dr Monirul Hussain Retd. HOD, Department of Politics, 
Guwahati University 
1 Personal interview 
Apart from the District commissioners, the Project officers of the District Disaster 
Management Authority, the Chief Secretary of the State, the Chief Minister of the State 
as well as the CEO of the Assam State Disaster Management Authority were 
interviewed using the same technique of responsive interviewing. Within the Central 
government administration, two interviews were conducted at the Joint Secretary level 
with officials from the Assam cadre who have served in the state for a long time and 
have dealt with migration and environmental issues intensively. One of the Joint 
Secretaries is currently serving in the Ministry of Forest and Environment and is one 
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of the key participants in the Indian delegation to the UNFCCC. The research was also 
enriched by interviews with Professors and Civil society leaders at Guwahati 
University, the National Law University of Assam and Nagaon University. Given the 
controversial nature of migrations in the politics of Assam, many administrators 
requested different levels of anonymity and these are respected while quoting them in 
the study. The table 7 shows the number of interviews conducted with each interviewee 
To triangulate the study, seven group discussions were conducted in randomly selected 
areas that have faced erosion induced displacement, including one group discussion 
conducted at a refugee camp site. These sites were randomly selected and the group 
discussion participants voluntarily communicated with me with no prior notice of an 
agenda or prior discussion. It is well-worth noting that as I was not earlier planning on 
conducting group discussions, they were unstructured and open-floor, allowing the 
participants to openly discuss the issues they faced when migrating. As an outsider, 
the participants in some of the groups were suspicious of my stated objective and 
intentions. In the village of Asudhubi, I sensed growing hostility during the discussion, 
and coincidental election-violence in the proximity of the village and cut short the 
discussion at an opportune time.   
Table 8: List of Group Discussions 
Group Discussion Date Remark 
Laharighat group discussion 20th 
February 
2016 
10 people led by village headman who was 





10 people group.  Village Headman from either 
of the villages not available 
Asudhubhi GD, Goalpara 6th April 
2016 
15 people group. The discussions were cut 
short due to an election-related disturbance on 
the nearby village road 
Kaura Gram (Dhobakuar), 
Jaleshwar Village, Goalpara 
7th April 
2016 
20 people. Mother of the local BJP candidate 
led the discussions.  
A separate discussion with NRC officers was 
held in the adjoining NRC office 
Bhashayani Char, Dhubri 20th April 
2016 
10 people group led by the Village headman 
Bagdhora Char, Dhubri 20th April 
2016 
10 people group. The discussions were 
interrupted by the BSF personnel 
Relief Camp GD, 
Bongaigaon 
1st March 12 people group, represented by the PO, 
Disaster Management Unit Bongaigaon 
Dhemaji farmer group 
discussion 
14th April  8 people group engaged in farming and allied 
activities  
 
91 Research Methodology 
 
The work was further enriched by the use of basic geographical system information 
mapping skills and Excel skills to view and analyse the geographical placement of 
vulnerable communities and governmental programmes in order to understand 
whether the governance is, in fact, assisting the people who are the most vulnerable. 
This helped analyse the reasons behind the protection deficit and variations.  
3.6 Timeframe and Data Triangulation 
The field inquiry for this research was conducted over a four-month period from 
January 2016 until April 2016. Of the 17 weeks spent in India, 15 weeks were spent in 
the state of Assam and two weeks were spent in New Delhi. I used a personal level 
connection who retired as Additional Deputy Inspector General of Assam (2nd most 
senior Indian Police Office in the State) to snow-ball the interview participation. Each 
interview with an officer was planned for a whole day, during which I engaged in 
open-ended discourse using semi-structured interview method and spent time in 
passively observing the proceedings of their offices. Few officers did not allow me to 
observe the proceedings of their office and their concerns were respected. Few other 
officers like Dr Angamuthu, Mr Victor Carpenter, and Mr Nazirul Islam allowed 
several hours of direct interview and observations spread across different days.  
The initial intention was to record the official proceedings and interviews digitally, 
however, this was felt to be an invasive technique and created barriers at some places 
where the officers found it difficult to talk openly. Thus, I resorted back to the 
conventional technique of taking handwritten notes of interviews and field 
observations. There are nine available interview recordings of an approximate duration 
of one hour each, and a field diary maintained on a daily basis. There were situations 
like the meeting with the Chief Secretary and the meeting with the Chief Minister 
where the interviewee requested not to transcribe the information they provide. To 
allow an open discourse, I respected the comfort zone of the interviewees and used 
memory to transcribe the events and details of the interview after the meeting.  
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Apart from the interviews, there is administrative data which was available only in 
physical format at the time of the fieldwork.16 Some of the state data like the internal 
report on migration flow, a police report theorising the linkage between char-island, 
migration and crimes, and the D-voter dataset were provided confidentially by the 
state. These datasets were handed in physical format on printed papers, as well as in 
digital format through CD and emails (soft-copy of the reports).  
The information gathered from the interviews was triangulated against the 
administrative data. It is worth emphasising here that Indian administration follows a 
strict policy on paperwork and documentation of state action. Thus, it is possible to 
find documentary evidence of every official meeting, directive, and task 
implementation. The absence of paper documentation (often called paper trails by 
ethnographers) would undoubtedly mean phoney information provided by the 
interviewee.  
However, most ethnographic studies on Indian bureaucracy would also warn against 
the authenticity of records. It is widely believed that Indian administration ace the art 
of constructing bogus paper trails of their everyday administrative practices. There is 
a constant paradox of asli development (real development) and farji development 
(fabricated development). This fictitious narrative of administrative data can be 
significantly different from the real picture of the administration in India. Especially 
in case of the welfare projects, the beneficiaries usually appear as mystical characters 
to rationalise an eccentric drama of state presence  (Mathur, 2016; Gupta, 2012).  
The reservations towards over-reliance on administrative state data are fully 
acknowledged in this work. A layer of caution is added by further triangulating the 
findings with sample survey of field locations and group-discussions in some of the 
villages which have found mention in initial interviews and document trail created by 
the administrative actors.  
                                                             
16 It is well worth mentioning that due to Indian central government’s continued support to Digital India program 
and agenda to promote administrative transparency a large amount of reports which I extracted from the 
government offices and archives in Assam are now available online. Especially the data on, daily flood report,  
Indira Awas Yojana and Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. Later during the time of 
analysing and writing the thesis I heavily relied on the online data which was more clean and discernible uptill 
the village level in most cases.  
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I also had the opportunity to re-examine my interviewees, with the knowledge I 
gathered from the field surveys. In many such occasions, the interviewee either 
demonstrated a (somewhat) scripted shock, refused to acknowledge lapse by 
suggesting that I might have confused the village names or even used the tactical drama 
of summoning the local authorities immediately and reprimanding them in my 
presence. I am not sure how the tactical theatrics influenced or changed the 
administration for better (or worse), but it did allow me to view state practice as it 
unfolded.   
The triangulation method also reflects my training in Indian Law. As a law graduate, 
who studied Indian legal system I have training in the Administrative law, Law of 
Evidence, and Procedural Laws of India. I have previously also worked for nearly four 
years in a local law firm dealing with matters of civil nature at the district level. This 
exposure to the legal system at a sub-national level left me with considerable 
experience of recognising admissible and non-admissible17 state documents, and to 
continually suspect the paper trail to be farzi kagaz (fabricated documentation) unless 
there was corroborating evidence to prove their ‘realness’. My own past professional 
experience added a layer of nuance and carefulness in analysing and interpreting the 
data I received from the state.  
Conclusion 
Based on the literature review and initial assessment the following results are 
predicted for this study: 
First, the institutional perception has a mixed effect on framing the policy regarding 
climate change migration and its deliverance. Once the institution perceives climate 
change migration as a problem to be solved, it engages in identifying it as a 
developmental or security issue. This identification of the issue directly impacts 
whether the protection will be positive or negative. It is expected that the framing of 
climate migration as a developmental issue will lead to positive protection while its 
                                                             
17 The two terms admissible and non-admissible are used to indicate paper evidences that are admissible (or non-
admissible) in a court of law as a proof of administrative action. 
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framing as a security crisis will lead to an adverse protection scenario, especially for 
those who are not considered citizens of the state. 
Second, the political narrative at the subnational level will negatively impact the 
protection outcomes. The state of Assam has a negatively charged narrative of 
migration, which has led to a state of violence and emergency in the past. The political 
association of the term migration with illegal cross-border immigration negatively 
affects how the society, including the actors responsible for governance, view the 
people they must govern. Moreover, communities that frequently engage in migration 
or are already embroiled in a narrative of ‘others’ are negatively impacted through the 
protection they receive.  
Finally, the demographic variable should show mixed results in regard to protection 
outcomes. While particular communities of people who can represent themselves will 
be able to attract better protection and assistance, the weaker sections of the society 
like the aged, women and children or politically under-represented groups will not only 
be more vulnerable to forced forms of migration due to disaster but will also receive 
little to no assistance from the state.  
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Chapter 4 Enabling and Mitigatory Policies: Tracing 
Institutional Frameworks and Progress 
The present chapter provides a brief overview of the legal instruments and institutional 
policies used for managing migration and displacement caused by flood disasters in 
the state of Assam. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the national governance agenda lies at 
the heart of climate change migration policies. Governance can be delivered through 
existing norms and models that synergise with climate change migration or by creating 
new institutions and new norms. In the Indian scenario, the governance of climate 
change migration is conceived as a part of the existing development and welfare 
agenda. While the policies are not enacted explicitly for regulating forced movements, 
they provide synergy in regard to a positive outcome.  
As stated in Chapter 3 earlier for convenience, I have grouped these policies into four 
thematic categories: (a) Enabling policies – which allow citizens to use migration as 
a form of adaptation. Citizens can migrate freely and without any detriment, to seek 
gainful employment and alternative economic opportunities in any part of the country. 
These policies enable citizens to engage in gainful employment outside of their local 
areas and provide opportunities for cyclic, temporary and permanent migration 
undertaken voluntarily. The purpose of such voluntary movement is to increase the 
economic capacity needed to adapt to changing weather patterns. (b) Mitigatory 
policies – these help mitigate forced migration scenarios by enhancing structural 
capacity and building preparedness. The goal of mitigatory policies is to build a 
general state capacity to predict and mitigate disaster impact; thus this strongly relates 
to scenarios of forced migration during sudden-onset disasters. (c) Relief policies – 
these are tailored to provide adequate relief response in the event of disaster-induced 
displacement. As a humanitarian action, the relief policy is built to assist any person 
in the face of disaster, including any foreigner or those trapped due to an inability to 
migrate to a safer location. (d) Compensatory policies – these are built to provide 
financial assistance and compensation to those who suffer loss of their habitat or 
damage to their property during a disaster. Compensatory policies also allow the state 
to provide ex-gratia support to disaster victims. 
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In the current chapter I engage with Enabling Policies and Mitigatory Policies, and in 
Chapter 5, I discuss the strength and impact of Relief Policies and Compensatory 
Policies. Both of these chapters are constructed as descriptive chapters to provide a 
detailed overview of the response process and give the reader a general idea about the 
administrative functioning of the state in regard to the above-mentioned thematic 
areas. The open audit data used in these chapters was taken from the respective 
programme websites. In the case of the MGNREGA scheme and the IAY scheme, the 
open data is available for social audit as an MIS database on the program websites 
(Ministry of Rural Development, n.d.). Unpublished state data is also used, for 
example, the list of erosion-affected areas and the D-voter list of the State of Assam. 
These datasets were procured during the field work. Geographical maps for the chapter 
are generated using the basic functions in the Bhuvan GIS software of the Indian Space 
Research Organization and GIS portal of the Central Water Commission (Indian Space 
Research Organisation, n.d.).  
The chapter is divided into two parts. Part 4.1 discusses Enabling policies, and part 4.2 
discusses mitigatory policies. Programs discussed in these sections are the ones 
identified as having maximum synergy with climate migration governance by the elite 
bureaucratic actors in India. These policies are aimed at maximising the local benefit 
from voluntary adaptive migration while reducing scenarios of forced displacement 
and being trapped in a collapsed ecosystem.   
4.1: Enabling Policies  
In a disaster-prone State, adaptability towards known and regular episodes 
of disasters is seen to be very high (Adger, 1999). Researchers agree that 
people residing in vulnerable locations circumscribe their lives and well-
being around the disasters and use several forms of temporary migration 
as an adaptation strategy (Black, et al., 2011; Campbell, 2010). Most 
adaptive migrations are used to diversify livelihood options and improve 
economic resilience to climate change-related weather events. Policies 
which facilitate free economic movement and provide livelihood 
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opportunities, are therefore, necessary elements of enabling policy 
thematic area. I will consider three primary frameworks in this section: (a) 
the Right to Freedom of Movement (b) Right to freedom of Residence 
(emanating from the need of temporary/cyclic relocation), and (c) The 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 
2005(hereinafter MGNREGA), which created a legal obligation on the 
Indian state to provide 100 days of guaranteed paid unskilled employment 
to anyone demanding it.18    
4.1.1 Right to Migrate 
In India, Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution of India guarantees freedom of movement 
to all its citizens (Constitution of India, 1950). The qualifying words for this right – all 
its citizens – implies that the provision of freedom of movement is available only to 
those who are Indian citizens. Other than a citizen, a recognised alien who is legally 
present in Indian territory has a temporary right to freedom of movement as specified 
by the central government of India. This right to freedom of movement for a 
recognised alien may involve statutory restrictions from entering some areas, such as 
nuclear facilities of a country, or refugee/asylum camps, or restricted buildings. But 
for an irregular alien who do not have a legal permission to enter or travel within Indian 
boundaries, or a person whose citizenship status is contested, the right to freedom of 
movement under the constitution does not exist (Pylee, 1999; Derrett, 1961). Any such 
person can be duly deported outside the territorial borders of India unless such 
irregular migrant can establish a right to non-refoulement. The international principle 
of non-refoulment is a fundamental principle of International Law recognised under 
the key human rights and humanitarian law treaties, including the Geneva Convention 
on the Law of War, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN Convention on the 
Status of Refugees, Convention Against Statelessness, Convention Against Torture 
(McAdam, 2012). The principle of non-refoulement enjoys a status of jus-cogens norm 
                                                             
18 Scholars often also use the term NREGA (National Rural Employment Guarantee Act) interchangeable with 
MGNREGA, perhaps for the ideological need to distance oneself from party politics connected with the Gandhi-
Parivaar in India. I however, use the term MGNREGA as that is what the Act is legally called during the time of 
writing this thesis.  
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under international law and forbids countries from returning anyone to another country 
where their lives are in perceivable and immediate danger. Being a jus-cogens norm it 
is immaterial if the country wanting to deport an irregular migrant is in fact signatory 
to any of the mentioned treaties (Goodwin-Gill, 1996; IOM, 2014; Zimmermann, et 
al., 2011). The applicability of non-refoulment is however, restricted to irregular aliens 
who are already found outside the boundaries of their own nation and who fear 
persecution on political grounds relating to colour, class, gender, nationality, race or 
membership of a particular social group. It is highly debatable if the principle is 
applicable also in situations of hydro-metrological disasters (Murray, 2010; Gill, 2010; 
Martin, 2010; Bates, 2002; Leal-Arcas, 2012). India does not per se recognises natural 
disasters as a reason for allowing temporary refuge or asylum to an irregular alien.  
In case of regular alien and right of movement granted to the citizen, Article 19 clause 
5 allows the state the to impose reasonable restriction in order to maintain public order. 
These reasonable restrictions include the confinement of offenders from the general 
masses, and the use of externment or internment orders with a clear procedural 
mandate to disallow movement for a specific amount of time in a pre-specified time. 
Other than these restrictions, the right to freedom of movement imposes an obligation 
on the state not to interfere with the personal liberty to migrate.  However, whether 
such rights create an absolute duty on the state to pursue policies that allow citizens to 
enjoy their liberty to its fullest extent is a jurisprudentially fluid question. Hohfeld, 
while explaining the concept of rights, classified them in correlation with the 
obligation they attract. Rights are ‘privileges’ when they create an obligation of non-
interference, thereby guaranteeing liberty for the rights-bearer. Rights are ‘claims’ 
when they require an action to be performed by some entity other than the rights-bearer 
to allow the rights-bearer to enjoy the right (Eleutheriadēs, 2008; Lindahl, 2006; 
Vatiero, 2010).  
Freedom of movement as a privilege right puts an obligation on the state not to 
interfere with the right by enacting any legislation that unduly challenges the 
citizenship right of any specific group of people within Indian territory. I will elaborate 
more on this point in chapter 5 where I discuss the politics of entitlement and identity. 
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However, to state it here succinctly, in the State of Assam the struggle to identify 
migrants and remove them from spaces occupied by the aboriginal Assamese 
population has led to enactment of The Illegal Migrant Determination (and 
Deportation) Act of 1986 (hereinafter IMDT Act). The legislation which became 
operational almost immediately after its enactment allows detention and deportation 
of anyone believed to be an illegal immigrant in the State (Roy & Singh, 2009). In 
2012, after a long drawn out judicial process the IMDT Act was declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of India amidst a high political drama (Thaker, 
2004; Economic Times, 2015; Singh, 1984). However, during the time-period the 
legislation was in place, executive orders were adopted by the Election Commission 
which allowed anyone to apply a plain sheet of paper contesting the citizenship and 
voting rights of any other person believed to be illegally present in the state. The 
Election Commission received en-masse applications from the ‘disgruntled youth of 
Assam’ (Retd. Addl. DIG Rajender Kumar, 2016). The procedure still dictates that 
once an application is received the person whose citizenship is being contested will be 
placed on a D-Voter list until they can prove in the Foreigners' tribunal that they are 
in fact a bona fide Indian citizen. Presently, around one hundred and forty thousand 
adults are listed as D-voters in Assam (Block Develoment Officer Dhemaji District, 
2016). These people and their families are unable to migrate due to fear of further 
marginalisation, detention and deportation. Those who are listed as D-voters are 
treated as non-citizens, and their families cannot avail themselves of any benefits of 
the welfare programmes sponsored by the government (NRC Verification Officer, 
2016; Pratima Devi Rabha, 2016). In chapter 5 I will discuss how the political narrative 
on migration disenfranchises people from their rights as citizens, making it very 
difficult for them to move away from their geographical vulnerability or avail 
themselves of the institutional support provided by various welfare programmes in the 
state.  
The operationalization of the IMDT Act targeting specific communities (non-
Assamese speaking, non-ethnic) negatively impacts the enabling rights of those who 
would like to move out of their fragile ecosystems. In the districts selected for this 
study, there are presently thirty-eight thousand, three hundred and four D-voters 
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remaining, among whom twenty-four thousand, five hundred are women. In the last 
twenty years, the Foreigners' tribunal has only decided ten thousand, seven hundred 
and seventeen cases in the study districts. 
On the other hand, freedom of movement as a rights claim puts an affirmative 
obligation on the state to provide the conditions necessary for the realisation of this 
freedom. The state has a duty to create a public infrastructure for transportation 
(Sileno, et al., 2014). The lack of adequate infrastructure for transportation, including 
damaged roads and bridges, and the lack of safe and affordable transport can limit 
people’s ability to move out of fragile ecosystems (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 
2010). This constraint becomes extremely dangerous in the case of sudden-onset 
disasters, where a lack of transportation can lead to a situation of entrapment for the 
disaster victims (Squires & Hartman, 2006).  
4.1.2 Right to Freedom of Residence 
In a rural economy that is primarily dependent on agriculture, the provisions of 
livelihood are closely related to the right to land-ownership and the security of tenancy 
rights (Manjunatha, et al., 2013; Awasthi, 2009). In India, the right to property is not 
a fundamental right. However, the right to residence under Article 19(1) (g) is of 
paramount importance for people residing in homesteads and engaging in subsistence 
farming practices. Most of the land holdings in Assam are small marginal holdings 
that are used for subsistence agriculture (Figure 4.1) 
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Chart 1: Distribution of Landholdings in the State of Assam (no. of holding in each category) 
 
Source: Generated from the Agriculture Census of India, 2011 
The State government manages the subject of property and ownership transfer under 
entry 18 of List II, Schedule VII (Government of India, 1950). It is also the repository 
of land-tenures and the primary actor in deciding land-use policy. In the state of 
Assam, this responsibility lies with the Department of Revenue and Disaster 
Management. The State government, under Article 19(5), has the authority to impose 
reasonable restrictions on freedom of residence, based on its land-use policy, and any 
specific constraints on land-use placed by the central government. The Central 
government has the authority to designate reserved forests and wetlands, based on its 
commitment under the International Convention on Conservation of Biodiversity, and 
the Ramsar Convention on the Protection of Wetlands (UNESCO, 1971; Damodaran, 
2013; Sharma & Sarma, 2014; Menon & Vadivelu, 2006). 
In the State of Assam, by virtue of Schedule VI to the Constitution of India, the State 
government has foregone its authority to regulate land-use in some territorial regions 
that are classified as Tribal areas. These areas include the North Cachar Hills District, 
the Karbi Anglong District and the Bodoland Territorial Area District. The Bodoland 
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Kokrajhar, Baska, Barpeta and Chirang. Within these autonomous district areas, any 
new acquisition of property by non-tribal people is restricted by Article 51 of the 
Bodoland Territorial Council Act of 2003 (Bose, 2013; Mahanta & Das, 2013; Datta 
& Sarkar, 2012).  
However, the existing ownership right of the non-tribal population residing in the area 
is protected in its entirety. Any non-tribal person asserting a right to property 
(including the right to residential property) must be able to show the presence of such 
a right before the commencement of the BTCA of 2003 (Government of Assam, 2003). 
Apart from the constitutionally recognised BTCA, there are several tribal factions in 
Assam that are demanding a similar autonomous status. The following map provides 
an overview of the tribal concentration in the Bhramputra Valley of Assam. The data 
shown on the map are aggregated at the village level and provide a good overview of 
the village sectors where the displaced non-tribal population find social opposition (if 
not legislative) in acquiring land for residence. In chapter 5, I will discuss how the 
issue of tribal and non-tribal identities continues to create a large segment of denizens 
in the state who cannot claim regularisation of their land-ownership until their status 
as citizens is established, thus, pushing these communities towards landlessness.   
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Map 12: Percentage-wise Distribution of Scheduled Tribe in the Brahmaputra 
Valley  
 
Source: Generated from Bhuvan GIS platform using Census Data 2011 (village level grid 
data used) 
The restrictions on the availability of land due to the designation of sectors as forest, 
wetlands or tribal holdings makes it difficult for erosion-affected families to 
permanently relocate to safer areas. It also makes it difficult for the government to 
assign alternative land for rehabilitation to those living in fragile ecosystems. I will 
highlight this again in the discussion on compensatory policies in section 4.4 of this 
chapter. 
Due to small-holding of farms throughout India (85% as per 2011 Census), there is a 
deep-seated realisation in the Indian administration of the need to diversify livelihood 
options for the rural community and make urban growth more inclusive. Two 
significant programmes that have been created to achieve this target are the Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (discussed in next section) and 
Indira Awas Yojana (Renamed as Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana -Gramin) (discussed 
in Section 5.2)  
4.1.3 Right to Livelihood  
The central government of India has several programmes for employment generation 
that are operated on an all‐India basis. The major ones are the Mahatma Gandhi 
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National Rural Employment Guarantee Act for rural wage employment; the National 
Rural Livelihoods Mission for self‐employment; and the Prime Minister's 
Employment Generation Programme. The state government of Assam operates 
additional schemes to assist in livelihood diversification. These include the World 
Bank supported Assam Agricultural Competitiveness Project; the Mission for 
Integrated Development of Horticulture; and different schemes for the development of 
livestock and fisheries that are undertaken on a departmental basis and through the MP 
Local Area Development fund.  
In this thesis, I concentrate on the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act of 2005 (hereinafter MGNREGA). The Indian government has 
expressed several times that MGNREGA provides a cross-sectoral synergy with 
climate change adaptation, and is aimed at reducing rural-urban migration (Ministry 
of Environment and Forest (India), 2012, p. 116; Ministry of Environment and 
Forest(India), 2015, p. 145).19  
Under MGNREGA, any adult from a household can demand 100 days of paid 
unskilled employment from the government, and such a demand must be met within 
15 days. If the government fails to meet such a demand it is duty bound to pay 
unemployment allowances to the applicant (Section 3, MGNREGA). The scheme 
represents an explicit recognition by the government of its responsibility for ensuring 
the availability of adequate employment for all registered households all of the time. 
The stated objectives of MGNREGA include the creation of a social safety net for 
vulnerable groups by creating a fall-back employment option. However, unlike other 
schemes, the MGNREGA does not require a specific economic threshold or 
demographic character for those seeking employment. Any Indian citizen can register 
for unskilled jobs in a rural area in an unskilled sector.   
                                                             
19 India’s 1st National Communication to UNFCCC was written in 2004, a year prior to the enactment of the 
MGNREG Act. In that report, the Government of India strongly identified the need to diversify rural employment 
and help households increase their income threshold as a strategy towards adaptation. See for example pg. 93 of 
India's First National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/indnc1.pdf  
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In the state of Assam, 90% of the cost of the employment created under MGNREGA 
is borne by the Central government of India and the state has only a 10% share 
responsibility. In scenarios where the state administration fails to provide guaranteed 
employment, the state has to bear the 100% fiscal burden for the payment of 
unemployment allowances (Sec. 22 clause 2, MGNREGA).  
In the organisational scheme for the MGNREG Act, the village panchayats are the 
primary stakeholders in the promotion of the scheme, registration of workers and 
identification of the work to be undertaken. The District Collectors as the Chief 
Program Coordinator have the responsibility for approving block-wise series of 
projects to be taken; according necessary sanctions and administrative clearance; 
supervising and monitoring progress across the whole district; conducting periodic 
inspections of works in progress; and redressing the grievances of the applicants 
(Section 14-15, MGNREGA). The roles of the Central and State Councils are only 
supervisory and consultative in nature, in terms of determining the policy's progress.  
Figure 2: Organogram for functionality under MGNREGA 
 
Source: Chapter IV (Section 14-16) MGNREG Act 
Previous localised studies considering the synergies between MGNREGA and climate 
change vulnerability reduction in agrarian villages have reported a positive outcome 
and potential for reducing rural-urban distress migration (Tiwari, et al., 2011; Esteves, 
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a high synergy between the MGNREGA scheme and Climate Change adaptation is 
also found in the state of Assam (Bhattacharyya & Vauquline, 2013). However, the 
overall impact of the scheme has remained limited so far. In poor states, the generation 
of livelihood under MGNREGA has remained weak due to corruption and inferior 
quality asset creation  (Fraser, 2015). Das (2013), in analysing the impact of the 
scheme in the state of Assam, concluded that the generation of jobs under the scheme 
is inadequate and that this has led to a general dissatisfaction amongst the rural 
communities about the prospects of the scheme. 
A review of the data on the extent of the deliverance of the scheme in the state of 
Assam certainly raises some fundamental questions about the State government’s 
innovative ability to create job opportunities for all eligible households. The 
MGNREGA data available from 2010 to 201720 was analysed for the districts selected 
for this study. A collective overview of the data for the eight districts taken together 
shows that while there has been a steady increase in the number of households seeking 
registration under the scheme, the demand for jobs remains low and the provision for 
the guaranteed 100 days of employment per year remains abysmal.  
Chart 2: Impact of MGNREGA in the state of Assam 
 
Source: Calculation based on MGNREGA district-wise data set  
                                                             
20 At the time of writing this thesis the data for the year 2016-2017 was only available for the first three quarters 
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The data is retrievable from:http://mnregaweb4.nic.in/netnrega/MISreport4.aspx?fin_year=2013-
2014&rpt=RP 
In 2010-211, around 3.89 million households registered under the MGNREGA scheme 
in the State of Assam. The eight study districts of Dhubri, Gaolpara, Bongaigaon, 
Chirang, Kamrup Metro, Morigaon, Jorhat and Dhemaji constituted 25% of the total 
registrations. The study districts issued job cards to nearly 100% of all registered 
households. The highest demand for jobs was in the district of Dhemaji, where 52.66% 
of the registered job card holders demanded MGNREGA employment. A similar level 
of demand was reported in the Morigaon (50.90%) and Goalpara (50.33%) districts. 
In the districts of Jorhat and Kamrup Metro, which are more urban than the rest of the 
State, the demand was low, at 35.54% and 32.73% respectively.  
Chart 3: District wise overview of MGNREGA impact in 2010-11 
 
Source: Calculation based on MGNREGA district-wise data set  
The data is retrievable from:http://mnregaweb4.nic.in/netnrega/MISreport4.aspx?fin_year=2013-2014&rpt=RP 
However, what is deeply concerning is that across the entire state only 3.17% of the 
households demanding employment received 100 days of guaranteed employment. In 
the district of Dhemaji, 11.12% of the households demanding employment were 
engaged in a 100 days’ employment, while in Morigaon only 0.84% of households 
demanding employment were given 100 days of work. The chart below provides a 
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district-wise overview of the work demand pattern for the year 2010-2011 for the study 
districts. The year 2010-2011 is the base year in which all of the districts of Assam 
were brought under the MGNREGA scheme. A total of 962,169 households registered 
in the eight study districts and the districts of Goalpara and Dhubri had a collective 
share of 10% of the total registrations achieved throughout the whole state. 
In 2011-12 there were 60,129 more registrations under the scheme. However, the share 
of registration from the study districts fell from 25% to 24%. In the study districts, the 
reduction in registration was seen only in Dhemaji despite its relatively better 
performance in job creation over the previous year. All of the other districts registered 
higher numbers of households than in 2010-2011. The demand for employment 
amongst job card holders decreased across the state from 40% in 2010-2011 to 34% in 
the 2011-2012 fiscal year.  
Chart 4: District wise overview of MGNREGA impact in 2011-2012 
 
Source: Calculation based on MGNREGA district-wise data set  
The data is retrievable from:http://mnregaweb4.nic.in/netnrega/MISreport4.aspx?fin_year=2013-
2014&rpt=RP 
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It is worth noting that the 2011-2012 fiscal year started with the 13th General Assembly 
election for the state, and cash incentives provided to families during the election 
campaign could be a reason for the decreased work demand (Deputy Commissioner 
Bongaigaon, 2016; Deputy Commissioner Dhubri, 2016). Except for Jorhat and 
Morigaon, which registered a slight increase in demand, all of the other study districts 
registered a decrease in work demand. Work demand in Bongaingaon fell from 44.46% 
in 2010-11 to 29.37% in 2011-12 while in Dhubri the demand fell from 40.79% in 
2010-2011 to 24.18% in 2012-2013. Households completing 100 days of work fell 
from 3.17% in 2010-2011 to 1.17 in 2011-2012. In Dhubri only 0.29% of households 
demanding work were able to complete 100 days of employment, while in Jorhat, 
despite the increase in work demand, only 0.69% were provided with 100 days of 
employment. The chart below provides an overview of the work demand pattern in the 
year 2011-2012 
In 2012-13 the registration of households and the issuance of job cards under the 
scheme was 3.02% higher than in the 2010-2011 base year.  There was no significant 
change in the registration of households from the study districts, and their collective 
share in the state cohort of total registrations remained at 24%. However, work demand 
and work availability during this year fell from 34% in 2011-12 to 31% in 2012-2013. 
Chart 5: District wise overview of MGNREGA impact in 2012-2013 
 
Source: Calculation based on MGNREGA district-wise data set  
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In Kamrup Metro, only 20% of those who were issued with a job card demanded work, 
and in Dhubri this percentage was merely 26%. It is worth noting that the year 2012 
witnessed severe flooding during April, June, July, September and October.  
The flooding in the state occurred in three waves, lasting for a short duration each time. 
The first wave of flooding occurred in April and led to the temporary displacement of 
4068 people. During this time, no relief operation was undertaken. However, the 
intensity of the floods increased tremendously during the second flood wave that 
occurred in June and July. Forty-three embankments and dykes were breached by the 
flood waters across the state, and all twenty-seven districts of the State were affected. 
The districts of Dhemaji and Jorhat were the worst hit areas. The river island Majuli, 
which lies in the district of Jorhat, was completely submerged during the floods. 2.3 
million people were displaced during this period, and 4540 villages across 128 revenue 
circles were severely inundated. On 26th June 2012, the rainfall was 400% higher than 
the expected rainfall pattern. This was a small period of flooding and by the 30th June 
2012 The monsoon rain fell below by 90% of the annual average allowing flood water 
to recede.  
However, in the third week of September, the third wave of flooding washed across 
22 districts, affecting 2.9 million people across 2594 villages in 94 revenue circles. 
The incessant monsoon rain, which is a common hydro-metrological phenomenon, 
was unusually heavy during the June 2012 episode of flooding. Past occurrences of 
such strong flooding have only been recorded in the years 1988, 1998 and 2004. The 
Map 13 shows the extent of the rainfall and flooding during the monsoon season of 
2012 (National Institute of Disaster Management, 2013).21 
                                                             
21 NIDM report on 2012 flooding uses ASDAMA rainfall data from 26th June 2012 and 30th June 2012 
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Map 13: Impact of 2012 Monsoon Flood in the state of Assam 
 
Source: Times of India, Archive 
It is worth noting that after the June 2012 floods severe violence broke out in the lower 
catchment of the Brahmaputra river in the districts of Kokrajhar, Chirang and Dhubri. 
Approximately 77 people in Assam were killed during this violence, and 400,000 were 
displaced for an indefinite amount of time (Al Jazeera, 2012). The situation was 
handled by the involvement of 13 factions of the paramilitary, a curfew and shoot-at-
sight order within these three districts (Buisness Standard, 2012; BBC, 2012). The 
conflict and curfew led to the suspension of works conducted under the MGNREGA 
programme, which mainly affected job-availability for the displaced families (Project 
Officer DDMA Chirrang, 2016).     
Some of the people displaced by this violence are still living in camps in the 
neighbouring district of Bongaigaon, where the living conditions are abysmal and there 
is no provision of water, electricity, livelihoods or schooling (Project Officer DDMA 
Bongaingaon, 2016). The only sign that gives away its status as a camp for those 
displaced due to severe violence is a board that states, ‘rehab model village’ (picture 
below). 
These Rehabilitation camps do not offer opportunities to engage in MGNREGA 
programmes. The displaced families can, however, claim unemployment benefits 
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under the MGNREGA Scheme, if they can establish their status as citizens of India 
(citizenship discussed in detail in Chapter 7). The non-availability of workers in areas 
from which displacement has occurred leads to a skewed programme performance. 
Picture 1: Rehab Model Village for violence affected families, Bongaigaon 
 
Picture 2: Inside the Rehab. Model Village, Bongaigaon 
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The July violence was followed by an August exodus of North-Eastern youths from 
the megacities of India. Video clips of the violence in Assam were widely circulated 
through social media to incite communal violence against North-Eastern youths 
working in several Indian cities (First Post, 2012). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
significant instances of violence and killings occurred in the cities of Mumbai and 
Pune (Maharashtra State), Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh State), Bangalore (Karnataka), 
Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh) and Coimbatore (Tamil Nadu). In the city of Bangalore 
alone 30,000 North-Eastern youths fled to their home states during this time 
(Economic Times, 2012; India Today, 2012; Indian Express, 2012).  
The then Prime Minister of India, Dr Manmohan Singh, who was also a 
parliamentarian from the Guwahati constituency of Assam, along with the Chief 
Minister of Assam, Shri Tarun Gogoi, became directly involved in negotiating space 
and strategies with the Chief Minister of Karnataka (Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi, 
2016). At the request of the Assam government, additional trains were arranged to 
enable north-eastern youth to return to Assam (Zee News, 2012; Deccan Herald, 2012; 
Al Jazeera, 2012a). And the Home Minister of India ordered a blanket ban on SMS 
and MMS circulations in the violence-affected states for 15 days to mitigate public 
incitements (Times of India, 2012; First Post, 2012).  
The floods, the violence in Assam, and the violence against north-eastern youths in 
rest of India badly affected not only the MGNREGA scheme's performance but also 
the performance of all other social welfare schemes and infrastructure building 
projects during that year (Deputy Commissioner Kamrup (M), 2016). Collectively the 
three floods severely ravaged the rural infrastructure building works while the violence 
and requirement for support for the conflict-displaced people pulled everyone in the 
administration towards the urgent requirements, such that the projects under the 
MGNERGA scheme were put onto the back-burner.  
During the 2013-2014 MGNREGA scheme cycle, the registration of households 
across Assam slightly increased again. However, the employment demand amongst 
job card holders decreased in the districts of Dhemaji, Dhubri, Kamrup Metro and 
Goalpara, while it increased significantly in the districts of Morigaon and Bongaigaon.  
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Chart 6: District wise overview of MGNREGA impact in 2013-14 
 
Source: Calculation based on MGNREGA district-wise data set  
The data is retrievable from:http://mnregaweb4.nic.in/netnrega/MISreport4.aspx?fin_year=2013-
2014&rpt=RP 
It is interesting to note that in the 2013-2014 registration cycle, the issuance of job 
cards decreased from the earlier 100% target to 95% in the district of Morigaon. 
Although this is only a slight decrease, I have reason to believe that the care in issuing 
job cards is associated with the State’s perception of citizenship.  
The Assam violence in 2012 over the narrative of ‘illegal Bangladeshi Migrants’ and 
the backlash against that violence across India by religiously charged groups who 
considered the Assam violence part of a sustained scenario of violence against the 
Muslim community in the north of India were picked up heavily by social media and 
the news media. Central government leaders like Nitin Gadhkari placed the blame 
squarely on ‘illegal Bangladeshi Muslims’ who enter from Assam and settle in various 
parts of the country for the backlash violence against the North-Eastern youths in the 
major cities of Indi (Business Standards, 2012a) a. The Central government, as well as 
the Supreme Court of India, gave multiple strong instructions to the Assam state 
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Citizenship in the State and withdraw rights conferred to alleged non-citizens 
(Ministry of Home Affairs, 2013). Thus, it can be assumed that the sudden decrease in 
the issuance of job cards and workers immediately following the episodes in the year 
2012 was the result of a strong political undercurrent in regard to citizenship and 
belonging. When asked, the deputy commissioners of the districts refused to discuss 
this issue, calling it ‘immaterial as the number of non-registrations is very low’. 
Chart 7: District wise overview of MGNREGA impact in 2014-2015 
 
Source: Calculation based on MGNREGA district-wise data set  
The data is retrievable from:http://mnregaweb4.nic.in/netnrega/MISreport4.aspx?fin_year=2013-
2014&rpt=RP 
In 2015-2016, the number of registrations into the MGNERA scheme increased by 
almost 50,000 additional households. At the same time, the number of deleted job 
cards doubled from 15,893 deleted households in 2014-2015 to 29,082 in 2015-2016. 
In the district of Chirang, 3% of the job cards from the previous year were deleted. The 
work demand pattern went up from 26% to 36% in 2015-2016. In Chirang, 58.5% of 
those with a job card sought employment. Around 5.54% of those were given 100 days 
of employment in the district. Overall there was a slight increase in guaranteed 
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Chart 8: District wise overview of MGNREGA impact in 2015-2016 
 
Source: Calculation based on MGNREGA district-wise data set  
The data is retrievable from:http://mnregaweb4.nic.in/netnrega/MISreport4.aspx?fin_year=2013-
2014&rpt=RP 
It is worth noting that 2015-2016 was the year that preceded the 14th General Assembly 
elections in Assam, which were held during April 2016. The performance of the 
districts on their essential programmes was under the media spotlight and social 
scanner throughout this particular year. In the district of Chirang, which out-performed 
its records, both the sitting MLAs won the elections although with a very narrow 
margin (Election Commission of India, 2014).22  
The work demand dependence on MGNREGA is usually low and fluctuating. In some 
districts like Goalpara and Kamrup Metro, the dependence has in fact further decreased 
and the state government has not been able to create100 days of waged employment 
in any of the districts. So far, the overall success of MGNREGA in reducing 
vulnerability by increasing livelihood security has been minimal. Thus, although the 
                                                             
22 The Bijni election was won by a margin of just 1567 votes. Both of these constituencies are massive voter turn-
out constituencies with 86% of registered voters casting a vote. Both the returning MLAs of Chirang had stiff 
competition from first-time contestants, one of whom was an Independent candidate, while the other one was 
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government of India has proclaimed it to be one of its key strategies for mitigating 
rural out-migration through livelihood adaptation, the synergy between MGNREGA 
and climate change migration remains operationally insufficient.  
One of the other principal characters of the MGNREGA scheme is the building of rural 
infrastructure. This involves tasks such as building dykes, constructing roads and 
irrigation canals, maintaining wetlands and creating small structural measures for 
flood-control and erosion prevention. Such structural responses are necessary for 
mitigating vulnerability to floods. Elements of MGNREGA, therefore, also overlaps 
with the Mitigatory Policy thematic area – I discuss them in more details in the second 
part of section 4.2. 
4.2: Mitigatory Policy 
India’s first National Flood Relief Policy was created in 1954 in an aftermath of the 
devastating floods that followed a massive earthquake in the state of Assam during 
1950-51 (Umashankar, 2014; Singh, et al., 2013). From the memory people of Assam 
may tell how the 1951 earthquake permanently altered the geomorphology of the 
Brahmaputra River, making it a shallow basin river.23 The changed morphology is 
partially responsible for the river braiding and extensive flooding during the monsoon 
season (Sarma, 2005; Gilfellon, et al., 2003; Allison, 1998).  
The 1954 policy was designed with three phases of action. The Immediate Phase 
(Within two years) mandated the construction of embankments at vulnerable sites, the 
creation of revetments and spurs, to protect towns against river erosion, and the 
collection of data, to investigate the patterns of flooding. The Short-term Phase (from 
3rd to 7th year) included progress in the creation of embankments and making 
structural improvements in drainage channels. The Long-term Phase (from 8th to 12th 
year) consisted of the construction of water storage reservoirs, the building of new 
                                                             
23 The fearful narrative of earthquake is potent in Assam. It was witnessed first hand by the researcher during the 
field work, when a Richter 5.3 level earthquake with epicentre across the Indian border with Myanmar shook the 
bhumi (land) of the circuit house in Dhemaji and the open spaces got flooded by crowds of people. Having 
experienced a 7.8 Richter earthquake in Tokyo during one of my fellowship in 2009, I personally felt immune to 
a tiny quake until my fearful neighbours insisted that I vacate the premise immediately and take safe cover with 
them. The night hours after that were filled with memories of 1951 earthquake, and phone calls from my newly 
acquired Assamees well-wishers, like it must usually happen in Assam after every earthquake since.   
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embankments wherever necessary, and the adoption of other long-term measures for 
flood control and irrigation (Water Resource Information System, 2013). The Policy 
has since been revised to include the non-structural measures of flood zoning and early 
warnings, which require state governments to identify flood zones within their 
jurisdictions and promote land-use patterns that will disincentivise land ownership in 
flood-prone areas.  
4.2.1 Setting up of Brahmaputra Board 
The management of floodplains under the 1954 policy was left to the state 
administration as river morphology and land-development policy differs on a state by 
state basis. However, due to the massive size of the hydro-metrological projects the 
state rely upon the central government for financial assistance as well as technical 
guidance. The River Management Wing of the Ministry of Water Resource and 
Irrigation looks after the implementation of the flood management programmes 
throughout India except in case of the Ganga River Basin and the Brahmaputra River 
basin. Specialised institutions were created in 1972 and 1980 to provide technical 
expertise and financial support for the Ganga and Brahmaputra basins respectively 
(Rashtriya Barh Ayog, n.d.; Mukhtarov & Gerlak, 2013).  
The Brahmaputra Board, set up under the Brahmaputra Board Act of 1980, is tasked 
to perform functions and exercises that the central government may specify from time 
to time by notification in the official Gazette. Since its constitution, it has been given 
the task of carrying out surveys and investigations in the Brahmaputra valley and 
preparing a master plan for the control of flooding and bank erosion and the 
improvement of drainage in the Brahmaputra and Baraka valleys. The Board has also 
embarked on the construction of multipurpose dams in consultation with the central 
government. In the state of Assam, the policy on flood control is implemented through 
the agendas set out/revised in the National Flood Relief Policy of 1954 and the works 
undertaken by the Brahmaputra Board (Brahmaputra Board, n.d.).24  
                                                             
24 The documentation on the Statutory provisions for flood planning and management in India are available 
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Overall progress under the 1954 policy has been slow. In the Brahmaputra basin, an 
estimated 4458.60 Km of the embankment has been constructed since 1954. In 1976 
the government of India constituted the Rashtriya Bhar Ayog (Central Flood Control 
Board - CFCB) to provide an in-depth analysis of approaches needed to strengthen the 
strategies under the 1954 policy.  
The measures recommended by the CFCB are incorporated through the non-plan 
budgets of the state and central governments. The Public Works Department deals with 
all public works related to flood control. State Flood Control Boards are constituted of 
representatives of the various departments of the state governments and central 
organisations directly involved in flood control measures. However, often, the 
structural flood control measures are inadequate, and in the state of Assam the level of 
this inadequacy is alarming (National Disaster Management Authority, 2008). The 
following maps provide a comparative visual analysis of the water management work 
undertaken in India and the State of Assam. The water resources projects depicted in 
the maps are broadly categorised into Major and Medium Irrigation Projects, and 
Hydroelectric Projects. The Central Water Commission maintains voluminous records 
on projects implemented by the State and Central Government Departments. The 2010 
dataset has been used to plot information on the maps using the spatial-relations-
interface and the query-interface map of irrigation projects including dams, reservoirs, 
and irrigation channels. The maps have been generated through the GIS project 
overview programming. The all India map on the next page depicts a total of 1759 
Major & Medium Irrigation Projects; 132 ERM Projects; 220 Hydro-electric Projects; 
293 Powerhouses; 390 Lift Irrigation Schemes; 4608 Dams; 208 Barrages; 299 Weirs; 
74 Anicuts and 4574 Reservoirs.25 The All India Map also provides a comparative 
overview of structural development in the North-east part. The Map shows a relative 
absence of water projects in the State of Rajasthan (western part of India). It is worth 
mentioning here that Rajasthan is a desert landscape with dry-spells and lack of rainfall 
as a primary issue. There are no significant rivers in Rajasthan and thus, the current 
                                                             
25 Information collated through the Water Resource Information System of India website. The List of water works 
in Assam is available at the following page http://www.india-wris.nrsc.gov.in/wrpinfo/index.php?title=Assam  
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mapping of river-projects and flood risk reduction projects do not populate the state of 
Rajasthan.  
Map 14: Water Management Projects across India, based on 2010 dataset 
 
Source: Map not to scale - generated using the WRIS data available at http://www.india-wris.nrsc.gov.in/WRPApp.html  
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Map 15: Water Management Projects in the North-East (including Assam), 2010 data 
 
Source: Map not to scale - generated using the WRIS data available at http://www.india-wris.nrsc.gov.in/WRPApp.html 
The maps depict a lack of structural development in the Brahmaputra Valley as well 
as the Ganges Valley. However, there are differences between the nature of the 
Brahmaputra valley and the Ganges Valley. First, due to its morphology, the river 
Ganges has a deep drainage basin with mostly defined banks; this character is missing 
in the case of the river Brahmaputra, which, due to the 1950 earthquake in the region 
and a resultant shift in the tectonic plates, became a shallow basin river with an 
undefined course. GIS imagery from Indian Space Research Organizations’ National 
Remote Sensing Mission shows that the Brahmaputra is very susceptible to river 
course-change and bank erosion (National Remote Sensing Center, 2011).  
Second, the Ganges, due to its ‘sacredness’, has an abundance of privately managed 
river-bank structures called ‘ghats’, which are an important part of the everyday rituals 
of the lives of the Hindu people occupying the bank of the Ganges. People living across 
the Ganges use these ghats not only for special ritualistic purposes like birth and death 
ceremonies, but also on an everyday basis for purification baths and the offering of 
daily prayers. However, Brahmaputra is not a ‘mother river’; in fact, it is the only 
paternalist river in India, and no such religious sentiment or physical structure 
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symbolic of religious practices is visible across its Banks.26 Brahmaputra river system, 
does not attract a similar emotive response as Ganga. There is no fundamental 
sacredness associated with the river itself. Unlike the Ganges, which is the ‘life-giving 
mother river’, the Brahmaputra is the ‘mighty destroyer’ or a ‘stream of sorrow’ in the 
popular colloquial narratives.27 The narrative of destruction normalises the disasters in 
Brahmaputra valley and they are not considered as intense as the ones faced in the 
Ganges river system. 
The occurrences of floods in Brahmaputra are politically inconsequential for the 
Central Indian government, due to a relatively low population of the North East India 
as well as the normalisation of flood incidences itself. The prominent place that Ganga 
river basin receive in Water management agenda of India is not shared by 
Brahmaputra, which has led to negligence in big-scale projects in the region.    
4.2.2 Structural progress under MGNREGA 
The MGNREGA scheme is equipped in handling and delivering small-scale projects 
under its program operationalisation. The flood control activities under the 
MGNREGA scheme are 7th in the order of priority of projects that can be adopted 
(Sharma, 2012). In the state of Assam, the erosion protection and flood control 
measures include the construction of cross drainage and bunds, boulder pitching of the 
river bank, the construction of spurs, the deepening of drains and the construction of 
side-slopes and bed-slopes.  
In the cluster area of flood control works, the State of Assam had a total of 4044 
ongoing projects in the year 2015-2016 with a combined value of 199.235 million 
rupees. There has been a decrease in expenditure since 2012-2013, when 1751 projects 
with an estimated value of 242.432 million rupees were undertaken. Most of the 
projects in the study districts are undertaken in the Districts of Dhemaji, Chirang and 
                                                             
26 An exception to the norm is presence of ghat at the water-side periphery of the Kamakhya Templededicated to 
Goddess Kamakya in Guwahati. 
27 In popular culture one of the most celebrated singer of North-East India - Dr. Bhupin Hazarika has famously 
alluded to river Brahmaputra for the ‘heartless miseries across its wide boarder’. The song Bistirna paarore was 
later translated to Hindi and Brahmaputra was replaced by ‘Ganga’ (reflecting might ganga-like river of north-
east). The Hindi rendition of Ganga Behti of Kyun (Ganga why do you flow?) made Bhupin Hazarika a colossal 
figure in mainstream music culture of India.  
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Morigaon, which are primarily rural and have an intensive river network requiring 
flood control measures. In contrast, in the district of Kamrup Metro, which is an urban 
district, the number of projects relating to flood control is minimal. The following table 
provides a breakdown of the projects undertaken in the study districts in 2015-2016 
and 2012-2013. It is necessary to note here that some of the projects that were started 
in 2012 may have spilt over into subsequent years, and even into the year 2015. 
However, there is no accurate data that can be used to provide an overview of the spill-
over projects.  
Table 9: Breakup of MGNREGA works undertaken in 'Flood Control and Protection' Cluster 
District 2015-2016 2012-2013 
 
Completed Ongoing Approved Completed Ongoing Approved 
Bongaigaon 29 89 5 3 48 1 
Chirang 114 284 26 252 74 24 
Dhemaji 37 271 44 55 207 47 
Dhubri 30 80 10 4 44 1 
Goalpara 2 59 0 54 21 0 
Jorhat 15 146 1 64 18 0 
Kamrup M 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Morigaon 13 350 36 16 125 7 
Assam total 519 4044 587 982 1751 395 
Source: Ministry of Rural Development, MIS Database for MGNREGA 
A United Nations Development Programme study conducted in collusion with the 
Ministry of Rural Development found that the construction undertaken under 
MGNREGA in the state of Assam was sub-standard; no proper survey or design was 
undertaken; and it lacked consideration of the cost-benefit ratio (Sharma, 2012). The 
projects, some of which cost over 10 million INR, were undertaken at the Gram 
Panchayat level and were found to be non-durable and technically unsound, often 
constructed under the supervision of the Junior Engineer with the authorisation of the 
Water Resource Department.  
For example, in the district of Barpeta, a single project for boulder pitching of the river, 
costing twenty-three lakhs INR, was undertaken by the GP under the supervision of 
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the Junior Engineer. It was found that the construction was made without any survey, 
design, or cost-benefit analysis. Due to the material weakness the project was unable 
to withstand even the normal flow of the river and got washed away prior to the flood 
season. Similarly, in the District of Bongaigaon, Popragaon G.P. undertook large-scale 
cross-drainage projects with an estimated cost of Rs 1.77 crore. However, the survey, 
design and execution were found to be flawed, and thus the project was deemed 
unsustainable in the long run (Sharma, 2012, pp. 67-70). 
The lack of structural projects in the State of Assam has led to the erosion of more than 
4.27 Lakh Hectares of land in the Brahmaputra valley over the past five decades. The 
total eroded area constitutes 7.4 % of the total land area of the state. The annual average 
loss of land is nearly 8,000 Hectares per year across the 17 riverine districts (Water 
Resource Department, 2016). In 2015, two surveys were conducted at the revenue 
circle level by the district administrators and the Special Advisor to the Chief Minister 
to estimate the number of families living on the embankments who were affected by 
erosion. The result of these non-published surveys was made available by the Assam 
State Disaster Management Authority during this research.  
The surveys indicate differential data and differential methodologies in terms of 
calculating the land-loss.  Over the two surveys, it is estimated that between 10,153 to 
18,495 families suffered from bank-erosion. Within the government, some people feel 
that the numbers from both the surveys are very restrictive. The enumeration accounts 
only for families who are undisputed land-owners and does not even include tenant 
residents, let alone landless residents or those with disputed titles. Furthermore, the 
surveys do not account for households that have degraded and uncultivable lands due 
to sheet-erosion and sand-deposition (Chief Operating Officer ASDMA, 2016). The 
people who live in these eroded and degraded land areas are now permanently 
displaced.   
Conclusion 
As stated in chapter 2, climate change migration is treated in this thesis as a wicked 
problem requiring complex and multi-layered responses. Two such responses were 
discussed in this chapter, which focused on enabling mobility as an adaptation strategy 
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and mitigating structural vulnerability to reduce episodes of sudden and forced 
displacement. In this context, the rights to freedom of movement, freedom of residence 
and freedom of livelihood were discussed along with the administrative responsibility 
for welfare (livelihood diversification) and development (structural enhancement). 
The chapter provided an overview of the existing normative framework and its 
deliverance in the eight study districts. The process of implementation of these 
policies, as stated in the chapter, is carried out by the office of the District 
Commissioner, which is the smallest comprehensive unit of administration in India. 
The District Commissioner is advised by secretarial departments like the Brahmaputra 
Board, and the Revenue and Disaster Management department, to make operational 
strategies and decisions about implementation. Local actors such as the Panchayats, 
block development officers and Junior engineers are the agents who nominate and 
identify projects based on the strategy planned by the district and secretarial 
administrators, for example the identification of structural works that need to be 
undertaken on a priority basis or the identification and registration of households for 
employment under MGNREGA.  
The local agents also act directly in terms of implementation once tasks have been 
approved by the office of the Deputy Commissioner. While some of these agents, like 
the Panchayats, are involved in the identification and deliverance of several different 
structural and welfare projects, their responsibility is limited to specified actions, and 
they are not required or expected to contemplate cross-sectoral or cross-project 
synergies. Furthermore, the administrative accountability of the local officers is 
limited to their line managers and does not include the public they are serving.  
The overall responsibility for delivering project(s), enhancing synergies, and public 
accountability in regard to service delivery is shared between the office of the Deputy 
Commissioner, the State Secretariat, and the governing political party (the public face 
of the government). It can be seen from the description so far that the state of Assam 
benefits from a functional normative framework in assisting in enabling adaptive 
climate migrations and mitigating forced forms of climate change migration. However, 
the deliverance is poor. I will be discussing in the discussion chapters why and how 
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the administrative perspective, the political influence on everyday administration, and 
the demography of the state allows for the variations in response to climate migration 
and considerably restricts any positive outcome. 
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Chapter 5 Relief and Compensatory Policies: Tracing 
Institutional Framework and Progress 
Continuing with the description in the previous chapter, this chapter concentrates on 
the Relief Policies and Compensatory policies that have synergies with the essential 
response required to deal with climate change migration. Understanding how countries 
respond to sudden-onset disasters and how those who are currently displaced due to 
loss of their lands and livelihoods are compensated is essential for two reasons. First, 
in the absence of an international consensus, national policies play a significant role in 
filling the normative legal gap by providing substantive rights to those who are on the 
losing side of the climate change battle. Although the UNFCCC has constituted a Task 
Force on Displacement, its role is limited to consultation and drafting 
recommendations for state parties. Following up on those recommendations or even 
being party to the consultative process is entirely a state’s own prerogative. It has also 
been seen that the Government of India has avoided any open dialogue on climate 
change-related displacement, citing it as a western negotiating tool and insisting that 
the existing legal mandates in India are sufficient to synergies climate change 
displacement with the human development and human security agenda.  
Second, as the administrative organisations work with an incremental stability 
approach, it is highly likely that despite having targeted legislation, the administrative 
apparatus of the country will take some years to internalise the mandates through 
revamping its functionality. It can be seen from the case of the enactment of the 
Disaster Management Act in India that while the legal basis for setting up a disaster 
management authority was created in 2005, the actual functional administrative set-up 
is not present in many Indian states.  
In the State of Assam, the Assam Disaster Management Authority as a fully functional 
entity was constituted in 2012 (Chief Operating Officer ASDMA, 2016), and even now 
most of the relief functioning in the state follows the 1976 Flood Relief Manual and 
associated executive order instead of the Disaster Management Act guidelines (Bohra-
Mishra & Massey, 2011). Although some administrators do believe that the earlier 
executive actions under the Flood Relief Manual and the Disaster Management Act 
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are complementary and in places even imitate each other, the Disaster Management 
Authority does not have direct involvement in disaster response. While it acts as a 
coordinating body, disaster management authority personnel are not involved in the 
yearly flood-management preparatory meetings between the Deputy Commissioners 
and the Revenue Department (Project Officer DDMA Kamrup(M), 2016).   
In the remainder of this chapter, I focus on the relative success of the relief and 
compensation policies of the state of Assam. Section 5.1 provides an overview of the 
relief process in the state while discussing the performance of relief across the eight 
study districts. I focus mainly on the district of Morigaon, which has been the worst 
hit by floods and flood erosion. Section 5.2 discusses the aspect of compensation, 
including the ex-gratia compensation allotted to flood victims, and the Indira Awas 
Yojana, whereby flood-erosion victims are prioritised in the allocation of the 
affordable housing fund.  
5.1 Relief Policy  
 
“Relief, recovery, rehabilitation it goes in stages. However, we have only kept 
ourselves limited to relief so far…. The flood comes, we assist, people go back, 
we go back.” 
(Chief Operating Officer ASDMA, 2016) 
The state of Assam is a relief-focused state. Following the devastating floods of 1972, 
1974 and 1975, the government of Assam adopted the Assam Flood Relief Manual in 
1976. The manual was aimed at streamlining the efforts of relief, demarcating the 
responsibility of each horizontal and vertical department in the necessary 
administration and fixing the amount and duration of relief provided to each individual 
victim.  
The manual focuses on emergency situations arising out of flooding while suggesting 
that the same pattern of relief can also be followed in the case of other disasters 
including civil conflict and human-made disasters. Section 1.3 of the Manual specifies 
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the duties and responsibilities of Deputy Commissioners with a degree of flexibility to 
allow them to operate according to the needs of the situation. The Manual requires 
each department within the State Secretariat to draw up a departmental plan for 
minimising damage and ensure the supply of provisions that may be needed during 
flood relief (Section 1.6). Section 1.7 classifies the flood-affected areas into very 
vulnerable and vulnerable areas based on the recommendations of the Ministerial 
Committee on Flood Relief appointed by the Government of India through the 
Ministry of Irrigation and Power. 
The manual uses an administration pattern like that in the Famine Code of 1880. 
However, it is debatable whether, unlike the Famine Code, the Relief Manual provides 
relief that is too generous, which creates victim dependency and undue stress on the 
state economy. I will take up this discussion again in Chapter 6, where I talk about the 
institutional capacity to respond to climate migration.  
5.1.1 Disaster Management Act 
In the year 2005, the Government of India enacted the Disaster Management Act to 
standardise the disaster response across the entire country. The act made it mandatory 
for every state government to set up a State Level Disaster Management Committee as 
a nodal organisation to strategise relief and rescue operations across the state. The 
Assam State Disaster Management Authority was subsequently inaugurated in 2012. 
At the time of the field visit, the authority had physically established itself with space 
and personnel and was fully functional up to the district level. Each district surveyed 
has a designated District Disaster Management Authority (DDMA) with a Programme 
Officer and District Disaster Management Plan, as mentioned in chapter 3.  
Under the new approach, Assam has adopted an integrated disaster management 
agenda, wherein all departments are involved in responding to all the hazards that 
may occur (Assam State Disaster Management Authority, 2012a). The response is 
carried out through a vertical system of responsibility depending on the severity of the 
disaster. The localised institution of the Panchayati Raj is the first initiator as well as 
a first responder. The implementation of strategic operations like the opening of relief 
camps, the provision of essential food and non-food items, or the management of the 
 
130 Governance of Climate Change Related Migrations in Assam (India) 
evacuation process is overseen by the District Commissioner’s office (Assam State 
Disaster Management Authority, 2012a).  
 
Figure 3: Functional Hierarchy under Disaster Management Act 
 
Although the DM Act of 2005 makes it mandatory to involve the PRIs and village 
bodies in the planning phase, it was seen that the relief plan follows the top-down 
approach of the 1976 Flood relief Manual and the villagers are unaware of the presence 
of the Assam State Disaster Management Authority or the District Disaster 
Management Authority (Group Discussion in Fafal, 2016; Group Discussion Sutar 
Gaon, 2016).  An overview of some of the necessary response functions in the event 
of displacement and planned relocation during a disaster episode is provided in the 
table below. Most of the planning and implementing functions are concentrated in 
either the DC office or the State secretarial departments, while the PRIs and even the 
State Disaster Management Authority only play a limited coordinating role.  
L0 – PRI level
•Close monitoring, documentation, and preparatory activities in anticipation of 
a disaster
•Communicate disaster intensity to district authorities
•Liase with local communities of volunteers, NGOs, Governmental departments
L1 – District 
Level
•Deputy Commissioner act as the Chief operating officer for planning and 
implementation of disaster response in the whole district. 
L2 – State 
Level
•Revenue Department as the Chief fiscal entity for budgeting disaster response




•Moblization of Army, airforce or the National Disaster Relief Force 
•Complimenting the state relief efforts through monetary support (primarily 
though National Disaster Relief Fund)
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• Coordinate support from line agencies to undertake response  






• Conduct weekly meetings to review flood management during the flood season 
• On receipt of flood warning D.C will:  
o Send relief officers  
o Request SP to send Police party and install temporary wireless stations 
o Request Fire & Emergency Services to place State Disaster Response Force 
(SDRF) personnel along with rescue boats if required 
o Seek suggestions from the WR department in regard to evacuating people 
from vulnerable places  
• Visit the places of flood occurrence  
o Make prompt operational decisions. Assess the requirements for men and 
materials for relief. Call for coordinated aid  
o Ensure that services are arranged, and materials are mobilised 
o Supervise arrangements in Evacuation centres and Relief Camps  
o Arrange to collect donations in cash and kind 
o Requisition the services of the officers of various departments, Urban Local 
bodies and Zilla Parishads to undertake relief works  
o Call for Non-Officials/Volunteers/NYK, Civil Defence, Red Cross 
Volunteers or members of other voluntary organisations 
o Secure assistance from the Army/NDRF or other Central Government 
agencies when the arrangements made by civil authorities prove to be 
inadequate  
• D.C will make arrangements to construct shelters in Relief Camps 
• Arrange sanitation and maintenance of clean lines and water supply in the Relief 
Camps  
• Grant gratuitous relief in cash and kind to the affected people 
• Arrange care of the infirm, destitute, orphans, children and expectant/nursing 
mothers in the relief centres 








• Dispatch quick response teams in high-risk prone areas for evacuation 
• Distribute relief materials, Restore basic services  
• Set up temporary shelters for the affected population 
• Coordinate with possible stakeholders  
Finance 
Department 
• Determine the preliminary allocation of funds for relief efforts 









• Dispatch response teams to hazard-prone locations based on the warning 
information 
• Coordinate with the State Disaster Information Centre 
• Facilitate evacuation  
• Provide resource support to conduct Search & Rescue Operations 
• Maintain law and order  
• Relay information through emergency communication lines 






• Determine routes for mobilisation of resources  
• Establish emergency communication network  
• Provide equipment support to search and rescue 
• Coordinate the supply of goods and services 
• Establish missing road-links 
• Clean and remove debris from communication infrastructure 
• Undertake emergency repair of roads/communication and buildings 
• Provide emergency communication links  




• Facilitate movement of emergency personnel, equipment and essential food, 
water and medical supplies 
• Move population to safe areas 




• Coordinate with local authorities and transport essential supplies to disaster-
affected areas and shelters 
• Provide tailored food packets to people with special needs 
• Mobilise air/land/inland water transport for food and essential item supply to 





• Provide immediate safe drinking water supply in disaster-affected areas, 
emergency shelters, relief camps and hospitals 






• Undertake vaccination drive/established disease prevention or mitigation 
protocols for the relief camps 
• Set-up medical relief camps from District to PHC Level 
• Assess the availability of medical equipment and staff  
• Provide basic medical assistance  
• Activate mass casualty plan if the need arises 
Source: Assam State Disaster Relief Manual 
5.1.2 Relief Operationalisation 
Every year between the months of October and December the Deputy Commissioner, 
in consultation with the Chief Minister Office, the Revenue Department, the State 
Secretariat and organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme, 
reviews the flood response approach for the upcoming year. In January and February, 
the DC Office invites tenders from private individuals and organisations to procure the 
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provision of relief (non-food relief). At the same time, the Block Development officer, 
in consultation with the Gram Panchayat and Intermediary Panchayats, survey the 
district to identify breaches and allocate buildings as shelter houses during a disaster.  
By the end of March, the tenders have been accepted, the provision for relief has been 
contracted out to private individuals, and buildings have been earmarked as shelter 
houses. The information about relief and shelters is disseminated by the PRIs and the 
Gaon Buda (Village headman). Any urgent task for repairing a structural breach is 
contracted out to the Public Works Department. The months of April and May are 
utilised by the designated contractors to stock up government inventories with relief 
items for inspection and shift them to the designated shelters after quality checks have 
been made (Deputy Commissioner Bongaigaon, 2016; Deputy Commissioner Kamrup 
(M), 2016).  The end of June until the end of September is the monsoon period when 
the flooding occurs. The relief process begins when the water reaches the safety mark 
in a local area. Temporary relief for a maximum of three days is provided in the form 
of food items and non-food items such as gasoline, rain-sheets, and firewood for 
cooking.  The utilisation of funds every year depends upon the relative intensity of the 
floods and the total relief expenditure (Deputy Commissioner Goalpara, 2016). 
Unexpected structural breaches due to unsustainable constructions, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, may lead to a broader than anticipated scale of disaster. And multiple 
flooding such as the triple flooding of 2012 may lead to ‘back-to-back relief 
operations’ (Bohra-Mishra & Massey, 2011). The principal task of the state during the 
monsoon months is to stay alert to any instance of flooding and respond to the 
humanitarian needs of the people; everything else, 'especially any infrastructural work 
comes to a stand-still as the rains are incessant and there is water-logging everywhere' 
(Deputy Commissioner Kamrup (M), 2016).  
A regular process of ‘incidence recording’ (IR) also known as flood situation reporting 
is used throughout the state and in all the study districts. This process, which has 
continued since the adoption of Flood Relief Manual in 1976, is a sophisticated tool 
that is used for recording details of flooding on an everyday basis, starting from the 
very first day of the monsoon onset. Everyday reporting of the flood-situation is 
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communicated in a set format from every revenue circle. The level of the water, the 
incidence of damage to infrastructure, life and property, and the details of rescue, relief 
and support are transmitted to the district administration. The District administration 
compiles the report into a single file format daily, to be communicated to the State 
Disaster Management Authority (before 2012 the reports were sent to the Water and 
Irrigation Department and the Revenue Department simultaneously). ASDMA 
compiles the report from all the districts to create a daily record, which is published 
on their website. A backlog of these reports can be found on the ASDAMA website. 
Since 2014 this has been accessible to the public. The pictures below show the format 
of the reports on 14th July 2014 and 13th July 2016. 
Picture 3: Daily Flood Report 7th July 2014 
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Picture 4: Daily Flood Report 13th July 2014 
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This reporting pattern has also been used to issue Flood Early Warnings under the 
State Government’s unique preparedness program – FLEWS, to assist communities to 
safely evacuate areas that might be prone to flooding.  The assessment for issuing a 
FLEW warning is made at each District headquarters and transmitted through radio 
channels and the use of sirens in some places. However, the group discussions at the 
river-islands showed a complete ignorance of the warning system and the communities 
evacuating the river-islands based on their perception of danger during disasters. This 
is also a more plausible explanation for people being marooned on inundated pieces of 
land during every cycle of a flood disaster. 
5.1.3 Response Delivery 
Generally, the people of Assam are adept at living with floods. The indigenous tribes 
build houses on stilts, and every rural area has dingy boats that are used for fishing 
during the year and commutation during the monsoons. In some cases, the State 
Disaster Response Force and the National Disaster Response Force are used to 
evacuate people; 'mostly women, children or the elderly need such support. The state 
tries to be self-sufficient by using the civilian police or the home guard unit first before 
approaching the CRPF, Army or the NDRF' (Deputy Commissioner Dhemaji, 2016).  
The state provides relief packages of food and non-food items to those who are 
physically present in the shelters (Deputy Commissioner Bongaigaon, 2016). 
However, in circumstances where people cannot come to the shelters due to 
entrapment and the inability of the state to evacuate them, air-dropping of relief 
material is undertaken. Limited assistance in the form of cash is also provided in areas 
where the provision of shelters and procurement has lapsed, due to structural flaws, 
like an inundation of the buildings designated as shelters. The guidelines require that 
cash is given only to individuals who have lost their grain stock. However, it is widely 
recognised that monetary assistance may not solve the problem of a lack of food 
resources for a stranded population. As one project officer said, 'people cannot eat 
money during floods, they still need grains' (Project Officer DDMA Chirrang, 2016). 
Another senior officer commented that the cash amounts to burden shifting from the 
state to the flood victims. 'If families are unable to come to the relief camps due to 
harsh geographic conditions, it is absurd to expect that they can go to a marketplace 
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to buy grains' (Shri Rajender Kumar Additional DIG, 2016). While at the shelter every 
person is entitled to a minimum support package, which includes food and non-food 
items (Table 12).  
Table 11: Relief Entitlement during Disaster 
Item Beneficiary Quantity 
Food supply for people housed in the relief camps 
and shelters or where air-drops are needed 






Pulse Per person 100 grams 
per day 
Salt Per person 30 grams 
per day 
Mustard Oil Per person 30ml per 
day 
Gur Per person 100 grams 
per day 






Cash given to families who have no food reserves and are not 
housed in the relief camps/shelters due to unavoidable 
circumstances (such as the absence of relief camps/shelter) 
Adult 60 rupees 
per day 
Minor 45 rupees 
per day 
Assistance for clothing where houses have been washed away, 
fully damaged or severely inundated for a week 
Family 1,800 (one 
time) 
Assistance for utensils where houses have been washed away, 
fully damaged or severely inundated for a week 
Family 2,000 (one 
time) 
Source: Data procured from Assam State Disaster Management Authority (entitlement for 2016/17 fiscal year) 
The window of relief operations is limited to a period of 3 days to 30 days. This means 
that the statutory accountability of the government to provide humanitarian assistance 
is restricted to a maximum of 30 days unless there is a continuation of the state of 
emergency (Department of Revenue and Disaster Relief, 2007). It has been found that 
in practice this period of relief stretches from 2 to 5 days, as the affected families return 
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to their place of habitual residence as soon as the flood water starts to recede. This 
quick return is motivated by a lack of shelter spaces, and the fear of losing their land 
to the new encroachers. In particular, in regions where land is held under collective 
community rights, and there is no clear ownership, there are conflicting claims of 
possession (Revenue Circle Officer Kamrup (M), 2016). 
Flood relief shelters/camps are temporary arrangements in school buildings. For 
example, in the district of Morigaon, the District Disaster Management Plan of 2012 
indicates 30 potential buildings that can be used as relief shelters, all of which are 
school buildings. The table below provides an overview of the number of shelters per 
study district alongside the number of villages in each district that are categorised as 
‘very high flood risk’ villages in the 2016 flood hazard atlas prepared by ISRO.  
Table 12: Number of Relief Shelter in the Study Districts 
District 
No. of very 
high-risk 
villages 
Total Number of 
Shelter in the whole 
district 
Number of Schools 
used as shelter 
Kamrup M 53 79 44 
Dhubri 202 162 142 
Goalpara 154 237 172 
Bongaigaon 37 57 57 
Morigaon 265 30 30 
Jorhat 109 34 23 
Dhemaji 11 39 21 
Chirang 8 11 11 
Source: Data collated from 2010 Disaster Management Plan, except in case of Goalpara (2006 figures) and Jorhat (2011 
figures). The Very High-Risk Village figures taken from the District Level Flood Hazard Atlas published by ISRO. 
It can be seen from the table above that the availability of necessary shelters for the 
protection of people displaced due to flooding in the state is abysmal. Except in the 
case of the District of Goalpara, there is not even one shelter per ‘very high risk’ village 
in any of the districts. In the district of Morigaon, a total of 30 designated shelters cater 
for the needs of flood victims throughout the state. Given that villages marked as high 
risk and moderate risk are also liable to temporary flooding and displacement, it is 
apparent that the state capacity to provide relief shelters is highly inadequate, shifting 
the burden of relocation entirely to the displaced families.  
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With the state having such a low capacity to structurally mitigate disasters (as 
discussed in Chapter 4) and almost no capacity to respond to them (discussed above), 
it is discernible that there is annual damage, including damage to human lives. The 
table below provides an overview of the estimated flood damage in the state.  





















2000 966 322 38.88 36 19988 2512 
2001 203 36 5.42 4 15 149 
2002 118.7 298 75.5 65 4294 7805 
2003 701 213 52.75 35 108 11281 
2004 236 522 12.64 495 118772 - 
2007 150.4 674 108.68 134 - - 
2008 416 314 0.29 40 8002 14442 
2010 - 147 0.25 17 3754 - 
2012 Entire state 583 5.3 149 - - 
2013 - 0.71 0.08 - 181114 - 
Source: Calculations based on information provided by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government 
of Assam (data from the highly devastating triple floods of 2012 is taken from National Disaster Management 
Authority. The data reflects the damage caused by the June and September floods only. Some of the data for all 
the years is not available due to discrepancy in reporting from the circle officers) 
It is evident from the annual flooding situation that there is not just loss of public 
infrastructure but also personal loss of livelihoods, crops, land and life. People affected 
due to these losses are pushed further towards climate change vulnerability and are 
more likely to migrate to re-build their economic capacities. Most of these adaptive 
migrations are cyclic, as discussed in Chapter 2. However, when the cost-benefit 
analysis at the household level makes it apparent that the cost of cyclic rotation is 
higher than permanent relocation, the families tend to relocate to their new areas. In 
the case of flood erosion (data provided in Chapter 4), the displacement is permanent 
and forced. The sudden-nature of floods and the fragile nature of the river island and 
river banks in the Brahmaputra valley make it difficult to predict the loss of land. There 
have been instances, like in the case of Morigaon specifically, where in just one season 
of flooding during 2012, a land area encompassing approximately 14 villages on the 
river bank was entirely washed away. The families who left their houses during the 
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period of flood inundation returned to find their lands completely submerged under the 
Brahmaputra river (Project Officer DDMA Morigaon, 2016). Similarly, in the village 
of Sutar gaon, the displaced families returned to barren land covered with silt and sand 
deposition after the floods, unable to farm on their original land (picture 5), and due to 
lack of timely assistance from the state, these families encroached the wetland which 
was 100 meters inward from the bank. 
 
Picture 5: Sheet Erosion and River Braiding in Sutar Gaon, Laharighat Revenue 
Circle, Morigaon District 
 
The map series (Map 16) drawn on a temporal scale shows the decadal change in the 
river-system from 1986 to 2016. The Google earth time-scale imagery is used for 
viewing river-bank erosion in Laharighat Revenue Circle of the Morigaon District. 
The placement is adjusted to provide satellite imagery of the location pictured in 
picture 5. 
As can be seen from the pictures and the GIS imagery a large portion of land in the 
District is now eroded and the families living in the eroded villages are now 
permanently displaced. It is imperative that these families require some form of 
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rehabilitative support from the State. This brings me to the analysis of the final 
normative component of this thesis – the compensatory policies.  
Map 16: Satellite Imagery of Flood Erosion in Morigaon District on a decadal 
time-scale from 1986 to 2016 
 
Source: Google Earth Temporal Mapping Function 
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5.2 Compensatory Policies 
The prime responsibility for providing compensation to the victims of floods including 
those permanently displaced due to floods rests with the government of the state. This 
is because the primary responsibility to build a flood-resilient infrastructure is also that 
of the state government, as per the State List II of Schedule VII to the Indian 
Constitution. The funding for damage compensation, restoration and rehabilitation is 
scattered across various departments through their regular budgetary planning. For 
example, the Department of Agriculture will help with the loss of crops; the 
Department of Labour welfare will provide minimum wage compensation for the 
duration of the flood. Similarly, for structural losses, the Department of Water will 
assist in the restoration of embankments or irrigation canals, while the Department of 
Rural Development will respond to housing needs. There are no pre-determined 
budgets for responding to loss, and every flood cycle is individually assessed through 
an actual estimation of the damages caused during each episode of flooding.  
In terms of fund allocation, as cash given to the victims of disasters, ex-gratia 
compensation is part of the relief operations mentioned in the previous section. There 
are, however, claims for compensation arising from the loss of land and livelihoods on 
a permanent basis. Until very recently the state actors relied on previous precedents in 
regard to compensation allocation and policies, such as the Land Acquisition and 
Resettlement Act of 1894; the National Policy of Resettlement and Rehabilitation of 
2007 (NPRR); and the Land Acquisition Act of 2013 to value land damaged by 
erosion. The values calculated were not uniform and depended upon the demographic 
and political circumstances. For example, a woman owner losing her land is likely to 
receive a larger compensation package and sooner, than a man (Revenue Circle Officer 
Dhubri, 2016).  Similarly, compensation allocated in crucial constituencies or in the 
run-up to the state or central government elections can be higher, and quicker (Deputy 
Commissioner Dhemaji, 2016). The state also has assistance policies like Indira Awas 
Yojana to assist landless Below Poverty Line families in seeking grants to construct 
affordable rural housing. The scheme prioritises benefits for families who have lost 
their lands due to floods. In 2013, the state of Assam also adopted the Chief Minister’s 
Policy on Compensation to Erosion Affected Families. The scheme is the first of its 
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kind in the state (and also the nation) to acknowledge erosion as a reason for seeking 
compensation from the state.  
5.2.1 Ex-gratia Compensations 
In the regular plan, the government indemnifies four broad types of losses through ex-
gratia payments. These are loss of life, loss of a limb (causing permanent disability), 
loss of property (including cattle) and loss of livelihood. On 5th December 1988, via 
communication No. RGR. 120/86/70 made by the Governor of Assam to the State 
Revenue Department, an addendum was added to Appendix 5 of the Flood Relief 
Manual of 1976, quantifying the amount of ex-gratia payments the state government 
should pay under various categories (Department of Revenue, 1976).  
Over the years the loss compensation format has remained unchanged although the 
quantification of payments has been revised several times to keep it in line with the 
inflation and market assessment of losses. 
The rate of ex-gratia payment for the year 2016/17 is provided in Table 14. Apart from 
these, in the case of total damage to a house, a payment of between 95,000 and 
1,01,000 Rupees is made depending upon the geographical location of the house. In 
the case of partial damage, the amount of compensation is between 5,200 and 3,200 
Rupees depending upon the consistency of the building structure (Deputy 
Commissioner Kamrup (M), 2016). It is quite likely that the additional payments are 
in fact made out of the Indira Awas Yojana Scheme discussed in Section 5.2.2 
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Table 14: Policy on Ex-gratia Compensation for Flood Affected Families (2016/17) 
Items Norms of Assistance 
Gratuitous Relief  
a) Ex-gratia payment to families 
of deceased persons. 
Rs. 4.00 Lakh per person including those 
involved in relief operations or associated in 
preparedness activities, subject to certification 
regarding cause of death from appropriate 
authority 
b) Ex-gratia payment for loss of 
limb or eye(s) 
Rs 59,100/- per person, when the disability is 
between 40% and 60% 
Rs 2.00 Lakh per person, when the disability is 
more than 60% 
Subject to certification be a doctor from a 
hospital or dispensary of Government, 
regarding extent and cause of disability 
c) Grievous injury requiring 
hospitalisation 
Rs 12,700/- per person, requiring 
hospitalisation for more than a week. 
Rs. 4,300/- per person requiring hospitalisation 
for less than a week 
d) Clothing and utensils/house-
hold goods for families whose 
houses have been washed 
away/fully damaged/severely 
inundated for more than two 
days due to a natural calamity 
Rs 1,800/- per family, for loss of clothing 
Rs. 2,000/- per family, for loss of 
utensils/household goods 
e) Gratuitous Relief for families 
whose livelihood is seriously 
affected 
Rs. 60 per adult and Rs 45/- per child, not 
housed in relief camps. State Govt. will certify 
that identified beneficiaries are not housed in 
relief camps. Further state government will 
provide the basis and process for arriving at 
such beneficiaries district-wise. 
Period for providing gratuitous relief will be as 
per assessment of the State Executive 
Committee and the Central Team (in case of 
NDRF). The default period of assistace will 
upto 30 days, which may be extended to 60 
days in the first instance, if required, and 
subsequently upto 90 days in case of 
drought/pest attack. Depending on the ground 
situation, the State Executive Committee can 
extend the time period beyond the prescribed 
limit subject to that expenditure on this account 
should not exceed 25% of SDRF allocation for 
the year.  
Source: Document number MHA No. 32-7/2014-NDM-1, Assam Secretariat 
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The victim's family must initiate the process of relief through an application made to 
the revenue circle officer in whose jurisdiction they reside. These applications are 
verified for duplicity and forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner’s office. The DC has 
full power to assess and authorise ex-gratia payments after receiving such applications. 
However, in each year there is a maximum amount within which the DC can make 
authorisations.  
It is also a general practice for the political leaders, especially the Prime Minister and 
the Chief Minister of the state, to sanction ex-gratia assistance to affected people from 
the Prime Minister's Special Relief Fund and the Chief Minister’s Special Relief Fund 
respectively. There is no minimum or maximum amount that can be sanctioned 
through these funds, and thus such support may vary from one year to another and 
from one state to another. For example, the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh 
announced an ex-gratia support of 2 Lakh each to households in Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh who had lost a family member during the 2012 floods, while 1 Lakh per 
household was allocated to the victims of floods in the State of Assam during the same 
year. The granting of compensation is done under the media spotlight with political 
leaders from the government physically handing compensation cheques to the people 
whose applications have been approved by the DC for such grants.   
5.2.2 Indira Awas Yojana 
Indira Awas Yojana provides a priority housing provision to households who have 
become homeless due to floods. IAY is one of the most massive housing schemes of 
the central government of India. It has been widely proclaimed by the Assam state 
government for its ancillary benefits in the rehabilitation process. Essentially a public 
housing scheme, it enables Below Poverty Line (BPL) households, houseless low-
income families, and those living in dilapidated houses to build or get house sites with 
financial and technical assistance from the Government.  
The scheme stipulates a sharing arrangement between the Centre and the State in the 
proportions 75 -25. In case of the North- East State, the Centre accounts for 90% of 
the budget provision while in the case of the Union Territories 100% of the liability 
for the scheme budget lies with the Central government. It creates four categories of 
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expenses: (a) the construction of new houses, (b) the upgrading of dilapidated Kutcha 
houses; (c) housing sites for eligible landless; and (d) administrative expenses. The 
following table provides details of expenditure earmarked for each housing unit within 
the scheme. 
Table 15: Fixation of Funding under the Indira Awas Yojana 
Item  Unit cost Central and State Share 
Construction of new house 
(i) Plain areas 






90:10 for the NE States 
and Sikkim  
100:00 for UTs 
75:25 in other cases 
Upgradation of dilapidated kutcha 
house 
Rs. 15,000 Same as above 
House sites for eligible landless Rs. 20,000 
100:00 for UTs 50:50 in 
other cases 
Administrative Expense 
4% of funds 
released 
As in (1) above 
Source: Ministry of Rural Development, GoI  
Available at: http://pmayg.nic.in/netiay/PMAY-G%20BOOK%20English.pdf 
 
The scheme reserves 5% of the total allocation per funding year as a contingency fund 
at the Central level for: (i) the rehabilitation of BPL families affected by natural 
calamities, (ii) the rehabilitation of BPL families affected by violence and law and 
order problems, (iii) the settlement of freed bonded labourers and liberated manual 
scavengers, (iv)  the settlement of particularly vulnerable tribal groups, (v) the 
rehabilitation of people affected by occupational diseases, (vi) the settlement of 
households benefitted under The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest 
Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, (vii) the settlement of people 
forced to relocate in districts along the international border, and (viii) new technology 
demonstration –with a focus on affordable and green technologies. Apart from the 5% 
reserve share, further prioritisation can be made by the state in consultation with the 
Zilla Parishads and Ghram Panchayats based on needs. The Government of Assam 
prioritises people who are affected by floods and flood erosion in granting benefits 
under this scheme.  
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However, the auditing of the scheme is done based only on funds released to BPL 
families and it does not specify how many beneficiary families have been affected by 
erosion. Thus, it is difficult to ascertain whether the scheme has any impact at all on 
those permanently displaced due to erosion.   
5.2.3 Chief Minister Special Assistance Fund for Erosion Affected Families 
As mentioned earlier, the CM Special Assistance Fund for Erosion Affected Families 
is the only scheme that has a direct synergy with loss and damage caused by disasters. 
The scheme was first introduced in 2010 with the intention of providing limited 
compensation to every household affected by erosion. However, the flaws in tenancy 
and ownership records led to numerous dubious claims being filed and rejected by the 
government (Chief Operating Officer ASDMA, 2016). The scheme was also put on 
hold pending litigation in the High Court of Assam at Guwahati, wherein the validity 
of the scheme in identifying beneficiaries came into question. A challenge was made 
towards the granting of compensation to households whose rights to property were 
already being questioned. Subsequently, the government ratified the scheme by adding 
two critical caveats: (a) The person seeking damage should be able to prove a clear 
right of ownership over the land in question, and (b) applicants or their immediate 
family members should not have benefited from any other state or central government 
scheme. The new guidelines were introduced in 2015, and since then the local bodies 
– PRIs and the Block Development Officers - have been asked to identify the extent 
of erosion and nominate beneficiaries. 
Conclusion 
In the current chapter, I gave an overview of the Relief and Compensatory policies, 
and their operationalisation and outcome in the state of Assam. Once again it can be 
seen that the actors in the network of administration are the same. The office of the 
Deputy Commissioner is a comprehensive unit of government that acts as the core of 
the district-level administration, while the secretarial departments, mainly the Revenue 
and Disaster Management Department, act in their capacity as consultative and 
advisory units in planning and strategising the relief operations and compensation 
policies.   
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The local actors – street level administrators such as PRIs, Block Development officers 
and Designated Village elders (Gaon Buda) – are once again at the forefront of 
identifying the problem areas and implementing the solutions within the strategy and 
policies communicated to them by the Deputy Commissioner's office. Similarly, in 
terms of compensation, the local actors identify and nominate a list of households who 
must be compensated based on their local knowledge of the loss and damage caused 
by the disaster. This list is reviewed and approved by the Deputy Commissioners. The 
process of communicating the approval and allocating the specified amounts of 
compensation is once again done by the local level actors.  
From chapter 4 and chapter 5 it can be concluded that the problem of governance in 
the state does not lie on the normative side but with the deficit of implementation. The 
lack of implementation of the norms has always been a matter of concern for 
academics and policymakers. However, in the international debate on climate change 
migration, the primary focus is on the formation of new policy and new institutional 
regimes, while concerns about the operational abilities of the state are ignored. This is 
partly because many policymakers and academics believe that climate change refugees 
are a new form of migrant that never existed before. In Chapter 2, I discussed the work 
of Piguet (2013), who refers to climate change migration as a return of primitive 
migration into migration studies. And the work of security study scholars who do not 
view climate change migrant as potential ‘refugees’ but rather as economic migrant 
capable of challenging western cultural homogeneity and security. 
As also discussed, the Indian government sees climate change migration as stress 
migration caused due to developmental deficit, rather than a security crisis. Going 
forward with this view in the next three chapters I will reflect upon the sub-national 
framing of climate change migration and how it impacts the response that climate 
change migrants receive in the state of Assam. We have seen so far that the response 
is highly inadequate; however, within this inadequacy there are visible strains of 
differential treatment due to the social and political pressures acting in the state.  
In the following chapters, I will discuss three factors that create these differing 
responses. The first is the role of institutions. From my study, it can be deduced that 
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although the institutions can perceive and identify the problem clearly and precisely, 
they are not able to cope with it because of the inherent lack of capacity and the socio-
political circumstances within which they should act.  
Second, the political narrative surrounding migration not only negatively impacts the 
senior bureaucratic officers in taking the initiative, but also restricts how the ground-
level workers deliver the solutions. Even when the senior bureaucracy is sympathetic 
and willing to push schemes to benefit climate change migrants, the ground level 
officers are influenced by their own political ideologies and commitments in the actual 
operationalisation of the strategies.  
And finally, demography tends to play a dynamic role in creating the image of a 
climate change migration victim. The component of demography determines where 
the vulnerability lies, and it also determines, to a large extent, who is susceptible to 
forced forms of migration. However, in the process of administration, demography as 
an identity marker for climate change migration is overlooked. This neglect not only 
enhances the vulnerability and likelihood of forced migration but also steals the 
window of opportunity through which the administrators can make a relevant impact.  
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Chapter 6 Institutional Influence in the Governance of 
Wicked Problems 
In this chapter, I will reflect on the functioning of senior bureaucracy and street-level 
administrative actors in Assam. The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, 
I will analyse the institutional perception towards climate change migration. Earlier on 
in the thesis, I mentioned that the framing of climate migration impacts how the 
government responds to it. It has been found in the public policy and administration 
literature that the knowledge and mindset of managers profoundly influence the policy 
direction they adopt (Weber & Khademian, 2008; Weick & K.M., 2001; Rittel & 
Webber, 1973).  
In the case of the Indian central government, climate change migration is broadly 
perceived as a complex developmental issue that should be dealt with by the existing 
welfare and developmental policies. However, in a subnational space, the 
governmental actors are influenced by additional external and local factors that lead to 
the reframing of the central governmental perception. The framing by the sub-national 
government is a necessary influence on the utilisation of multilayered synergies and 
complex interdependencies between developmental policies and climate change 
migration governance.  
The second part of the chapter discusses the institutional capacity, with a focus on the 
street-level administrators. Lipsky (2010) argued that there is an irreducible core of 
discretion in street-level public welfare bureaucracies. The street level actors work 
with their own assessment of priorities influenced by multi-dimensional political and 
social contexts. 
It is argued that even when sub-national actors are sympathetic and willing to assist 
climate change migrants, the street level administrators may not perceive and locate 
the interdependencies of their actions (or inaction) to climate change migration 
synergies. And this non-alignment between the local actors and the state bureaucracy 
in perceiving and framing climate change migration affects the overall protection 
response.   
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6.1: Opinions, Perceptions and Framing 
‘Of course, it is an issue of survival.’ - M. Angamuthu, DC, Kamrup Metro, Assam 
‘The country belongs to everyone; everyone belongs to this country…… This is the 
janambhumi and the karambhumi…. people go and live wherever they can.’ 
- VK. Piepersenia, CS, Secretariat, Dispur, Assam 
Unlike the Central government in India, the State government of Assam is more 
forthright in associating climate change with the growing trend of out-migration and 
intra-district migration in the state. In my discussions with the senior officers of the 
state secretariat and the deputy commissioners of the districts, all of them associated 
climate change with the change in the monsoon rain pattern and erratic flooding. 
Highlighting specifically the triple flooding in the year 2012, deputy commissioner of 
Bongaigaon, Mr Pegu stated, ‘we always know that there will be an annual flood in 
the June – July window; however, this was unprecedented, and we were not prepared 
early enough to handle flooding in April…usually, April is a month when we are still 
working on our flood strategy….so indeed it took everyone by surprise. Similarly, the 
flooding in September. We had just finished our relief process when there was a new 
flood that no-one expected. The nature of the floods has certainly changed, and we 
think it is due to climate change.’   
Despite the widespread opinion that climate change has altered the 
hydrometeorological cycles in Assam, the state of Assam has not undertaken any 
systematic analysis to prove this relation. The studies conducted by local researchers 
are qualitative analyses of the community perceptions and no quantitative modelling 
on the relation between the floods in Assam and climatic change has so far been carried 
out. Ms Hazarika, who is in-charge of the ASDMA, recognised this shortcoming and 
stated, ‘we know that climate change is affecting the people in Assam due to its impact 
on hydrometeorological cycles…however, if a central government functionary asks me 
to prove it, I will not be able to do that as we do not have data or correlation analysis… 
so we do not say anything. However, if you ask anyone in Assam they would say that 
the monsoon flooding is more intense and wide-spread. Earlier we used to have a 
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problem only in the river-bank regions; now the entire district gets flooded during the 
monsoon.'  
Due to its geographic vulnerability to flooding and heavy dependence on monsoon rain 
for irrigation the state has been inherently aware of its vulnerability to climate change. 
Assam was one of the first states in India to constitute a fully functional Disaster 
Management Authority and put in place District Disaster Management bodies with 
operational disaster management plans. The push to create the ASDMA came directly 
from the current Chief Secretary of the State, who has made disaster resilience one of 
his priorities.   
In 2011, Assam became one of the first states to undertake a comprehensive 
vulnerability assessment. It is also one of the only two states in India to have utilised 
the Indian Institute of Space Research to map its catchment flood vulnerability using 
a geographical information system. The Flood Atlas of Assam was first produced in 
2011 and was refined and reproduced with added grid data in 2016.  
In 2011, the state of Assam also set out to reinvent its Flood Early Warning System 
(FLEWS), which utilises social media and telecoms technology, especially the 
WhatsApp functionality, to communicate early flood warnings. The FLEW system is 
fully functional It is staffed in the district of Kamrup Metro and is outsourced to the 
Block Development Officers, who act as a temporary communication link in other 
districts of the state.  
It is highly apparent that the push in policy as well as agenda setting, along with some 
favourable planning on disaster risk mitigation in the state has occurred during the 
tenure of the current Chief Secretary. It can also be seen that the UNDP and World 
Bank have been instrumental in raising awareness of climate change risk in the policy 
sector through their risk resilience projects, which have been undertaken in Assam 
since 2010. As one of the Project Officers in the District Disaster Management 
Authority explained, ‘the UNDP project was instrumental in institutional creation. 
Earlier we were working out of the Revenue Department with only one Additional 
Secretary responsible for strategising climate change and general disaster risk…of 
course the waterworks and PWD department etc. can provide information on risk from 
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before, but the state and the districts did not have a systematic body that could 
comprehend all the different types of risks. The UNDP project helped in doing a 
comprehensive risk assessment and from there it became evident that we needed a 
Disaster Management Authority to coordinate everything’ (Project Officer DDMA 
Bongaingaon, 2016). 
However, it is worth noting that a policy push of this type in terms of institution 
creation to deal with the natural disasters in Assam last occurred in 1976. The state of 
Assam adopted a Flood Relief Manual in 1976 with a top-down model for the 
governance of relief during floods. The policy was aimed at streamlining the relief 
operations, demarcating the responsibility of each vertical department and creating a 
minimum state responsibility paradigm. The period of the 1980s and 1990s was marred 
by severe political trouble and violence in the state and can be discounted in terms of 
any new policy and institution creation. The state was under a political siege and 
Presidential rule for most of this period. The first stable government was formed in 
1996 by Praful Kumar Mahanta of Assam Gana Parishad (AGP). I will discuss in detail 
the political influence on migration governance in my next chapter. To put it succinctly 
here, the AGP was elected on the due to the Assam National Movement, and therefore 
the top political and administrative priority in the state was protecting Assamese 
identity and culture. Managing chronic Flood Disasters or displacements due to 
disasters was not a principal concern of the State Government throughout the 1970s, 
80s and 90s.  
In 2001, the Congress government came to power with Tarun Gogoi as the Chief 
Minister and their leadership continued until 2016. Looking at the early research that 
emerged from the local authorship in Assam, two conclusions can be drawn: (a) There 
is a broad sense of dependency on floods for irrigation. And this dependency 
continues, even now. (b) Environmental migration was a security concern and was 
constructed as the immigration of Bangladeshi nationals into Assam due to 
environmental constraints in their country. It was indeed seen not as an internal state 
problem of Assam but as an external issue of border security.  
This narrative of Assam as a host society for environmental migrants from across the 
border has been diluted following the research development as well as the population 
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census of 2011, which for the first time recorded out-migration from the state of 
Assam. The state administration now subtly recognises the internal migration and out-
migration from the state of Assam due to environmental reasons, precisely 
hydrometeorological disasters. Out of the twelve senior-level administrators 
interviewed for this study, eight officers expressed concerns about the safety of the 
people migrating from Assam to other states in India, while also accepting that the 
‘structural development for flood protection in the State has been rather slow’ (Deputy 
Commissioner Dhemaji, 2016; Chief Operating Officer ASDMA, 2016).  
The central government of India has long held the opinion that Assam has been an 
anti-development state and that the current problem of out-migration is a manifestation 
of the continued failure to achieve adequate livelihood security within the state. 
However, the state government considers the problem to be much more complicated 
with a multitude of layers, one of which is climate change. There is no denying that 
the progress in the state has been slow, but the relatively slow rate of growth can also 
be attributed to the annual flooding, amongst other things. One state official, while 
explaining the development deficit, stated that ‘the annual flooding reduced the time-
frame within which any structural or developmental works could be achieved. What 
can people do where there is flood water everywhere? The entire state comes to a 
standstill during that time’ (Deputy Commissioner Kamrup (M), 2016).  
Blaming it on climate change 
With the increase in climate change in the development and disaster mitigation 
vocabulary of the international actors, there has been a visible impact on the use of this 
terminology by the local actors too. Subtly admitting this usage bias, one officer from 
the disaster management board stated, ‘the problem is more or less the same, but if I 
am doing a project on disaster risk reduction and I do not use the terminology of 
climate change and connect how the projects will assist in adaptation or mitigation, 
my project will be rejected. 
The diffusion of international norms into national and sub-national policy action is a 
well-studied phenomenon (Simmons, et al., 2006; Park, 2006). The prominence of the 
phenomenon in creating regulatory regimes in the areas of international trade, 
environmental protection, intellectual property rights, and even human security has 
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been documented as a significant impact of international aid and cooperation (Busch, 
et al., 2005; Beise & Rennings, 2005; Berliner & Prakash, 2012; Berliner & Prakash, 
2013). The growing integration between climate change and disaster risk reduction 
strategies has led to an increased expectation that policies aimed at reducing hazard 
impacts would also have elements of mitigation and adaptation to climate change – in 
other words the disaster reduction strategies would be sustainable and climate-proofed 
(Forino, et al., 2015; Birkmann & Teichman, 2010; Rivera, 2014; Davies, et al., 2009).  
Being a flood-prone state, disaster mitigation has always been a key and continuous 
issue in the state, and thus the shift to perceiving climate change as a 
hydrometeorological disaster was a natural phenomenon for the state actors. On the 
other hand, the central actors, including the ones who earlier served in the state 
administration and are thus highly aware of the state’s problems and its dynamics with 
the central government, firmly believe that the state is using climate change as an 
excuse to cover up its past developmental deficits (Jt. Sec. Ravi Shankar Prasad, 2016; 
Jt. Sec. Jishnu Baruha, 2016; Retd. Addl. DIG Rajender Kumar, 2016).  
Nevertheless, the Central, as well as the state actors, are increasingly aware of the out-
migration from the state of Assam. While the centre blames it on the lack of 
opportunities within the state and the state government’s failure to mitigate disasters, 
the state government has adopted a more nuanced view. Every administrator 
interviewed in this study recognised that climate change was one of the critical factors 
behind the erratic monsoon floods and increased migration within and outside the state. 
The interviewees were also of the opinion that it is not strictly forced migration, but 
migration out of poverty and thus more aligned to adaptive migrations. Rajesh Kumar, 
the Deputy Commissioner of Morigaon district, which is one of the most vulnerable 
districts in the state, stated, ‘It is wrong to say that they are forced to move, yes some 
influential circumstances are there, but that force is from nature and not from the state 
or any other entity of the state. If the lands are eroded they have to move, it is an 
involuntary movement in those cases but not forced.’ (Deputy Commissioner 
Morigaon, 2016)  Similarly, the Deputy Commissioner of Goalpara district stated that, 
'when people do not have a job in the local area, they move to the nearby areas and 
Urban centres. Village economies are small, and there is not much scope for 
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development. A lot of youths from Goalpara go to Guwahati for a job, even on a daily 
basis due to its proximity (Deputy Commissioner Goalpara, 2016).  
Explaining the migration trajectory and migration reasons, the Deputy Commissioner 
of Dhubri District Nazirul Islam stated, ‘normally a single youth from a family will 
migrate either to Guwahati or to outside of Assam. The majority of the youths from 
Dhubri migrate outside of Assam state to West Bengal, Delhi or Bangalore. As Dhubri 
is an old district and a port city it has equal opportunities like Guwahati so the youths 
from here will migrate outside the state instead. It works in a cycle; they will migrate 
just before the flood season and return during the Bihu festival. Now that the floods 
are more erratic the migration is also more erratic, and sometimes the youths do not 
come home for Bihu. However, we do not know if it is yet a pattern, we do not have a 
record. It is just a logical explanation’ (Deputy Commissioner Dhubri, 2016). 
The senior bureaucracy in Assam reflected an awareness of climate change, possibly 
due to the internalisation of the international norms, or replicating the language of the 
development agencies, or just keeping abreast of the global warming discussions, or 
feeling the constraints. They understood that in a warming world the 
hydrometeorological cycles will be disturbed and crop yields will decrease. They are 
also fully aware that the existing problems due to the lack of development will be 
exacerbated, and communities will migrate out of collapsing ecosystems.  
However, the question of whether climate change can be directly correlated to the 
present out-migration scenarios yielded an uncertain response. In particular, due to the 
triple flooding in 2012 and then the December monsoon in 2014, which was a changed 
hydro-metrological scenario in the state, the administration is now beginning to 
connect the dots and is starting to consider climate change as a current problem instead 
of a problem for the future. For example, Dr Angamuthu stated, ‘earlier there was only 
one flood, now there are instances of multiple flooding and flooding even in what used 
to be dry months. If this is an effect of climate change than we are certainly facing it, 
and all the displacement which occurred during and because of these floods can be 
attributed to climate change’ (Deputy Commissioner Kamrup (M), 2016).  
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Nandita Hazarika, building a more nuanced explanation, said, ‘we commissioned a 
livelihood diversification study for the state in 2012, because we are aware of our 
climate vulnerability and if we are unable to provide alternative means of employment 
to our farming communities they will migrate outside the state to generate income… 
farming cannot provide everything, in this state farming is only subsistence’.  
Like a wicked problem, climate-change related migration is perceived by the state 
actors as an issue that is present but cannot be decisively pinned down for an 
explanation. The multitude of reasons for which people migrate, the effect of climate 
change on those reasons and the gap in the data about understanding how exactly 
climate change affects migration are some critical questions regarding which each 
bureaucrat has a different understanding, much like each academic working on the 
issue. Nevertheless, each of the state administrators agreed that climate change is 
somehow affecting the out-migration from the state and it is an issue that the state must 
deal with.  
Priority, Agenda and Programmes 
As discussed in chapter 4 and chapter 5, the state of Assam is highly focused towards 
disaster relief programmes. Despite an unremarkable performance every year, the state 
officials do consider relief operations as critical task of the administration. Primarily 
because of the seasonal nature of the floods, there is no room for escaping their 
responsibility for flood relief. It is a mandatory task (Deputy Commissioner 
Bongaigaon, 2016). The relief operations are directly beneficial to the people displaced 
due to the floods and thus have a straightforward synergy with sudden-onset disaster 
migration.   
In the past, the state has been highly focused on infrastructural development projects, 
especially in relation to irrigation and water resource development. Recently this focus 
has shifted towards rural development and livelihood diversification programmes, like 
horticulture, sericulture, handicrafts, tea-exports and forestry. Legislation like 
MGNREGA, the development of the State Level Human Development Index and the 
Assam Disaster Management Authority's study on livelihood diversification for 
climate change adaptation have collectively contributed to this change. A subtle force 
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has also been the development of the right to information and the digitisation of 
government works, which has streamlined the departmental functioning, making it 
more transparent and accessible for social auditing purposes.   
Mr Victor Carpenter, the Deputy Commissioner for the Dhemaji district in Upper 
Assam, explained in a somewhat upfront conversation, ‘earlier no-one knew 
government business, so there was huge scope of corruption. People in the department 
used to get a big project sanctioned before the wedding of their daughter, and they 
would go for a smaller project if they had to buy a car. Every project gives a money-
making opportunity; infrastructure development projects were the cash-cows of 
corruption for everyone. It is a flood-prone state so half of the blame for the non-
completion can be shifted to the floods straight away, and the other half can be put on 
the political parties. The political violence during the 1980s and 1990s created an 
image of the state as being politically disturbed; that image was used to disperse the 
blame for non-achievements. Sometimes it is also true that some local leaders will not 
let progress happen, but mostly it is just smoke without fire.' 
To put it succinctly, however, an example would be the Lower Subansari Dam project 
in the district of Dhemaji in the Gogamukh revenue circle of Assam. The Brahmaputra 
river board started its initial feasibility studies about the construction of a hydel-power 
project, including a dam reservoir, which was aimed at reducing down-stream flood 
damage and generating electricity in the region. The Subansari Hydropower project, 
which was to be constructed at the border of the State of Arunachal Pradesh and the 
State of Assam in the district of Dhemaji was proposed in 2001. It was expected that 
the dam would not only provide adequate flood control measures but would also raise 
the electricity generation capacity of the state substantially, by 2000MW. However, as 
of 2016, the lower Subansari Dam, which falls under the State of Assam, is still under 
construction, despite almost 117 MoUs being signed between the State and the Central 
government at various points to kick-start the halted progress. In the 2016 State 
Assembly election, the opposition to the Dam construction was once again an agenda 
item of the BJP, and the current Chief Minister, Sarbananda Sonwal vehemently 
opposed the project. Nevertheless, a gigantic 400% of the initial proposed monetary 
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value has already been spent on a Dam, which is practically non-existent (Deputy 
Commissioner Dhemaji, 2016; Project Officer DDMA Dhemaji, 2016). 
The process of fiscal approval for planned work over a twelve-month period occurs on 
an annual basis in April/May. In June and July, the state and its departments are busy 
dealing with floods. During this time the local political leader uses the fear of flooding 
to generate a commotion regarding the building of the Dam, through ‘what if dam 
collapses’ articles, which are published on a regular basis in local papers with a large 
circulation. As soon as the flood recedes and the relief process is concluded, local 
leaders start a sit-in protest for Dam construction on grounds that vary from ‘misplaced 
priority’ to ‘environmental issues’. The protest stagnates the work until September 
when the position of the local leadership is bought through the proportion of project 
money donated as party funds. The construction continues between October and 
December, and if there is no flood during this season, the state officials can supervise 
the works. From January onwards, the state is busy with its regular relief progress 
strategy, budgeting for next year etc. and during this time there is no supervision of 
infrastructural building projects. So, the overall progress and quality achieved during 
the time are undoubtedly below par. In the end, it is only for three months out of twelve 
months that any real structural work happens. This delaying tactic is beneficial for 
everyone involved. Every year a new budget for the project provides a new opportunity 
to syphon off public funds. Political parties like it too, as they can bring people to 
protests and create a pro-Assam culture imagery while also generating party funds. It 
is good even for those who take part in the protest, as they get paid by the parties 
arranging the protest. The longer a project goes on the easier it becomes to take money 
out of it. 'The Gogamukh project is in that sense a golden egg laying hen. If we finish 
it the hen is dead' (Deputy Commissioner Dhemaji, 2016).  
However, the delay in the progress of the Dam has given the state an anti-development 
image, and it has become increasingly difficult to get similar big projects approved by 
the centre. Thus, the focus has shifted towards programmes that are more aligned with 
the central policies and directly beneficial to the rural communities.  
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This shift means that the state is not able to adequately respond to mitigation needs, 
and hence the synergy with policies needed for mitigating migration by protecting and 
developing liveable landscapes are weak. Even though the state has lost 7% of its 
territorial region to flood erosion in the last five decades, it does not want to depend 
on structural measures and has instead adopted a policy to compensate those who are 
forced to relocate due to land erosion. Erosion affected households are also prioritised 
in every state government welfare policy, including the rural housing policy, the crop 
insurance policy, the maternal health policy, tribal development policies etc.  
In the last five years, projects like MGNREGA, IAY and Horticulture development 
have become the district priorities in the study districts. For example, in the Dhubri 
and Kamrup Metro Districts, the District Commissioners have placed affordable 
housing at the top of their agenda, in addition to maternal health and digitisation 
project. Affordable housing has a synergy with climate change migration, as it allows 
families to own structurally stable accommodation and reflect on the mitigation of out-
migration. It has been seen in several studies, discussed in chapter 2, that ownership 
influences out-migration negatively.  
In the districts of Dhemaji and Morigaon, priority is given to livelihood diversification 
projects under the MGNREGA and Horticulture projects. Livelihood diversification is 
necessary to reduce involuntary rural to urban migration by communities living in 
fragile areas. Similarly, in the districts of Jorhat, Goalpara and Bongaigaon, the deputy 
commissioners are keen on employment generation activities, including business 
development enterprises, through the promotion of semi-skilled trades such as mobile 
telephone repair shops and electrical shops.  
The district commissioners in Morigaon, Dhubri and Goalpara are also highly 
concerned with the loss of land and the permanent displacement of farming 
communities from these areas. Thus, the development and revision of cadastral data is 
also a key functional area. The state government of Assam has adopted a single piece 
of software to deal with land allotment and revenue data under the Dharitri project. 
The software allows the districts to compile data on land use and land availability 
including data on the formation and deformation of the river islands. Knowledge of 
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land-use and land-ownership is necessary not only to improve the focus of programmes 
in fragile ecosystems but also to enable compensation for loss of land. Thus, it has a 
direct synergy with the loss and damage component of climate change migration 
governance.  
However, policies are only as good as the implementation they beget and, in the 
scenario, where the management of migration is not the end –goal of the policy the 
synergies are often missed, ignored and overlooked. There are at least three approaches 
to the implementation of any policy: the top-down approach, which relies on a strong 
central organisation, a clear and consistent policy objective, fully specified tasks, 
minimal dependency relationships and an inherent assumption that the implementing 
authorities will execute the task efficiently as per the expectations, unless an external 
socioeconomic condition significantly undermines the process. In contrast, the bottom-
up approach charts the implementation of policy through self-selecting clusters of 
organisations (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes, 1997). The third approach is to tie the 
bottom-up, and the top-down approaches into a new administrative management 
model, wherein the centre constitutes the loose outline of the policy while the local 
actors can negotiate competing details and synergies that they would like to prioritise 
(Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes, 1997) 
In the Indian context, policies on rural employment generation and disaster 
management follow the new administrative model, wherein the legal document 
provides a loose outline of the functions and responsibilities while leaving space for 
the local actors to fill in the details. It was seen during this study that while the senior 
bureaucratic officers can perceive the complexity of wicked problems, requiring a 
series of tasks to be achieved in a relatively harmonious routine, for the street-level 
actors, the designated tasks are just a routine – part of the mundane everyday 
administration. There is a growing body of public policy literature that has critiqued 
the omnipresence of senior bureaucracies (managers), expressing scepticism about the 
managerial rhetoric of problems and policies, and pointing at the systems' inability to 
eliminate discretion and differential policy outcomes (Evans, 2010; Baldwin, 1998; 
Ellis, 2007). In the next section, I analyse the response of the street level actors to tasks 
that are essential for a positive protection outcome. 
 
162 Governance of Climate Change Related Migrations in Assam (India) 
6.2 Street-Level Actors and their influence on institutional response 
There is an intricate core of discretion at the street level in public welfare bureaucracies 
that is necessary to make policies works. In classic models of public policy 
implementation, it has been seen that street-level actors use discretion within their 
powers to make a choice among the possible courses of action and inaction. These 
choices are influenced by the micro-cosmos of social and political interactions and 
have the power to impact policy performance profoundly.   
In the policies studied for this thesis, the street level actors are crucial in not only 
identifying the local issues and beneficiaries but also making sure that the policy 
benefits are delivered to them. The table below provides an overview of the essential 
tasks that must be achieved by the street-level bureaucrats in the thematic areas 
discussed in chapter 4 and chapter 5 
Table 16: Implementation process broken to essential street-level actions 
Thematic area Essential Street-level 
action 
Task 
Enabling Policy Recognition of citizenship 
rights 
Maintain citizenship data 
Recognition of possession 
and ownership rights 
Maintain data on temporary and 
permanent ownership 
Registration of workers Maintain household level data and 
register households for job cards 
Mitigatory 
Policies 
Identification of works for 
construction 
Maintain geographic and cadastral data 
Supervision of work 
completion 
Visit construction site to supervise 
works 
Relief Policy Identification of risk Visit vulnerable sites for assessing risk  
Distribution of relief 
material 
Disseminate information on relief and 





Draw up list of people eligible for 
compensation 
Recognition of ownership 
for claims to compensation 
Verify ownership documents 
Draw up list of temporary ownership 
holders who qualify for permanent 
ownership 
 
It can be discerned that at the local level the management of data is essential for the 
deliverance of any programme. In the case of migration governance, citizenship data, 
data on the ownership of resources, and land data are critical to enable the government 
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to provide targeted programmes on livelihood, affordable housing and compensation 
for loss of property. I have discussed already, in section 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 of the previous 
chapter, how the process of relief is operationalised in the state. I will return to this 
again in chapter 7 and chapter 8 due to its intricate connection with the politics of relief 
contracting and the influence of demography on the distribution of relief material. I 
will also discuss the process of maintaining the citizenship data in more detail in 
chapter 7 due to its complicated relationship with the political narrative in the state.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I will focus on the collection of ownership and 
possession data and how it is utilised to provide compensation to families permanently 
displaced due to flood erosion. This data is very important for people who are forced 
to move on a permanent basis due to the loss of their habitat and is essential for 
strategising the rehabilitation of displaced communities. This is also a functional area, 
which, unlike relief operations or citizenship records, is hidden from the constant 
media and civil society scrutiny, and hence provides a more significant opportunity for 
the local actors to exercise discretion in determining rightful ownership claims.  
Determining the rights to the land 
In the state of Assam, the basic unit of the cadastral data record is a plot, and several 
groups of plots are categorised as a Lot (Field), maintained by a Lot Mandal. Villages 
can be mapped on a single cadastre sheet consisting of a single Lot. Several villages 
are put together to form a pargana, which is equivalent to the block level 
administration supervised by Mauzadars, and several parganas form a tehsil, which is 
managed by a Revenue Circle Officer (Tehsildar). Several Tehsils together form a 
district, headed by the District Commissioner, which is the complete basic unit of 
administration (Section 122 – 124 of the Assam Land Revenue Act of 1986).  
The registration of ownership of land is not compulsory, and possession rights can be 
held in the form of a registered deed called a patta. A Patta is further classified as an 
annual patta or periodic patta. In the case of an annual patta the patta holder must pay 
an annual revenue to maintain their possessory rights, while in case of a periodic patta 
the revenue must be paid on a 10-yearly basis. There is four general starting points for 
land ownership: (a) the purchase of periodic patta land, (b) hereditary transfer, (c) land 
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grant under the government scheme to benefit landless farmers, or (d) adverse 
possession ownership of fallow land.  
Each of these categories is recognised under a different patta system. When a person 
purchases periodic patta land, the buyer gains the land as periodic patta land. In the 
case of hereditary transfer, the status of the land as annual or periodic patta is passed 
on to the successor. In the case of land grants made by the government to landless 
farmers, the land was granted as an annual patta land until 2014. And in case of adverse 
possession, the land is allotted as patta land only when the right of the possessor is 
established without conflict. For example, the ownership of government lands is 
prohibited through The Assam Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act of 2010. Before the 
Act came into force, the state recognised the adverse possession rights of landless 
farming households over the non-reserved category of land. This meant that the 
possessor had the right to seek a periodic patta on a land if they had paid the amount 
equivalent to annual patta taxes for a continuous period of 12 years, and the possession 
had not been disputed by another private party or the state (Department of Land and 
Revenue, Assam, n.d.).  
The data on possession and ownership within each village is maintained by the Lot 
Mandal, who must update the local cadastral maps and report to the district 
administration any changes that might have occurred. These changes include any new 
possessions, changes in the existing ownership of land, and topographical changes 
such as erosion.  
Most of the land surveys in the state were done before Indian independence and re-
surveys are conducted only when the cadastral markers points are severely altered. The 
process of resurveying is a highly manual process that does not utilise modern 
technology for surveying or mapping, leading to disparity in the data. The cadastral 
data on ownership and possession is updated when the interested parties approach the 
Lot Mondal, while the data on flooding and flood erosion of lands is updated when the 
victims along with the village headman approach the district authorities to re-survey 
the cadastral data of the affected village. The District authorities will then direct the 
Lot Mandal to make a resurvey report. In the case where a new river island emerges 
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and is occupied by incoming inhabitants, a new cadastral map must be made by the 
Lot Mandal (Deputy Commissioner Dhubri, 2016; Kumar, 2016; Rajkumar, 2016; 
Revenue Circle Officer Kamrup (M), 2016; Deputy Commissioner Kamrup (M), 
2016).  
As per the data provided by the State Government, there are 1391 completely non-
surveyed villages out of which 358 are char villages that are possibly newly created 
land areas. Close to 196,856 people inhabit the non-surveyed Chars within the study 
districts. The absence of knowledge about the nature of geographical existence of these 
land-areas seriously jeopardises the associated rights of the land-owners/occupiers and 
downplays the claims of compensation in cases of loss of territory (Department of 
Land Records and Survey, 2016). 
Furthermore, even in cases where the cadastral data is known, there is an admitted 
laxity in the performance of duty at the Lot Mandal level. The burden of ensuring that 
the Lot Mandal is doing his job falls upon the household that stands to lose their 
property rights. And the cost of inviting the Lot Mandal and providing hospitality is 
not always feasible for low-income families. As one Gaon Buddha explained, 'this is 
the invisible cost of the system'. The visible cost includes the documentation itself – 
procuring a copy of the cadastral documentation incurs the costs of transportation and 
copying, and losing at least one day's worth of working hours, which is not an 
affordable proposition for households living below the poverty line or headed by a 
female member. For farmers, maintaining their property rights in a scenario where the 
land holdings are small and are used for subsistence agriculture alone is neither easy 
nor economical (Group Discussion Sutar Gaon, 2016; Revenue Circle Officer Dhubri, 
2016).  
Now, under the CM’s Erosion Affected Families scheme, people displaced due to 
flood erosion can claim state support. However, to rightfully establish a right to 
compensation a claimant must prove that the land in question was in existence and the 
person seeking compensation had an ownership or possession right over the eroded 
land. The question of existence and ownership of a land-mass is thus directly tied to 
the capacity of the state to maintain and regularly update the cadastral data.  
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The Revenue Circle Officer, who is the next in line officer responsible for the 
maintenance of the data, has the task of updating the entire data set under his 
jurisdiction every ten years, and submits a report to the Deputy Commissioner, who is 
the only authority empowered to convert land tenures from an annual patta to a 
periodic patta after a thorough inspection of any contesting claims to the land, 
including any claim on the land from the government itself (in which scenario the 
payment of the revenue is for 30 years before conversion from fluctuating to fixed 
tenure can be effectuated). However, both the positions of the Revenue officer and 
Deputy Commissioner are rotational and subject to change every three years. Thus, the 
work of updating the cadastral data and regularising the land tenure may not always 
enjoy bureaucratic priority (Revenue Circle Officer Dhubri, 2016).   
For example, it became clear during this study that none of the deputy commissioners 
has regularised any land patta from an annual patta to a periodic patta, thus granting 
ownership rights to the land possessors. The government of Assam further refused to 
provide statistical information on the number of households holding annual pattas and 
those holding periodic pattas in the state. The group discussions conducted during the 
study found that the majority of landowners were paying annual taxes and believed 
that their land rights were held in the annual patta category (Group Discussion 
BashaniChar, 2016; GaonBudha, 2016; Group Discussion Sutar Gaon, 2016).  
Land held under an annual patta does not allow the possessor an ownership right, and 
their status as the rightful possessor is itself under constant scrutiny. As one of the 
Revenue Officers explained, ‘It is challenging to grant land; most of the time the 
families have occupied a reserved category land in a wetland area or a forest… you 
can see for yourself new families residing in the Hasil Bill area or look at areas within 
the Kamrup Metro…all of these areas were wetlands once; now people live 
here…where have they come from? Look at all the villages whose names end with NC; 
they have reserved forest areas. The government cannot transfer reserved areas to 
private ownership……. We let them stay…..most of the time…. They are poor people, 
they have to farm to feed their families…sometimes the younger generations forget 
that it was a forest or a wetland and then if there is public sympathy or court orders 
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than we convert….but mostly people remember where they have come from and it is a 
big political issue whether or not the conversion of land happens.’ (Revenue Circle 
Officer Dhubri, 2016). However, until the conversion happens, the possessor has to 
maintain a full record of the payment of annual taxes to maintain a possessory right 
over the property in question. If during this time the land gets submerged or is made 
barren due to sheet erosion, the possessor must keep paying the revenue until such 
erosion is recognised, or the rights are converted to periodic patta cultivation rights, 
when compensation for loss of land (instead of just loss of a single crop) can be sought.  
Once erosion is recognised, multiple claims may arise on the same piece of land. 
Oswin Nampuri, the Circle Officer from Kamrup Metro, explained that such claim 
cases are very regularly brought from the char areas, as the land and population are 
both floating. Narrating one of the recent cases, he said once land is eroded the Lot 
Mandal makes an erosion report based on which erosion victims can claim 
compensation or rehabilitation from the state revenue department. These claims, along 
with the certificate of ownership, are attested at the Revenue Circle level and approved 
by the District Commissioner. An ex-gratia payment ranging from 50,000 to 200,000 
rupees is made based on the type of land in question. Rehabilitation land for the 
construction of a homestead is provided if the district can identify suitable fallow land 
for the purpose. However, it is possible that long after such compensation has been 
made the land may re-emerge and the original owner may try to assert their rights. 
Meanwhile, it is also possible that through adverse possession some new residents 
might have started living on that property. The situation can be complicated further if 
the original owners were annual patta holders and continued to pay taxes for land that 
was eroded that subsequently re-emerged. The whole process of identifying clean land 
titles with an explainable line of transfers, hereditary ownership, and possession is one 
of the most legally complicated areas of adjudication in India (Revenue Circle Officer 
Kamrup (M), 2016). In a state like Assam, where the land itself is floating and 
destructible, there are additional layers of complexity. For example, some of the chars 
that were submerged in the Morigaon region re-emerged on the Sonitpur district 
boundaries. For the people occupying the chars across the Sonitpur Districts these 
were new chars, but the Morigaon district farmers claimed existing ownership due to 
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the presence of debris from their previous houses. It is interesting to note that the 
claims of the Morigaon farmers were based on the debris of thatched houses (non-
permanent structures) washed away in floods, a claim that cannot be proved by any 
legal standing. The Morigaon officials treated the chars as falling under the Sonitpur 
district jurisdiction, while recognising that some of the farmers had indeed become 
landless due to floods (Project Officer DDMA Morigaon, 2016). This implies that they 
can claim land-grants or IAY grants under the state policy for landless farmers. 
However, whether the grant will be equivalent to the market value of the land they lost 
or will enable them to buy more land and resettle in a new area is not an issue with 
which the administrators at the local level are concerned.  
The state capacity to untangle the complex land titles is further intensified by the 
claims of the indigenous tribal communities in the region, who politically channel their 
right to all the land in the state. I will analyse the influence of politics on the status and 
rights of the victims in greater detail in Chapter 7. It is, however, necessary to mention 
here that the implementation on the ground of even the most well-meaning policies is 
deeply affected by the political narrative. Not only are the communities who are 
suffering vulnerability kept at a threshold of welfare policies, but their rights are also 
not adequately represented.  Despite the insistence of the senior bureaucracy that the 
executive functioning of the state is separate and bereft of legislative interference, the 
political interference of the leadership cannot be ruled out. Where there is no direct 
interference, there is indirect interference at the street-level. The street-actors 
themselves use their discretionary powers to avoid undertaking acts that conflict with 
their personal political understanding. If such non-actions cost the system, its 
performance is overlooked in a scheme of dispersed accountability.   
Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter gave an overview of how the institutional perception and 
institutional capacity affect the deliverance of welfare policies, which are closely tied 
to migration governance. It was shown that while the senior bureaucracy is aware of 
the nested complexity of migration due to environmental constraints and is capable of 
identifying policies that could potentially benefit households that are forced to migrate 
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due to climate change, the same level of understanding of the complexity is not visible 
among the street level actors. The absence of concern added to their inability to 
perform their jobs effectively allows for a substantial amount of discretion in providing 
welfare and protection to those who are displaced in the state. The system perceives 
migrants as dynamic actors who are surrounded by the unfortunate circumstances of 
poverty and resource deprivation. Nonetheless, even in a constricted environment, the 
communities are capable of self-care. The administration describes the flood victims 
as poor helpless people who must relocate to survive (Deputy Commissioner Kamrup 
(M), 2016). On the one hand, the State administration is conceptually aware of the 
complex nexus between several policies furthering resource ownership, resilience, 
adaptation and migration, on the other, the operationalisation of the plans by street-
level actors is devoid of this rationality. At one end of the spectrum, the political and 
social customs surrounding a street-actor influences their perception and deliverance 
of their task, while on the other end, it adds a layer of complexity by adding yet another 
interpretation to an already wicked problem. The insufficiency of the results of 
programmes not only makes the provision of care  inadequate but also regularly pushes 
the vulnerable communities towards further marginalisation and the inability to adapt 
to changes in weather scenarios.  
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Chapter 7 Political Impact on Governance Performance 
In the current chapter, I analyse the impact of state politics on the operationalisation 
of welfare policies. It is worth noting at this point that from 2001 until 2015 the state 
of Assam was under the stable leadership of the Congress Party, headed by Shri Tarun 
Gogoi, who was also interviewed for this study while he was still in office. Despite the 
Congress government’s open stance towards minorities and migrant communities, the 
history of cross-border migration in the State of Assam has continued to negatively 
affect the deliverance of protection to displaced people. It is argued in this chapter that 
the social and political construction of migration as illegal migration from Bangladesh 
has restricted the scope of citizenship rights at the micro-levels. And anyone in the 
state using migration as a strategy to adapt or forced into displacement due to flood 
erosion can be placed in the ‘illegal migrant’ category, on which the state politics 
thrive. This political interference of the state leadership severely constricts the scope 
of executive functioning and limits the amount of protection that climate change 
migrants can receive.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I ask, who can seek protection? How does the 
historical hostility towards ethnic and religious minorities put them in a structurally 
disadvantaged position that adds to their vulnerability due to forced environmental 
displacement? And finally, does the politics of relief still have the sympathetic 
capacity to alleviate some of the suffering even for those whose rights are 
questionable?  
7.1 Politics of Citizenship  
Whether, a person, displaced due to climate-change related weather event has the right 
to have a right? Who is the subject of care? How does the categorisation of people as 
citizens or non-citizens affect the quantum of protection that the government is 
obligated to offer them? These are some of the fundamental questions that are crucial 
to this thesis. The incidence of citizenship lies at the heart of all the conditions that 
govern mobility in a national context. As discussed in chapter 4 section 1, it is the 
citizens alone who have the right to freedom of movement and residence within 
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national boundaries. The administration, by respecting this right and ensuring the free 
right to movement, enables communities to use migration as an adaptation strategy.  
Similarly, the quantum of response provided by the government to people displaced 
due to hydro-meteorological disasters correlates to their status as a citizen or non-
citizen. The right to seek compensation for loss or damage caused to a habitat, due to 
climate-change related weather events, is dependent upon the recognition of a person’s 
right to own property in that habitat.  
In the current section, I examine the context of citizenship by analysing the complexity 
of the de jure and de facto citizenship rights practised in the state of Assam. This 
practice of citizenship determines how the state administration does (or does not) 
respond to the needs of those displaced or migrating due to environmental stress.  
Legal determination of citizenship in India 
The key legislation that determines citizenship in India is the Constitution of India 
1950, The Citizenship Act of 1955, and The Foreigner Act of 1956. In the state of 
Assam, further detail is added to the anatomy of citizenship through special legislation, 
namely The Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act of 1950, the Citizenship 
(Amendment) Act of 1985 (recently amended again in 2015), The Illegal Migration 
Detection (and Deportation) Act of 1985 (hereinafter IMDT Act), The Assam Accord 
of 2003, and the Supreme Court Judgement under Sarbanadan Sonwal Versus Union 
of India, 2012. 
The Indian Constitution isolates citizens from non-citizens in Chapter II Article 5 and 
Article 6. Article 5 grants Indian citizenship to every person residing in the territory of 
India as of 26th November 1949 provided such a person:  
(a) Was born in the territory of India, or  
(b) has parents who were born in the territory of India, or  
(c) Has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not less than five years.  
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Article 6 of the Constitution provides naturalisation rights to persons who migrated to 
the territory of India from Pakistan (including the then East-Pakistan) before the 
nineteenth day of July 1948 and have been ordinarily residing in India, providing that 
at least one parent or any of the grandparents of such a person was born in the 
undivided India.  
In the case of migration occurring after the nineteenth day of July 1948, the person 
seeking citizenship by naturalisation must have registered himself as present in India 
and must have resided in India for at least six months.  
The minimum articulation of nationality by the constituent assembly was a response 
to the massive influx of migrants at the Western borders in Punjab. However, the 
unsettled territorial delimitation in the Eastern border added complexity to the 
citizenship debate (Home & Political Department, Assam, 2012). Thakur Bhargav and 
BP Junjhunwala raised some doubts regarding the political allegiance of the Muslims 
supposedly migrating to Assam. It was proposed that naturalisation under Article 6 
must be granted only to people who have resided in India for a continuous period of 5 
years instead of a measly six months (Bhargav & Junjunwala, 1949). The Hindu leader 
from Assam also raised concern about securing the rights of people of Sylhet who may 
want to migrate to India (Choudhary, 1949). It was felt strongly by several members, 
including Dr Rajendra Prasad, that the question of citizenship must be subject to future 
consideration outside of the constitutional assembly (Prasad, 1949). Article 11 of the 
Constitution was thus adapted to allow the Indian Parliament to make laws about the 
acquisition and termination of citizenship as time may demand.  
Following the incidence of communal violence and probably due to its fear of another 
episode of atrocities, as witnessed across the Western border, the Indian Parliament 
passed the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act of 1950. The act provided that 
any person who ordinarily resided outside India and had migrated to Assam, whether 
before or after 1st of March 1950, could be scrutinised and expelled by the Central 
Government (or its delegated officials), if the presence of such a person was considered 
detrimental to the tribes residing in Assam. The Act barred the application of its 
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provisions on refugees fleeing East-Pakistan because of civil disturbances or the fear 
of such disturbances.  
During the 1951 census, National Registration of Citizenship was conducted in Assam 
and the citizenship status of each person residing in Assam at the time was recorded 
against each house under occupation. The period between 1950 to 1956 was a period 
of legal limbo and fuzzy institutionalism. While the Constitution created a substantive 
right of citizenship, the Immigrant (Expulsion from Assam) Act negated that right. 
During this time, the administrative scrutiny of nationality and the forced expulsion of 
those deemed to be non-citizens became a usual practice in the region. Police orders 
were issued in several places requiring citizens to carry identity documents at all times, 
and Foreigners' Tribunals were constituted during the early 1960s to bring a semblance 
of justiciability and due procedurality to the whole process of expulsion.   
The marginalisation of the Bengali speaking community in East-Pakistan led to a 
further influx of migrants into the territory of Assam throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
At the same time, the agitation in Assam due to the permanent residence of the non-
Assamese community also started to strengthen socially and politically. The fear of 
demographic change leading to a reduction in the aboriginal tribes of Assam to a 
politically subordinate position fuelled the Assam Movement, which initiated a 
process of constructing a subnational identity distinct from and yet concurrent to the 
Indian national identity. Based on the constitutional right of maintaining communal 
identities the movement sought to preserve ‘Assamese language and culture.' 
The Central Government of India adopted the Illegal Migration Detention by Tribunal 
Act in 1983 and the Citizenship (Amendment) Act of 1986 to pacify and accommodate 
the differential interests in Assam. The IMDT Act of 1983 aimed to destabilise the 
citizenship status of those deemed ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants', who were not related 
through race or ethnicity to the state of Assam, while the Citizenship (Amendment) 
Act of 1986 sought to regularise the status of these contested illegal Bangladeshi 
residents by providing them with the right to naturalise as citizens (Jayal, 2013). 
Section 6A of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, regarding the incidence of citizenship 
in the state of Assam, is as follows: 
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a) All persons of Indian origin28 who came before the 1st day of January 196629 
to Assam from the specified territory30 and who have been ordinarily resident 
in Assam since the dates of their entry into Assam shall be deemed to be 
citizens of India as from the 1st day of January 1966. 
b) Every person of Indian origin who came to Assam on or after the 1st day of 
January 1966 but before the 25th day of March 1971 from the specified 
territory; and since the date of entry has been residing in Assam shall register 
himself with the Central Government. 
c) The rule for compulsory registration also applies to any person who is detected 
to be a foreigner by the Foreigners' tribunal, from the date of the order of such 
detection.  
d) The names of anyone who entered India after the 1st day of January 1966 if 
included in any electoral roll should be deleted from the date of registration or 
detection.  
e) A person registered with the Central government or detected by a Foreigners' 
Tribunal will have the same rights and obligations as a citizen of India 
(including the right to obtain a passport), but will not be entitled to political 
participation for ten years from the date of registration or detection. 
Although the provisions of the law accord the right to gain citizenship to those who 
have immigrated to reside in the state of Assam, the moral right to belong and the 
political right to vote have not been accorded to certain classes of residents. Thus, the 
paradigm of citizenship rights in the state of Assam is limited and varied. This 
differential construction of citizenship determines the obligation that a government 
holds towards a person.  
                                                             
28A person shall be deemed to be of Indian origin, if he, or either of his parents for any of his grandparents was 
born in undivided India;  
29 The date 1st January 1966 was fixed as a cut-off date for the grant of citizenship after Rajiv Gandhi's 
Government negotiated the same with the Assam Agitation Leadership. There was no special reason to pick 1st 
January 1966 as a cut-off date except the fact that it was negotiated as a middle -ground.    
30“specified territory” means the territories included in Bangladesh immediately before the commencement of the 
Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985;  
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Operationalising the Right to Movement and Residence 
As discussed in Chapter 4.1, the right to complete freedom of movement and residence 
is available to all citizens of India. This right guarantee interstate and intra-state 
migration and is one of the vital assurances available to any citizen living in the fragile 
ecosystem. It provides an uncontested notional capacity to move away from a disaster 
while also facilitating the ability to use migration as a strategy for adaptation.  
However, in Assam, the availability of this right is differentially restricted for people 
who are viewed as ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’. Assam has been reeling in and out 
of ongoing conflict since the very first day of the creation of India as an independent 
nation. As previously discussed in chapter 2, the literature review, the state of Assam 
has remained a persistent example of a place facing conflict due to migration. The 
notion of migration in the state is so tainted that it is talked about in hushed voices 
within the bureaucratic circles. This can be deduced from the fact that several high-
level interviewees in this research chose to remain anonymous and decided to be 
interviewed outside of their public offices while commenting on the issue of migration 
among marginal communities due to environmental pressures.  
The mainstream political rhetoric in Assam views every migrant as an outsider 
irrespective of their nationality and is particularly detrimental to those who are 
ethnically Bengali. The political rhetoric, when layered with the narrative of 
environmental fragility and relative poverty in Bangladesh, assumes that Bangladeshi 
nationals illegally enter Assam, through a porous border, in order to overcome their 
climatic vulnerability (Reuveny, 2007; Swain, 1996; Swain, 1996). 
The movement of refugees from Bangladesh (former East-Pakistan) is persistently 
viewed as infiltration by the Assamese community who consider themselves to be the 
‘sons of the soil’ and thus the only rightful citizens of Assam (Weiner, 1978; 
Vandekerckhove, 2009; Van Schendel, 2004; Baruah, 1986). In the process, all other 
non-Assamese communities, especially the Bengali-speaking and Hindi-speaking 
communities, have faced episodes of extreme violence throughout the seven decades 
of Independent India. The Nellie massacre against the Bengali speaking Muslim 
community of Nagaon district (presently falling in Morigaon) and the 1991 massacre 
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against the Hindi-speaking Marwari communities residing in the upper reaches of 
Assam are two such episodes that have created a sense of paranoia towards any form 
of open discussion on migration within the state bureaucratic elite.  
It is worth noting here that although the Nellie massacre was a manifestation of the 
political agenda against the Bengali community it was often projected as religious 
violence. Thus the 1991 violence against the Hindi-speaking Hindu Marwari 
community by the Hindu Assamese community came as a surprise. The similarity, of 
course, lies in the perception of the Bengali community as ‘Bangladeshi citizens’ and 
the Marwari community migrating from Rajasthan (India) as outsiders and an alien 
threat to the Assamese culture.  
Despite the claims of continued illegal migration from Bangladesh, there has never 
been any formal bilateral dialogue between India and Bangladesh on the issue of illegal 
Bangladeshi migrants (Deputy Commissioner Dhubri, 2016). There have been several 
political discussions within the Indian Parliament on the rhetoric of continued illegal 
migrations from Bangladesh into Assam (listed in annexure). But none of these 
charged discussions in Indian Parliament has ever materialised into a systematic 
international negotiation with the Republic of Bangladesh on the issue. It is also worth 
noting that the political apprehension of ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ is publically 
refuted by the government of Bangladesh, which maintains that Muslims from 
Bangladesh would never migrate to the Hindu majority nation of India (Home & 
Political Department, Assam, 2012).  
However, the political rhetoric has resulted in a significant reduction of the citizenship 
rights of those who are viewed as outsiders due to their linguistic and ethnic 
dissimilarities to Assamese people and culture. A series of administrative orders and 
legal instruments whose constitutionality is reproachable have contributed towards this 
reductionism behaviour of the State in Assam.  
In 1978, the Chief Election Commissioner of India, S.L. Shakdher stated: 'I would like 
to refer to the alarming situation in some States, especially in the North Eastern region 
(referring to the state of Assam), wherefrom reports are coming regarding large-scale 
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inclusions of foreign nationals in the electoral rolls. In one case, the population in the 
1971 census recorded an increase as high as 34.98 percent over 1961 census figures, 
and this was attributed to the influx of a vast number of persons from foreign countries. 
I think it may not be a wrong assessment to make that on the basis of the increase of 
34.98 percent between the two censuses, the increase likely to be recorded in the 1991 
census would be more than 100 percent over the 1961 census. In other words, a stage 
would be reached when that state may have to reckon with the foreign nationals who 
may in all probability constitute a sizeable percentage if not the majority of the 
population in the state.' 
During this time, the agitation in Assam, as discussed in Chapter 2, reached its peak. 
In 1983 an appeasement strategy was adopted by the Central Government of India in 
the form of the Assam Accord, to pacify the extreme form of violence and resentment 
stemming from the Central government’s alleged protection of illegal Bangladeshi 
migrants.  
After the Assam Accord the central government adopted the Illegal Migration 
Determination by Tribunal Act in 1985 and the Electoral Commission set out to revise 
the electoral rolls based on this legislation. The Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) 
were asked to prepare two separate lists of names. List I was to contain ‘the names of 
those persons enumerated whose linkage with the 1971 electoral roll could be 
established directly or through their parentage’ and would act as the main voting list. 
List II was to contain ‘the names of persons whose linkage with the 1971 roll was not 
established’ and this would come to be famously known as the D-voter list of Assam.  
Patwaris, Amins and junior police officials were asked to submit the whereabouts of 
the persons enumerated in List II. An unfavourable report by these junior level officers 
of the state led to the unilateral decision to strike off their names entirely, thus 
rendering them the status of non-citizens. The Election Commission issued a further 
directive that cases of 'claims challenging election commissions' unilateral decisions 
should not be treated as ordinary cases' (vide massage No 23/AS/85/8/211 dated 
6.7.1985).  
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The EC also changed the format for raising an objection, which had been done through 
a prescribed form requiring the counter-signature of another legitimate voter of the 
same locality, to a new format for making objections on plain paper, in respect of the 
names listed in the main voter list. Any objection so received was to be given thorough 
consideration by the Election Officer following an inquisitorial process, and the person 
whose status as a legitimate voter was being challenged had no significant role in this. 
The easing of the procedural requirement made the process of raising an objection into 
a favourite pastime of the politically disgruntled youth (Samaddar, 2003; Samaddar, 
2009). En-masse applications were filled out by the AASU leaders against what were 
considered ‘Bengali minorities’. 
At the same time, any claims made to challenge List II entries required the use of a 
prescribed form duly countersigned by another legitimate voter of the locality. The 
burden of proving a person's status as a legitimate voter and a legal citizen likes 
squarely on the person seeking re-enrollment in the main voter list.  
The process of determining citizenship rested on the production of: (1) Citizenship 
Certificates, and (2) an extract from the voter list not later than 1971 (Notification no. 
23/85/AS Vol IV, dated 12.7.1985). Subsequently, through correspondence No 
23/AS/85/10748 dated 2.8.1985, documents like pattas and land revenue records, 
certificates by Gaon Buddhas, were also held to be legitimate although non-conclusive 
evidence. Over the years a mix of documents that are held in the non-conclusive 
category along with one of two documents, namely citizenship records from the 1951 
National Registry of Citizenship, or an extract from the pre-1971 voter list, were 
accepted for constituting claims of valid citizenship. The box 1 provides the present 
list of documentation needed for verification process under the National Register of 
Citizenship.  
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In a state ravaged by annual floods, it is not easy to maintain documentary evidence. 
It is noteworthy that during 1985 the government of Assam itself could procure the 
pre-1971 voter list for only 77 out of the total of 126 constituencies. And, to date, the 
National Registry of citizenship, which was constituted in Assam in 1951, has never 
Box 1 
ONE of the following List A document issued before the midnight of 24th March 1971, 
by the Government of Assam or any other State in India of the Central Government of 
India 
(1) 1951 National Registry of Citizenship Record 
(2) Electoral Roll(s) up to 24th March 1971 (midnight) 
(4) Citizenship Certificate  
(5) Permanent Residential Certificate  
(6) Refugee Registration Certificate  
(7) Passport 
(8) LIC 
(9) Any Govt. issued License/Certificate 
(10) Govt. Service/ Employment Certificate 
(11) Bank/Post Office Accounts  
(12) Birth Certificate 
(13) Board/University Educational Certificate 
(14) Court Records/Processes. 
 
If the name of the applicant himself/herself does to occur in the List A document, but 
such List A document are available in the name of a direct ancestor of the applicant. In 
such cases, the applicant shall have to submit documents from the List B below to 
establish relationship with such ancestor: 
(1) Birth Certificate  
(2) Land document  
(3) Board/University Certificate  
(4) Bank/LIC/Post Office records  
(5) Circle Officer/GP Secretary Certificate in case of married women  
(6) Electoral Roll  
(7) Ration Card  
Two other supporting documents are required in combination of the List A & List B  
(1) Circle Officer/Gram Panchayat Secretary Certificate in respect of married 
women migrating after marriage (can be of any year before or after 24th March 
(midnight) 1971),  
(2) Ration Card issued up to the midnight of 24th March 1971 can be adduced as 
supporting documents.  
 
Source: National Registration of Citizenship website available at  
http://nrcassam.nic.in/admin-documents.html 
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been updated. Therefore, anyone who has come to live in Assam between 1951 and 
25th March 1971 may not find their data in any of the citizenship records, despite 
having a legitimate nationality claim. 
Adding to the complexity is the fact that Indians residing in India were never 
compelled by law to register as citizens or voters until the year 2015, when unique 
identification under the Aadhaar Scheme of the Central Government was made 
mandatory for every citizen. This ambiguity over a person’s status as a voter or a 
citizen has never deprived a person of exercising their right to freedom of movement 
or residence in any other state in India. However, for the state of Assam, the non-
existence of the citizenship records has vast implications for the assertion of rights. 
First, non-existence in the pre-1971 voter list can conveniently lead a person onto the 
doubtful voter list. Moreover, the chances of becoming a non-citizen exponentially 
increase for anyone who has migrated into a new area within the state, especially when 
such migration is undertaken by a survivor of a flood who has lost the limited 
documentary evidence available to them because of the flood.  
This point was elaborated through the field surveys and group discussions conducted 
in chars and river banks in the district of Morigaon, Dhubri and Goalpara. 
Bhasanichar, which is 30-minute boat ride from the Dhubri riverside, is a region that 
has faced the continuous disappearance of land-mass, including the full submergence 
of the river island in the 1978-79 floods. The people who inhabited this island have 
taken refuge on the nearby river islands of Bagdahara, Birsing and Sutramara, to name 
a few. The movement across the river-islands is reciprocal and deeply dependent on 
the social capital and camaraderie amongst the char inhabitants. 
The lands are held as common property resources without a requirement for tenure 
delimitation from the government and in most cases, there is not adequately surveyed 
cadastral data due to the temporary physical nature of the chars (Deputy Commissioner 
Dhubri, 2016). Even in situations where ownership has been determined for a single 
person or family, the land is cultivated by several households with an understanding 
of shared yields (Group Discussion BashaniChar, 2016; Group Discussion Bagdhara, 
2016). 
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It was observed that most of the families engaging in this communal cultivation 
practice severely lacked the capacity to hold documentary evidence of their existence, 
let alone evidence of being a citizen and thus a rights holder. Freedom of movement 
for these people is a natural recourse, a human behaviour necessary for survival, and 
is severable from their right to be a citizen of a state. Citizenship is non-material and 
is locally identifiable with belonging to a local community or the local area where their 
husbands or fathers once lived. For example, after the erosion of a part of Aminerchar, 
families residing in the area moved to the neighbouring Birsing Char. Twenty 
households from this tiny char are listed as D-voters. Although 70-year-old Hajera 
Khatun Bewa is unaffected by such a listing, firmly believing in her right to migrate 
to survive, her son, who is a legitimate voter, stated that the listing has jeopardised 
their right to claim compensation from the government and the mother cannot be listed 
on the family ration card, which had led to a decline in the resources to which they are 
otherwise entitled (Group Discussion Birsing Char, 2016). 
Similarly, Hushanara Beghum, a former D-voter from the Dhudhnoi sub-division of 
the Goalpara district, who lost her household and husband, was listed as a D-voter in 
the new area when she arrived. She is unaware of who made the complaint against her 
that led to her registration on the D-voter list, but she could obtain the 1961 voter list 
from her birth-village where her father is listed as a legitimate voter, thus helping her 
clear her name (Group Discussion Dhobakura, 2016).   
It takes an average of 10 years and 8 thousand rupees in court proceedings to prove 
one’s citizenship. During that period of 10 years, those wrongly identified as D voters 
are stripped of their citizenship rights and are prevented from obtaining any state-
delivered social assistance package. This leaves such people and their families 
completely annihilated from political participation. At the same time, it restricts their 
right to freedom of movement and residence as they cannot risk moving more than a 
few metres away from their original place of residence, as they believe that it will be 
socially more convenient to gain legitimacy and ultimately prove their right as a 
citizen. This leads to a significant portion of the Char and river-bank residents being 
entrapped in their fragile ecosystems.  
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This problem is particularly an issue for women who move from one village to another 
due to their marriage. Shakina Begum, who moved to Dhudhnai with her two small 
daughters after her land was flooded, has been a D-voter for at least 3 election cycles 
– a period of 15 years. Her daughters, who are now over 18 and eligible to register as 
voters, because of their late father’s legacy data, have not yet registered themselves 
due to the fear that once they are married and move to a new village their status as 
voters in their original place of residence may be delegitimised. Hence, they will only 
register after getting married. At present, there are 1.3 Lakh D-voters in the state of 
Assam, 69% of whom are women. In my study area, the concentration of D-voters is 
as per the table below. 
Table 17: Distribution of D-Voters in Study Districts 
Source: CD-ROM with detailed register data on D-voter presence in Assam   
In all the above districts, except Jorhat and Bongaigaon (which in fact have a tiny D-
voter population), the population of female D-voters is remarkably higher than that of 
male D-voters. The district of Dhubri, which shares an international border with 
Bangladesh, has two and a half times more female D-voters than male D-voters. 
Meanwhile, the District of Chirrang, which lies in the Bodoland Autonomous Region, 
has double the amount of female D-voters than male D-voters.  
What is interesting about the political narrative against D-voters is the way it is utilised 
to depict an apolyptical flux of young male migrants entering Assam illegally from 
Bangladesh with a systemic agenda to completely change the demography of the state, 
by occupying one village at a time. However, not only are 69% of the D-voters women, 
District Total no. Male Female 
Dhubri 11875 3210 8665 
Goalpara 10389 3057 7332 
Bongaigaon 1247 674 573 
Chirang 233 75 158 
Kamrup M 4743 2250 2493 
Morigaon 5365 2466 2937 
Jorhat 17 11 6 
Dhemaji 4367 2093 2274 
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who are easily discounted in political participation, but there is also absolutely no 
instance of whole villages or char being occupied by D-voters.  
Most of the D-voters are in fact uniquely listed members of a household where 
everyone else is a legitimate citizen of the country. For example, just in Aminerchar, 
where 30 people were identified as D-voters, only four of them were men and only one 
male member shared a household with his wife who was also a D-voter. There is very 
little rational explanation for how a person whose entire family are legally recognised 
Indian citizens can be a D-voter.   
Nevertheless, even where a single member of a household is listed as a D-voter, such 
a household risks losing its social security net. Explaining this dichotomy, the Block 
Development Officer from South-Salmara in Dhubri explained that the documents 
required to prove citizenship and legacy data are the same documents needed to gain 
the benefits of the schemes. The unavailability of documentation for one purpose 
naturally means the unavailability of the documentation for the other purpose too. 
Thus, this leads to a reduced status as a citizen where the person in question is only 
entitled to an urgent response and not any rehabilitation or compensation strategies 
(Revenue Circle Officer Dhubri, 2016). 
The tribal, racial and religious dynamics acting at the micro level are also instrumental 
in determining the D-voter status of people in that micro-community. For example, in 
the D-voting list from Chirrang, all the D-voters are either Bengali Hindus or Koch 
Rajbhongshi people. Meanwhile, politically Bengali Hindus are unwelcome foreigners 
from Bangladesh who alter the racial landscape of Assam.  The Koch Rajbhongshi 
have occupied the Assamese territory since the 1500s, during the rise of Koch Hajo 
kingdom in the region.  
However, racially as well as through their lifestyle habits, the Koch Rajbhongshi have 
remained different from the Bodo Tribes, which are politically dominant in the Bodo 
Land Autonomous Tribal Region. As the district of Chirang falls under this 
autonomous administrative region, tribes other than Bodo tribes are heavily discounted 
in their claim towards citizenship, and Koch Rajbhongshi face persistent 
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discrimination and violence. Most of the Koch Rajbhongshi people have migrated to 
the Bongaigaon district in the last few decades following the Bodo Autonomous 
movement due to the existence of social capital in Bongaigaon (Project Officer DDMA 
Chirrang, 2016).  
The D-voters in Dhemaji are primarily Tea tribes who are discounted against the 
dominant Misshing tribes. The Tea Tribes migrated during the British Colonial Era 
and enjoyed Scheduled Tribe status in the state. However, they are socially and 
politically looked down on as outsiders from what are now the Uttar Pradesh and Bihar 
states in independent India. Another peculiarity of the D-voting list of Dhemaji is the 
presence of Marwari Hindus who migrated from Rajasthan (western India) to Eastern 
India to conduct business and faced extreme violence during the 1990s in the upper 
Assam region due to their Hindi speaking identity. 
Identification as a D-voter restricts a person's right of freedom of movement and 
residence in several subtle ways. D-voters limit their own choice of movement to safer 
grounds as they are concerned that migration to remote locations may severe their 
legacy connection completely. The lack of social capital in any new receiving area 
(which is not a neighbouring village) would make it difficult for them to prove their 
citizenship status or to even get necessary communal support and assistance with 
cultivation.  
And finally, the fact that anyone who migrates can end up being listed on a D-voter 
list strongly ties households to their place of ancestral residence due to fear that 
permanent or long-term movement will severe their relationship with the piece of land 
which determines their status as a citizen. Interestingly, this sentiment is also visible 
in the youth population who migrate out of the State of Assam for employment. The 
two sons of the Gaon Buda of Sutar Gaon regularly travel to Chennai and Bangalore 
to work as security guards. Each time, they stay away for a period of ten to eleven 
months, returning to Assam for the festivity of Bihu or to cast votes during the election, 
and to maintain a continued presence within the state (GaonBudha, 2016). 
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From an administrative point of view, however, being a D-voter is not a ‘big problem’. 
For one, the population on the D-voting list is not a sizeable population when it comes 
to the whole state. In addition, most of the cases on the D-voter list are dismissed by 
the foreigners' tribunal as false allegations. Although the process takes an average of 
10 years per case and is expensive for people already living below the poverty line 
with meagre resources, 'ultimately the rights of the citizen do get restored' (Deputy 
Commissioner Dhemaji, 2016). However, for low-income families who are pushed out 
of the safety nets without democratic representation in a place ravaged by floods every 
year, this means extreme forms of marginalisation and destitution.  
One may wonder, why despite the obvious known fallacies of the system and a 
Supreme Court mandate holding the D-voter list as unconstitutional, the state 
continues to not just maintain the doubtful voter list but also engage in fresh 
enumeration? To answer this question, we need to understand the institutional 
indifference and a dispersed sense of accountability.  
As explained in the regional registration office of Dhudhnoi division, the election 
officers genuinely believe that it is there essential duty towards the Assamese 
community to mark a person as a D-voter if citizenship doubts are raised against that 
person. This is particularly the case if the person is not an indigenous Assamese. For 
a street-level officer, such registration is just a part of the vigilante process and not an 
act of annihilation per se (Election Officer, 2016).  
As Mr Ashok Kumar Deka BDO Dhemaji also confirmed ‘there is always the option 
to go to court and show the right documentation there and once they do that their name 
will be restored’. On being questioned about the long time-frame it takes to clear one’s 
name from the D-voter list, Mr Deka stated that it was one of the many problems of a 
poor area and shifted the blame to the judiciary (particularly the Foreigners' Tribunal) 
for not providing a quicker solution (Block Develoment Officer Dhemaji District, 
2016). 
At the senior level of the bureaucracy, the Deputy Commissioners are mostly oblivious 
to the content of the D-voter list. Having never inspected it themselves, 7 out of 8 
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deputy commissioners interviewed for this study authoritatively stated that D-voters 
are mostly young men from Bangladesh. The Deputy Commissioner of Dhemaji 
estimated that there were around 500 D-voters in the District with a 50-50 ratio, stating 
that, 'Dhemaji is not so easy to travel to'. Four of the Deputy Commissioners, in fact, 
were visibly shocked when they were told that 69% of the total D-voters are women. 
And the Deputy Commissioner of Goalpara continued to maintain that the majority of 
D-voters in his district are males, who, according to him, are occupying the areas 
bordering the state of Meghalaya (Deputy Commissioner Goalpara, 2016). In a similar 
conversation with the sitting Chief Minister of the State, Shri Tarun Gogoi, Mr Gogoi 
stated, ‘the BJP makes D-voters a big political issue, and they never say that D-voters 
are mostly women because it goes against the political construct of the hordes of 
Bangladeshi men illegally migrating to India’ (Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi, 2016).  
It is now seen that the youth from Assam prefer migrating to states outside of Assam 
in order to bypass the administrative hassle that can potentially threaten their status as 
bonafide Indian citizens. Most of these youths get absorbed as semi-skilled and 
unskilled manual labour in the metropolitan cities of Delhi, Bangalore, Chennai and 
Cochin. However, the backlash against ‘north-eastern youth’ in these cities has 
become highly prominent and troublesome in the recent years. This backlash has been 
a concern for the government of Assam since 2012, after a major episode of violence 
against North Eastern youth in Bangalore and Mumbai. A minor rescue operation was 
initiated by the Assam government at the request of the Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi, 
to seek the safe return of Assamese youth from the violence-prone regions (Chief 
Minister Tarun Gogoi, 2016; Chief Operating Officer ASDMA, 2016). However, the 
scarcity of alternative livelihood opportunities within the state of Assam is a significant 
reason why the youths returned to the metropolitan cities soon the situation was under 
control. 
At the same time, the Deputy Commissioner of Kamrup Metro, Dr. M Angamuthu, 
asserted that, ‘if our tribunals decide that a person booked under the Act is, in fact, a 
foreigner we will employ push-back as a strategy to deport them out of the Indian 
territorial boundaries’ (Deputy Commissioner Kamrup (M), 2016).  Push-back is a 
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non-authorised strategy where border personnel use physical force to remove a person 
from Indian territory by pushing them across the international borderline into the 
territory of Bangladesh. Such strategies are used in places where there is a non-
presence of patrolling forces on the Bangladeshi side, usually in the dead of the night, 
so as to go undetected. Due to the presence of combat weapons upon the personnel 
engaged in the pushing strategy the victim is unable to return to India without risking 
their lives. The validity of push-back strategies has only been mildly debated among 
academics and in the judicial system. However, in a 2002 judgement, the Supreme 
Court of India strongly suggested that the Government of India must adopt long-term 
strategies to stop the flow of migrants from Bangladesh to Assam. Although there is 
no data on which the Supreme Court based its judgement of the ‘flow of migrants’, it 
authoritatively derived its conclusion from the political narrative surrounding 
migration in the State.  
There is a strong belief that anyone who is unable to cope with the flooding is not an 
Assamese, as the aboriginal Assamese communities are well adapted to living with the 
floods. ‘Assamese tribes like Bodo and Missing purposely make their houses on the 
polls to overcome the annual flooding situation’. Therefore, by deduction, ‘all those 
who suffer or migrate due to floods are those who have come to live in Assam recently 
(possibly from Bangladesh) and are therefore not accustomed to the floating lifestyle 
of the state’.31   
Among the street-level actors, there is a high semblance of the political belief that the 
communities living in flood-prone areas who are migrating and leaving their 
‘motherland’ to go to states outside of Assam are illegal Bangladeshi migrants who 
should not have been there in the first place. This belief stems from the mindset that 
Assam is a fertile plain and that the floods, even if they are devastating for a short time, 
bring water for paddy irrigation and easy access to fishing. As one of the Election 
Officer put it in the district of Dhemaji, ‘Assamese people will not migrate to work for 
                                                             
31 The interviewee chose to remain anonymous for this part of the interview. 
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other people; we have enough rice and fish in the field, a true Assamese is content by 
nature’ (Annonymous Interview, 2016). 
7.2 Politics of relief 
It is a public opinion in Assam that local businesses who are handed contracts are those 
with a good relationship with local Members of the Legislative Assemblies. While 
there is no documentary analysis of this correlation, I realised that there are no publicly 
advertised tenders for supply procurement.32  
The ambiguity of this situation was further highlighted through an interaction that 
occurred at the DC office in Bongaigaon. In between the interview with the Deputy 
Commissioner, Bongaigaon, a man (pseudonym Abdulla) walked in with an verbal 
complaint that the relief stock sent to this area was of low quality and the local business 
who got a procurement contract was a man of dishonest character, only selected due 
to his kinship with a local political leader. The DC Bongaigaon quipped and asked him 
to get lost, adding that if he had a valid reason to believe this he would have brought 
the complaint formally written on a piece of paper.  
The DC Bongaigaon told me, 'there is always a competition in getting these 
government contracts because they think that there is hardly any audit on the quality 
of supplies. The contractor may assure something to the government but supply 
something completely sub-standard. Errors are made, but mostly immense care is 
taken in handling relief procurement. Everyone in the administration realises that they 
are poor people, displaced from their houses and we tend to do as much as we can to 
ease their situation. The distribution of relief is a humanitarian task and the Assam 
administration is capable of reaching even the remotest in the area to distribute relief' 
(Deputy Commissioner Bongaigaon, 2016).  
While we were in the middle of this conversation, Shri Pani Bhushan Chaudhary 
walked in with Mr Abdulla, who had been shown in previously. The DC greeted Shri 
Chaudhary and introduced me to him; then the two started to discuss the election, 
                                                             
32 E-procurement does not have any archived tender on supply; the FCS website does not exist The Public works 
and Fire and Emergency department procurement orders do not match the relief articles. The district websites do 
not have any current or archived tenders.  
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before reverting to the man's complaint. Shri Pani Bhushan Chaudhary, a leader from 
the Assam Gana Parishad, had been an elected MLA from the Bongaigaon district 
since 1985. He discussed the concern of Mr Abdulla with a degree of conviction that 
came from being an elected representative for over 30 years. The DC obliged and asked 
Mr Abdulla in a tone of assurance if he could send a formal written complaint on paper, 
stating that then an inquiry would be made. Mr Abdullah left the office. Shri Pani 
Bhushan stayed a bit longer and had a cup of Assam Black tea. After Shri Bhushan 
had left, Mr Abdulla returned with a complaint written in Assamese. The DC glanced 
at it and passed it to me (knowing full well that I cannot read Assamese script). He 
then reverted to Mr Abdulla and said that the complaint was not stamped: 'get a 
(revenue) stamp fixed first'. The DC explained to me that, 'they try to avoid such 
inquiries because they result in nothing and merely waste the working hours that could 
be utilised elsewhere. The process of revenue stamps or paying a nominal fee to send 
in a formal complaint are some of the essential barriers to prevent people from making 
it a ‘national pastime’ (Deputy Commissioner Bongaigaon, 2016). 
Due to the nature of the relief being humanitarian assistance, people displaced due to 
disasters do not have a right to judicial recourse, in the case that the relief supplied is 
inadequate, absent or sub-standard. The accountability of the government is only 
limited to an administrative inquiry into the process of procuring relief supplies. There 
is an absence of a substantive right here, and the procedural right is available only 
when a collective action administrative complaint is filed by a member of the public. 
The capacity of a person to file a claim is dependent upon direct and indirect 
influences, which include that the complainant should be one of the aggrieved party 
and should be a resident of the place where the relief-supply in question was allotted; 
they should have appropriate financial means at their disposal to pay the appropriate 
revenue stamp fee and should indirectly have the support of a local MLA or such. 
Another interviewee while preferring to stay anonymous added, 'ensuring good-
quality supplies is a difficult task; by the time we are able to make all the inspections 
of the designated shelters the floods are already here, and there is no time to replace 
the sub-standard supplies that may be there. Sometimes, even where the inspections 
are made a handful of high-quality supplies are shown to the accessor for sampling. 
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The inspection accountability falls on the Circle Officers and the Deputy 
Commissioners, and sometimes we delegate the task to the ADC and SDOs or BDOs, 
but there is so much work and so few people. Sometimes the person assessing has their 
subjective notion of quality, how do you judge that?' 
Although there are no objective standards for the quality of supplies, the insufficiency 
may result in an electoral backlash. The supply contractors in Assam also work as 
crowd managers and community pleasers. They can use their clout as relief suppliers 
to swing the voters in favour of the party with which they associate. For example, in 
Dhemaji, one Mr Sunil Pegu who was introduced by the Dhemaji District 
Commissioner as an entrepreneurial farmer said that, ‘if supply is sub-standard people 
will not vote for us (the candidate he associates with)' (Pegu, 2016). From an 
administrative point of view, it is mainly immaterial who the supplier is if the suppliers 
or their competitors do not halt the process of relief or impose an additional burden of 
administrative review.  
In the aftermath of a disaster, relief contractors and suppliers often emerge as a 
sympathetic veneer who foster the gratitude, recognition and acclaim of the disaster 
victims towards particular political ends.  The aura of compassion surrounding these 
actors is in fact highly political. The sympathy they bestow upon the people in need 
imparts them power and dominion, augments there standing, garners continuity and 
remembrance, and most significantly, obtains the leverage they need to determine the 
exclusion, inclusion and flow of money and goods.  
For bureaucratic actors this strengthening of contractors as politically manipulated 
actors is obscured for two reasons: firstly, most of them maintain that the tendering is 
a blindly-reviewed process while agreeing that people who have been given the tenders 
in the past are generally aware of when and how to file winning tenders. Secondly, if 
a political actor is looking to gain widespread support through the distribution of relief 
then they make sure that the relief material is not sub-standard. However, what if the 
political actors are willing to marginalise individual communities to create a populist 
view of themselves? What happens when the politically charged contractors and 
suppliers thrive on a narrative of othering? And what if the people in need of relief 
 
191 Political Impact on Governance Performance 
have absolutely no political participation like in the case of D-voters? I will take up 
these questions again in section 8.3, where I analyse the state data at the Revenue 
Circle level to demonstrate the difference in relief work in main-lands and river-
islands.  
From an elite bureaucratic point of view, the problem of uneven relief distribution has 
been resolved by making relief available only through designated shelter areas. To 
claim relief, a family or its representative must physically come to the designated 
shelter and get their relief package under the watchful supervision of a street-level 
administrator. It is only in extreme cases of emergency, where communities are 
stranded in remote areas, that the essential relief is air-dropped until the SDRF, NDRF 
or Army can complete a rescue evacuation operation. During the floods, the 
government, as well as individual households, rely on wooden boats as a means of 
evacuation and transportation, thus earning the famous title of the ‘floating population 
of Assam’. The use of dingy boats also makes it convenient to reach remote river 
islands and places that are sparsely connected with roadways. The picture below shows 
two dingy boats, one used by people for their regular transportation needs, and the 
other used by the Army personnel (here seen patrolling the river around Bangladesh 
border).  
Picture 6: Dingy used for regular commutation from main-land to the river-island. 
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Picture 7: Boats used for everyday commutation by the Border Security Forces 
 
Both boats are in themselves a security hazard, which as per the administration is 
‘irrelevant'. If the people can be transported out of a heavily submerged area to a safe 
location, it remains irrelevant how the process is achieved (Chief Secretary 
Government of Assam, 2016).  
In certain ways, this process of forced displacement or evacuation is very similar to 
the journeys of the Mediterranean boat-refugees arriving in Europe, except that this 
movement is temporary and within the boundaries of one's own country.  
There is a profound sense of dissatisfaction within the bureaucracy with its capacity to 
respond to disasters. This disappointment is visible through every yearly flood report 
submitted by the district administration to the State Secretariat. Nevertheless, the 
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dissatisfaction does not translate into a drastic change in the way that relief responses 
are provided but is more of an empty sympathetic view towards those displaced. The 
emphasis is always on letting people act like dynamic actors who can decide their 
future even when faced with imminent displacement. Moreover, the displacement is 
but a 'temporary displeasure which occurs every year for three days' (Chief Secretary 
Government of Assam, 2016). The displacement is also justified within the 
administration as a necessary inconvenience caused by the floods, which bring the 
fertile top-soil for the paddy cultivation. 'It is like you leave your house for temporary 
renovation and return to a better structure' (Project Officer DDMA Dhemaji, 2016).  
That structure – of highly fertile alluvial soil – is however not the only thing that floods 
beget, as the submergence washes away every little material aspect of life that a 
household has gathered. It washes away the land and it washes away the documentary 
trail that can prove their right over a piece of submerged land. And it indeed washes 
away the right to be citizens. It is not a coincidence that 66% of the residential houses 
in Assam are constructed using thatch or bamboo with a sheet of asbestos as a roof for 
protection. At the individual household level, the non-expensive housing made using 
farming left-overs is recoverable, and the amount of ex-gratia relief from the state is 
sufficient to overcome such losses.  
Most of the officials interviewed empathised with the disaster victims; they also 
reflected a myriad of mixed opinions regarding the delivery of grant-in-aid. For 
example, Shri Rajendra Kumar, who had retired as the Commandant General Home 
Guards & Director Civil Defence in the State of Assam, explained that the ‘disaster 
victims are often self-styled victims’ who seek ‘floods as an opportunity to seek 
monetary compensation packages'. He explained that the, ‘government is bound to 
provide exgratia financial support to anyone who has suffered flood damage to life or 
property… this compulsion becomes higher in the case of media presence and social 
sympathy…. But most often the people who are most affected are also the ones who 
choose to live in flood-prone areas and engage in a calculated risk to obtain the 
exgratia support. Part of these payments is then utilised to buy cheap land in some 
other vulnerable region, and the whole cycle of compensation repeats in a loop’ 
(Kumar, 2016).  
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Several other officials agreed with the prevalence of this phenomenon of using exgratia 
payments as a ‘money making opportunity’ (Deputy Commissioner Kamrup (M), 
2016; Project Officer DDMA Chirrang, 2016). However, there was also a subtle 
reflection upon the humanitarian nature of these grants amid the rampant poverty and 
laagered development. This was evident from the remark made by another bureaucrat: 
‘yes it is possible that some clever people do this, but it is not right to call these people 
opportunists in the real sense. They are living in chronic poverty, and this is just one 
of the means by which they can overcome some of their hardships’ (Deputy 
Commissioner Dhubri, 2016).  
The scheme of providing ex-gratia compensation to the victims of flooding does not 
take into account the conditions of landlessness and displacement due to landlessness. 
Nevertheless, it provides a venue to seek grant-in-aid for flood damage caused to the 
house or homestead. The guidelines provide that a maximum of 50,000 INR assistance 
will be provided to each household for tangible property losses and 2000 INR for 
intangible losses (such as the loss of clothes/utensils etc.). 
However, the grant-in-aid is a discretionary commodity, and the Chief Minister has a 
significant influence in declaring how much aid will be given to each household in 
each flood year. The CM Relief Fund works through donations, including aid donation 
made by the Central government and international agencies during particularly 
devastating calamities. The number of people receiving assistance under the scheme 
is determined by the visibility of the calamity. For example, the Chief Minister can 
promise 2 Lakh rupees of assistance to every household losing land/crops or houses 
due to flooding, or he may specifically earmark funds for a particular district that is 
more visible in the media during a particular flood year. He can also utilise this funding 
to sway the voters during floods before the election season. The grant-aid distributed 
under the CM Fund is a highly discretionary media-popularised event with no uniform 
objective criterion on its distribution.  
Conclusion 
These findings are unsettling at several levels. First, any instance of migration in the 
state is complexly tied to the political construction of ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’. 
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Therefore, the host society tends to look at the migrants as non-citizen aliens. This 
host-migrant relational complexity is very intense in situations where the migrants do 
not have existing social capital in the new area of settlement or where they have lost 
their own land to river erosion, thus becoming long-term or permanent migrants. This 
relational complexity is intensified through the parameters of gender, age and race. 
And as mentioned earlier in this chapter the procedure for alleging that a new migrant 
is in fact a foreigner, without having the responsibility to prove that claim, gives an 
undue advantage to the host community.  
Secondly, there is structural indifference towards the issue of depriving migrants of 
their citizenship. The Constitution of India creates an affirmative obligation to provide 
enabling circumstances where migration within the country can be efficiently 
undertaken without discrimination or fear of being annihilated from political 
citizenship during the process. This obligation becomes exceedingly crucial in 
vulnerable geographical areas prone to annual disasters, as one's inability to migrate 
outside of a vulnerable area decreases one's ability to adapt to the changing climate 
circumstances. However, the state neglects this obligation not just by delaying 
structural development but also by creating barriers to be recognised as a citizen – and 
thus holding a constitutional right of freedom of movement.  
Third, there is a continuous tussle in terms of passing the burden from one linear level 
to another or across departments of the governance apparatus. For example, the 
Election officers in the field candidly spoke about how the courts and the judicial 
magistrates in the foreigners' tribunal have a duty to determine the status of people 
alleged to be foreigners, restricting their own role to that of a clerical nature, bereft of 
the power to make a judicial review of the situation. In the process, the responsibility 
is passed across a horizontal line of administration.  
Similarly, at the middle management level of block development officers, and the 
higher management level of the Deputy Commissioner, the practice of enumerating D-
voters is an ‘secondary business that needs to be dealt with due to the peculiar political 
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condition of Assam'.33 Therefore, despite the presence of an enabling right that 
guarantees freedom of migration from geographically vulnerable locations, the 
functionality of that right is critically constricted in the state of Assam. 
Thus, although theoretically one may say that people migrating due to climate change 
are dynamic independent actors capable of deciding their own destiny (Black et al.), 
this construction of ‘dynamic independent actors’ is undoubtedly an exaggeration in a 
society that is structurally indifferent to those who are at the threshold of climate 
change-related disasters.  
  
                                                             
33 Interviewee choose to remain anonymous for the discussion on D-voters in the state.  
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Chapter 8 Influence of Demography and Social Capital 
In the current chapter, I focus on the role of demographic factors such as age, gender 
and membership of the particular social group34 in determining the variation in 
protection response that climate migrants receive. As discussed in the previous 
chapters, the capacity of the state to respond to instances of displacement and 
migration is institutionally limited, and severely reduced by political interference. The 
political narrative of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants pushes certain ethnically and 
linguistically differential communities to the margins of protection. In this chapter, I 
continue to discuss how elements of ethnicity, religion, and gender determine the 
relegation of some communities to the margins of welfare and response programmes 
and normalise the process of ignoring the plight of particular communities.  
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three parts: the first part discusses the 
lifestyle differences that add to the household vulnerability and increase the need for 
government support. The second part analyses the social capital in the river islands 
and the functional scope of the schemes analysed in this study. I do so by drawing 
attention to the revenue circle level data within each study district. The third part looks 
specifically at the gender of migrants and those who benefit from the state’s action.  
It is argued that these micro-variables have an innate influence on not only creating 
vulnerability but also determining who receives support to overcome their 
vulnerability. The existing structures of governance continuously victimise certain 
classes of people. This structural marginalisation makes them highly vulnerable to 
climate change and takes away any agency a person may have in determining their life 
choices (including basic choices of residence and livelihood). Thus, in ways discussed 
in this thesis, the governance deficit continuously creates a class of climate change 
victims.   
                                                             
34 In international humanitarian law, demographic factors – gender, age, religion, ethnicity, nationality and 
membership of particular social group - are central to persecutory state behaviour and paramount in the 
determination of refugees’ rights. 
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8.1 Means, Manners and Vulnerability 
A farmer in the Majuli Island of Jorhat district commented, ‘it is good when the flood 
comes, I sit on my terrace and fish from the balcony, I do not even have to go anywhere, 
it is like a mini-vacation’. On the same island, Bishnu Payen invited me to his family 
house, made of bamboo and on stilts. His wife had brewed fresh Apong and was eager 
to offer Assamese hospitality with a recipe of fermented fish and pork. Bishnu Payen 
explained that the water causes food to spoil quickly, so all the indigenous tribes have 
methods to ferment and preserve food. Unlike most of India, pig meat is a delicacy in 
Assam, and rearing pigs is thus a common practice, as is the practice of making houses 
on stilt (Bishnu Payen, 2016).  
However, similar practices are not seen in lower Brahmaputra and the Central Valley. 
In Dhubri town, the habits of the Mishing are considered primitive. Babula (a.k.a. 
Rajesh Kumar), a local boy from the Rajani Revenue circle commented, ‘have you 
seem them climb like a monkey up their houses, they do not even have stairs, just a 
bamboo pole and even old women climb so swiftly…that does not happen here in 
Dhubri (down-stream Brahmaputra), here people like to live in normal houses’ 
(Rajkumar Babulal, 2016).   
In Dhemaji once again, Sheela Apang scorned the bamboo housing of the Mishing. 
When asked why the permanent house was not on a raised structure, she chided, ‘we 
are not tribal, it is for them to live in those kinds of funny houses’. In the lower valley 
in the city of Bongaigaon, the District Disaster Management Project Officer said, ‘we 
tell people to adopt designs which will reduce their vulnerability to floods, but at times 
there is too much ego surrounding lifestyle. It is not like the Mishing or Hajon tribes, 
who have copyrighted the design for stilt houses; other tribes will not follow it because 
for them it is an identity issue’ (Discussion with Sheela Apang, 2016).  Similar 
differences could also be seen in other non-tribal districts of Morigaon, Bongaigaon, 
and even Chirang. In the Chirang district under the Bodo Autonomous Council, the 
houses are built on raised platforms instead of stilts.  
In Guwahati city, the urban dwellers are increasingly adopting raised housing 
architecture. One cannot but notice that new buildings, including commercial ones, 
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increasingly use the ground floor as parking space, while human occupation starts at 
the first-floor level. Dr Angamuthu, the Deputy Commissioner of the Kamrup Metro 
district, explained, ‘Guwahati has the problem of urban flooding. The flood level is not 
high, but the water stagnates, and if you are living on the ground floor then not only 
is your property at risk, but you can also suffer from electrocution as a lot of the 
electricity network is underground, and even the overhead live wires sometimes break 
due to heavy winds. So, people automatically prefer living on higher floors for safety.’ 
(Deputy Commissioner Kamrup (M), 2016)  
While the housing styles influence the vulnerability of communities to flooding, the 
state in India cannot interfere with non-permanent physical structures, such as those 
built in rural areas using mud, thatch and bamboo. In the tribal areas, tribal housing is 
excluded from the standardised purview of the national building code. This is done 
with the intention of not burdening poor households with design aspects of their 
buildings and also to allow communities to maintain their housing cultures. The only 
place where the state administrators can weigh-in is through the application of the 
National Building Code in Urban areas and in relation to new permanent structures 
constructed in other areas.35 
89% of the households in the state of Assam live in rural areas and reside in non-
permanent structures made from mud, bamboo, thatch and pre-fabricated materials. 
While on the one hand, these non-permanent structures reduce the risk of damage to 
expensive building materials during flash floods, they also increase the households’ 
vulnerability to inundation danger. ‘The state does not engage in extreme measures of 
penalising rural households who do not follow a specific building pattern just because 
the administrator may think that it may be more sustainable’  (Chief Secretary 
Government of Assam, 2016). The state can only promote specific sustainable 
                                                             
35 During the time of the field visit the City of Guwahati was hosting the South-Asian Games, and therefore all the 
hotels in the region were fully booked at the time of my arrival. Yet a colleague at the National Law School in 
Guwahati suggested that we should go and negotiate with a hotelier who was a known friend. The hotelier, on the 
grounds of anonymity, told us that not a single building in Guwahati follows the building standard perfectly, and it 
is their imperfection that the government employees often use to leverage hospitality benefits for state functions as 
well as their personal needs.  
 
200 Governance of Climate Change Related Migrations in Assam (India) 
methods; if communities think that they interfere with their cultural or tribal identity 
than the state actors’ role is restricted.  
Commenting on the housing vulnerability, most elite administrators used words like 
smart, clever and intelligent in describing the Mishing raised-platform hutments, while 
the bamboo housing in rural areas was described as easily relocatable, non-expensive 
and flood resilient.  The efforts of the state to promote sustainable housing are limited 
to ensuring fire-safety norms and transmitting knowledge about secured roofing due 
to the Bordisila season.36 Both of these vulnerabilities – to fire and high-speed winds 
– are inherent to the non-permanent bamboo structures. 
The project officers for the District Disaster Management Authorities also perceived 
that the vulnerability of specific communities is higher due to their lifestyles and 
occupational habits (Chief Operating Officer ASDMA, 2016; Project Officer DDMA 
Chirrang, 2016). However, this research, or any other work on the vulnerability in 
Assam so far, has not considered the lifestyle habits that may push communities to be 
more vulnerable. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the administrative actors do view 
some communities as cleverer, and more adept and well-tuned to living with annual 
flooding. Meanwhile people who are more vulnerable were often described as un-
original habitants, who have migrated from elsewhere and have not learnt the manners 
which can help them survive and thrive in Assam.  
The communities in Assam are colloquially circumscribed as being Tribal 
(constituting scheduled tribes of the region), non-tribal Assamese (composing of those 
who identify themselves as successors of Ahom Kings) and Migrants (those arriving 
from outside Assam during the colonial and post-colonial period). In these three 
categories of people, Tribal people, the Bodos and Mishing (which are the most 
significant tribes in the Brahmaputra Valley region)37 are the ones who are most adept 
at coping with their geographical vulnerability. The Ahom, who are the non-tribal 
Assamese and have inhabited the state since the 13th century, while more modern, are 
still well-attuned in their lifestyle and dealing with annual flooding. The Migrants 
                                                             
36 It is a season marked by cyclonic winds and hail formation.  
37 The tribes are further divided into sub-groups, who are identified with their historic occupational activities. 
Like Sonwal is a Bodo tribe who dealt with gold (sona in Hindi). 
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loosely comprise those who were brought to Assam during the early 19th century by 
the British, to work in the tea plantations, as well as the immigrants allegedly arriving 
from Bangladesh and elsewhere; they are considered the least resilient (Project Officer 
DDMA Dhemaji, 2016; Project Officer DDMA Morigaon, 2016).  
However, the assumed non-resilience of those arriving in Assam during the 19th and 
20th centuries is only a rhetoric about the citizenship/migrant differentiation. There is 
neither any special policy to help reduce the vulnerability of those assumed to be more 
vulnerable nor any concern towards these migrating communities.  As discussed earlier 
in chapter 7, people who migrate are quite likely to be termed outsiders who do not 
belong in Assam. The state actors display a reduced responsibility towards these 
people; because the status of these people as citizens itself is contested the state thinks 
it can ignore them without a strong backlash (Project Officer DDMA Bongaingaon, 
2016). There are backlashes at times especially from minority leaders, ‘but it often 
ends up in violent conflict, and the agenda is lost' (Project Officer DDMA Dhubri, 
2016).  
8.2 Those who live on the river islands 
The people of char are always floating. 
Communities occupying the floating river-islands (char) in the lower and central 
Brahmaputra valley live a fluid life. The char, which is pronounced shore and can also 
mean ‘margins’ or ‘thief’ when translated from Hindi, are elusive and somewhat 
scandalous. 
‘Why do you want to go to the Char…It is not advisable to go there; you are a woman 
and the people in char are so dangerous that even our police officers avoid going 
there… if you persist we will send someone with you but please be really careful and 
do not take anything valuable with you. The bangles you are wearing can cost you 
your limb. Those people are barbaric and thieves. They will commit a crime and 
disappear across the borders; it will be impossible for us to locate them. And do not, 
in any case, go there after sunset, the islands are dangerous spaces in the dark’.  
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The statement above was the standard advice I received from every senior official to 
whom I expressed a desire to visit the river island. However, my field notes on the date 
of my first visit to a char village recall a different scenario. 
On the banks in Dhubri, six teachers take a depilated dingy towards the Bashaini 
hoping that they will not be caught in the rain. On a second dingy board, several other 
villagers – mostly families with small children - board to make it in time as the rains 
are expected that day. The dingy drop-off point is an eroded sand-dune, which is 
breaking off with the weight of the people climbing up to reach the island (picture 6).  
The habitation in the village is a kilometre walk inwards. There are no roads, no 
electricity lines and no water lines. The houses and shops however, have stand-alone 
solar lightening systems, every house having one square foot plate of solar panels 
(picture 7).  
The villagers of Bagadora tell me these solar panels were recently installed under the 
National Solar Mission of the Central Government. And I can see in action the Indian 
Climate Change Adaptation Action Plan, - promoting sustainable and low-carbon 
intensive energy options using solar panels. 
Picture 8: The Drop-off Point on Bashaini Char 
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Picture 9: Newly installed Solar Panel on a Shop Roof 
 
There is a tea-stall around which children are playfully gathered; it appears that they 
have not been to the school. The building of the school itself is new but empty. The 
doors and windows are shut, which makes one wonder if the teachers on the dingy 
boat and have reached their destinations at all. I am told the teachers arrived for 
election duty and not to teach that day. Right across the playground of the school is a 
Madrasa. The Madrasa teacher is inside and is eager to give a lesson to whoever may 
come by – child or adult. At a distance, some men are bent over a paddy field engaged 
in a collective farming practice, highly common to the char islands. There are no 
frightening people here, no hostile conditions at all, just the hospitable people who are 
eager to offer anyone chai in exchange for dialogue.  
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Picture 10: Newly constructed primary school in Bashaini Char  
(notice the closed doors and windows) 
 
 
Picture 11: Madrasa in a make-shift hutment right opposite to the Primary School 
 
The local boy Rajkumar, who followed us from the mainland into the char, points to 
the far end and says, ‘this whole land belongs to his grandfather, all these people here 
are cultivating my family’s land … but they are not tenants, this is how communities 
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live. We don’t know what to do with this land. We live in Dhubri, so these people can 
live here and cultivate for their families. We do not ask them for rent, but they send us 
rice sometimes’ (Rajkumar Babulal, 2016). It was hard to decipher whether this was 
the truth or an exaggeration, although the local families seemed familiar with this boy 
and they greeted him by touching his feet. 
The char communities have developed a system of social resilience due to their 
geographical vulnerability and governance obscurity. The people on the char treat land 
as a common cultivation resource and try to build self-reliance regarding access to 
food. Many households also send their youth to the main-land for daily-wage work to 
increase their household economic status. During the floods, if a part of the char is 
inundated and lost to the Brahmaputra river due to erosion, the displaced families are 
accommodated by friends and relatives living on the same char or on nearby char. 
At Bashaini char the families suggested a trip to Bagadora –one of the larger char that 
faced recent erosion, which washed away the south-east land-mass.  The char is right 
across the India Bangladesh border, and there are bamboo ridges that serve as a border 
fence inside the river while also assisting with sedimentary loss during floods. In the 
picture below the temporary structure that marks the India-Bangladesh border in the 
water can be seen. 
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Picture12: Bamboo structure determining the India-Bangladesh Border  
 
 
On the way from Bashaini to Bhagdora, the dingy was intercepted by the Central 
Reserve Police Force, who wanted to know the intention of a seemingly well-dressed 
person on board a local dingy instead of a governmental boat. They were confused 
because people from the city do not come to char for tourism or for research.  
In Bhagdora, a part of the island was eroded, and the families were displaced to the 
other side of a narrow dyke, which also acts as a bridge. The women of the families 
displaced ended up as D-voters.  
Like Bashaini, there are no roads on this char either, although there was a Maruti car 
driving around with party-posters for Congress. The locals narrated that the char may 
have better prospects now as one of the contesting MLA belongs to it. There are lots 
of things happening, including school construction and solar panels. According to the 
government, both the Bashaini and Bagadora char are fully electrified and have had 
village roads for the last ten years. However, the locals laughed at this proposition, 
gleefully, stating that the state would have known the truth only if an officer would 
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have come to inspect the construction site. The group went on to elaborate that ‘the 
local MLA was given a fund ten years ago for electrification; he kept that money … 
only now under the solar panel scheme are the panels being installed, and some 
progress is being made on the school. It is after all the election season’ (Group 
Discussion Bagdhara, 2016). 
Public spending on household consumption goods for electoral gains is a commonly 
known and well-documented phenomenon in India (Khemani, 2003; Wilkinson, 2006; 
Min, 2010; Scott & Seth, 2013). It is very palpable that the recent scenarios of 
construction and energy distribution in Assam and its river-island are part of the 
electoral strategy due to the Assam Assembly election unfolding during the time of the 
fieldwork for this thesis. It is well worth stating here that the State of Assam was under 
the Congress government leadership, led by Shri Tarun Gogoi as the Chief Minister 
from 17th May 2001. However, it was perceived that the BJP would manage to achieve 
a landslide victory in the 14th State Assembly Election and indeed, from 24th May 
2016, after 15 years, the Bhartiya Janata Party assumed governmental responsibility 
with Shri Sarbananda Sonwal as the Chief Minister. It is thus likely that had this 
fieldwork been conducted a year before the state election run-up, the experiences 
might have been different. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the chars and char 
dwellers are at the margins of development and governance.  
 
On the way back from the char the dingy sailors were seemingly in a hurry to reach 
the shore. 20 minutes later a dark cloud covered the sky, and everyone was worried 
that if it was a Bordisilla (hailstorm, accompanied by cyclone-like winds), the dingy 
would capsize. Two of the passengers held up a plastic sheet to help covers. Even in 
the face of disaster, they showcased the comforting hospitality that Assam is famous 
for by offering the only life jacket in the boat to me and reassuring me that everyone 
in the boat was a good swimmer. The retired Block Development Officer, who lives 
right across the river bank in Dhubri, was waiting anxiously at the drop-off point when 
we arrived. On seeing me get down from the boat, he rushed to greet me and offered 
me dinner with his family. He informed me that he had been waiting on the shore for 
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more than 3 hours and was getting worried due to the weather conditions. I am not sure 
how he knew that I was visiting the river islands. However, I think that, just like it was 
astonishing for the CRPF officers in the afternoon, it must also have been surprising 
for every other person in the region who saw me, a non-local educated girl, getting in 
a boat and floating away to a char.  
Nothing during that day’s experiences on the char was anywhere close to the narratives 
of ‘frightful, thieves’ that I had been warned about earlier. And one must wonder how 
these narratives came into being. A little archival research into the historic police 
records shed some light on this. There were instances of murders, dacoity and 
disruption of public order and the alleged criminals had absconded to the river island, 
making it very hard for the then British administration to trace them.  The records 
provide a somewhat detailed description of a police chase across the river and their 
disappearance into ‘thin mist onto an unknown river island’. The elusive geography of 
the river islands makes them a perfect hide-out for alleged criminals and they were in 
fact used during the period of the Assam Agitation as terroristic hide-outs and planning 
spaces for the United Liberation Front of Assam militants. My retired source, Shri 
Rajendra Prasad, remembering his own strenuous encounters during his days as a 
young Indian Police Service Officer, corroborated the scandalous nature of the chars, 
while asking, ‘can we ever be entirely sure about the nationality or intention of these 
people? So many of them were militants, and some groups even operated from across 
the Bangladesh border.’ 
There are documented journalistic trails of interviews with ULFA members in the hard 
to locate chars and difficult mountain terrain. However, due to problems of access and 
a lack of geographical information, there has never been enough academic engagement 
with the lives of the people occupying the Indian Chars. However ethnographic and 
geographic work from the Chars in Bangladesh, especially concerning vulnerability 
and migration due to climate change, has started to take shape.  
In Assam, the Indian administration has never been able to fully map and identify the 
river islands due to their temporary-existential nature. And while there is no hard 
evidence to validate the narratives that the occupants of the river islands are ‘mainly 
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criminals’ or ‘majority militants’ or in any way ‘certainly illegal immigrants from 
Bangladesh’ these metaphors are commonly used. Questioning these claims, the 
Deputy Commissioner of Dhubri District asked, ‘if these people are criminals then 
why does the NCRB (National Crime Research Bureau) not have data showing an 
alarming rate of crime statistics in these areas? In the same way as if you look at the 
D-voter list, you will find only a handful of D-voters in most of these areas, so if the 
government so strongly believes that the char dwellers are illegal immigrants, why has 
it issued them citizenship documents?’ (Deputy Commissioner Dhubri, 2016)  
 As discussed in chapter 5, the political narrative of ‘illegal Bangladeshi immigrants’ 
is highly flawed. Nevertheless, there is a continued sense of suspicion within the 
general society as well as the bureaucratic elite about the people who occupy the char 
areas. This elusive and scandalous character has not been subjected to academic 
discussion and debate except by Gorky Chakraborty, who conducted a socio-economic 
analysis of the char in his works.  
Interestingly, the Assam government included the Char as a specific subject requiring 
attention for development in its 7th Five-year plan (1983). Subsequently, a 
departmental unit was established in 1986. In 1996, this unit was made into a 
Directorate, and in 1998 the Directorate for Char Area Development was merged into 
the Welfare of Minorities Development. However, the only achievements that the 
Directorate can boast of are the socio-economic surveys of the region in 1992-93 and 
2003-04. These surveys, however, are the only source of information about the Chars.  
The following char provides a geographic overview of the known-char concentration 
in the study districts. The data below visualises the change in the numbers and the area 
of chars in the study districts. It is worth noting that the physical presence of the 
number of chars in each of these districts corresponds to 1992-93 and 2002-2003 data. 
It is highly probable that the number of chars has changed since then.  
 
210 Governance of Climate Change Related Migrations in Assam (India) 
Chart 9: Change in number and total area of char in study districts * ^ 
 
* The data taken for Kamrup correspond to old Kamrup district  
^ District of Chirang is the only study district with no marked Char 
Source: Socio-Economic Survey of Char Areas 1992-93 and 2003-04 
The demographic analysis of the data provided by these surveys shows a considerable 
increase in the number of families residing below the poverty line while there was a 
relative stagnation of the literacy rate from 1992-93 to 2003-04. The table below 
compares the data on poverty and illiteracy in the selected study districts.  
Table 18: Change in Literacy and Poverty Rates in the Char areas 
District Literacy (92-93) Literacy (2003-04) BPL (92-93) BPL (2003-04) 
Kamrup 17% 15% 53% 68% 
Goalpara 8% 14% 53% 68% 
Bongaigaon 13% 12% 54% 68% 
Dhubri 19% 15% 54% 69% 
Morigaon 8% 19% 53% 67% 
Jorhat 32% 61% 25% 64% 
Dhemaji 14% 16% 47% 71% 
Source: Socio-Economic Survey of Char Areas of Assam, 1992-93 and 2003-04,  










No. of Char Villages (1992-93) 148 187 150 313 41 210 95
No. of Char Villages (2003-04) 175 179 117 480 39 293 149
Total Land (sq. km.) (1992-93) 54 116 114 869 68 56 135
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The growth in poverty is indicative of the poor performance of the welfare 
programmes, and the change in the char areas is indicative of the lack of structural 
development to mitigate the silt and river bank erosion.  
The surveys do not provide specific data on religion and ethnicity, although this data 
is available through the village level census data. Given the fluctuating nature of the 
char themselves, and the resource constraints, this thesis did not identify each char 
village (1144 in total for the study districts). Instead, a demographic analysis of the 
revenue circles with a char majority in the lower Assam was conducted.  
The analysis shows that the population in the revenue circles with a high char 
concentration are primarily Muslim. For example, in the South Salmara Revenue 
circle, the population of Muslims is 98%. Dhubri has 480 recorded chars, the majority 
of which lie in the South-Salmara Circle.  In the district of Bongaigaon, the Boitamari 
revenue Circle and Srijangram Revenue circle both having a multiplicity of chars with 
a Muslim population of 69% and 66% respectively. It is worth noting here that in the 
district of Bongaigaon, the overall Muslim population is 50%. However, in the revenue 
circles, which have a multiplicity of chars, the population of Muslims is higher. 
Similarly, the Goalpara District has an aggregate Muslim population of 51%, while the 
Lakhipur Revenue Circle has a Muslim concentration of 81%.  
In the Upper Brahmaputra division in the District of Dhemaji, the total population of 
Muslims across the whole district is only 1.9%. However, in the Jonai sub-division, 
which has a multiplicity of river islands, this concentration is nearly 4%. The only 
exception to the Char population in the study area is seen in the Majuli Revenue Circle 
(now a district in itself), where the population is almost 100% tribal. It is an ST 
reserved candidate area.  
The District Commissioner of Dhemaji Mr Victor Carpenter candidly stated, ‘the 
people in the region are well adapted to living with floods… when you see the beautiful 
pictures of decades-old bamboo bridges hanging over the flooded river it is from this 
region. These living bridges are a glorifying example of local engineering and the 
tribal way of living. You do not find that in the lower or middle Brahmaputra valley. 
You would find them in the upper-areas of Bodo-land neighbouring Bhutan where the 
 
212 Governance of Climate Change Related Migrations in Assam (India) 
tribal concentration is higher or in the Karbi-Anglong district area, but not in other 
districts.’ He also explained, ‘in the last years we have seen an influx of non-tribal 
non-Assamese population. They are Bengali and Marwari migrants. They are 
economically cleverer, but their lifestyles are detrimental to the ecosystem, and thus 
there are clashes.’ (Deputy Commissioner Dhemaji, 2016) 
Answering the question, does the state try to negotiate peaceful living amongst the 
migrating and host community, the Deputy commissioners said, ‘no! But we try to 
prevent them from coming… you must have seen it is not an easy journey to travel to 
Dhemaji, the road… we are even thinking of barricading outside the district lines to 
stop and check the documentation of incoming migrants, but that is not legally 
possible, and there would be problems from civil society actors.’ 
The Deputy commissioner himself was raised in the tribal areas of Karbi-Anglong and 
feels genuine about the loss of tribal identity and culture in the state. It is also worth 
mentioning here that out of all the Deputy commissioners interviewed for this study 
Mr Carpenter was the only one who viewed protection of tribal identity as the most 
critical issue and genuinely believed in the threat from migrants including those 
coming from other regions of India and being culturally different to Assamese people. 
For Mr Carpenter, the Chars are an example of micro-cosmic ecosystems that must be 
protected and used for developing biodiversity reserves. He suggested a meeting with 
Dr Bishnu Payen, the forest man of India, who has converted an entire river-island into 
a tropical forest. For him it is only the aboriginal tribes who can respect and revere his 
land so much as to revive a barren sand-dune and convert it into a tropical reserve 
(Deputy Commissioner Dhemaji, 2016). 
In the middle Brahmaputra valley in the district of Morigaon, the population of 
Muslims across the district is 52%. However, the concentration of Muslims in the 
Laharighat Revenue circle and Bhuragaon Revenue circle is 60% and 91% 
respectively (Census India, 2011). The Bhuragaon Revenue Circle also has a large 
population who were displaced due to the massive erosion of approximately 17 
villages (Deputy Commissioner Morigaon, 2016). 
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In the Middle Brahmaputra valley, there is undoubtedly a large majority of Muslim 
Bengali speaking people, who are identified as ‘Miyaan’, occupying the fragile river 
island ecosystem. In Lower Assam, the general concentration of Muslims in the 
districts across the Brahmaputra river is generally higher.  The proximity of Lower 
Assam to the Bangladeshi border has added to the narrative of illegal Bangladeshi 
immigrants. And social and political groups have consistently questioned the 
legitimacy of these inhabitants residing in India (Home & Political Department, 
Assam, 2012). The administration, on the other hand, has carefully avoided any efforts 
towards the development or even identification of these areas.  
As I mentioned earlier in chapter 6, there are 358 char villages that have not even been 
surveyed and thus any existence of rights and claims in these islands is contentious.  
It seems that the inhabitants of the chars are unlike those living on the main-land of 
Assam. Politically they are invisible and administratively they are dispensable. In 
Lower Assam, where the chars are mostly occupied by a Bengali-speaking Muslim 
community, suspicion about illegal immigrants from Bangladesh or giving refuge to 
illegally trafficked family members from Bangladesh is strong. The residents of these 
islands live in obscurity with little to no livelihood options and no state support. Most 
households engage in community farming or work as daily wage labourers in the 
nearest town.  
8.3 Welfare, Support and the Question of Existence 
It was evident on inspection of these chars that the communities living here are not a 
part of the government programmes that are supposed to benefit erosion affected 
families or flood victims. There are no MGNREGA initiatives, no Indira Awas Yojana 
Housing and indeed no structural barriers to control flood damage. Regarding 
compensation, it was not entirely clear how many of the people have received any state 
help. However, it can be deduced that as the land ownership in these areas is unsecured 
and land-data is unsurveyed there are no registered cultivation rights against which 
compensation can be sought. Even in the Upper Assam areas of Jonai and Majuli, 
which are Scheduled Tribe areas, the land rights are held through community and 
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cooperative ownership, which makes seeking compensation for loss of territory a 
complicated issue.  
During the group discussions, it was seen that the families residing on the river banks 
tended to move inwards but close to their eroded piece of land. The proximity is kept 
to supervise the river flow and ensure that in the case of re-emergence of the eroded 
land it is not acquired by someone else. However, this is possible only in areas where 
there is empty fallow land available and sufficient social capital for the displaced 
family. For example, the Gaon Budha of Sutar Gaon acquired land 100 metres inwards 
from his eroded plot without opposition, due to the social clout he exerts. In the same 
village, other families had to move to Dhing or interior villages of the Laharighat 
circle. A similar effect of social capital was seen in Bhashaini Village, where co-
operative cultivation was practised, and char families displaced due to floods and 
erosion were given shelter by the Matbor’s family (GaonBudha, 2016).  
However, social capital is not permanent when it comes to land resources, which are 
already scarce. It is often seen that while first, families will accommodate the incoming 
erosion victims on sympathy grounds, if long-term rehabilitation is not offered 
elsewhere, hostility between families will arise. As Nandita Hazarika explained, ‘first 
they are a guest, then they are illegal settlers, it is challenging for the state to get 
involved in these community-dynamics’.  
In the absence of land-rights, displaced families are unable to claim compensation. The 
only avenue left for people displaced from this ecosystem is to seek a generous ex-
gratia compensation following every flood season and to get themselves prioritised 
under welfare schemes such as Indira Awas Yojana (IAY). To seek ex-gratia aid, it is 
necessary for the state to acknowledge the rights of a person as a citizen as well as a 
displaced flood victim. 
In the earlier chapters I showed that the feat of getting recognised as a citizen is a 
crucial and arduous task. In this chapter I will delve deeper into the acquisition of 
citizenship by the women of Assam, and how it inversely affects the assistance, aid 
and compensation they receive from the state.  
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Assam is a patriarchal society with only 13% of the total households headed by a 
woman out of a total of 853,374 households. This means that only 6% of the total 
women in the state of Assam are head of a household, while 94% of the women are 
part of male-led households. In general, birth registrations are not compulsory in India 
and, as household ownership and programme benefit documentation are attached to 
the biometric information about the household head, there is no incentive to register 
births or the existence of women members. In particular in rural areas, the 
documentation identifying women is limited to village panchayat certification that the 
woman in question is a daughter of a member of the village.  
This becomes problematic when the woman gets married and travels to another village 
to join her husband’s family; or when a woman becomes homeless and man-less due 
to the death of the guardian male member; or when she is deserted and excluded from 
the household. In the absence of any trail of documentation to prove their birth and 
lineage in the country, women are prone to being wrongly classified as D-voters. As 
seen in chapter 7, 69% of the total D-voter population are women.  
During the group discussion in Dhobkura village, 13 women came forward to identify 
themselves as D-voters who are present on the D-voter list. Most of these women 
lamented the problem as being due to the ‘unavailability of documentation to prove 
their birth or lineage from an Indian father’, a ‘clerical mistake in writing the names’ 
and the tradition of giving a ‘new bride a name of her husband’s choice upon 
marriage’. As the process of a name change does not include a state recognised system 
of public declaration in the newspapers, and as women lack identity documents, it 
becomes challenging for them to prove their citizenship and thus claim their rights in 
the event of migration or displacement.  
Shakina Begum, a woman who was successfully able to seek a court judgement against 
the wrongful listing of her name on the D-voter list, spent 8 years regularly attending 
the Foreigners’ tribunal and spent a total of 10,000 Rupees in lawyers’ fees. Her 
judgement does not provide a rationale but simply states ‘she is wrongfully listed on 
the D-voter list and the state authorities must reinstate her voting rights’. The 
judgement makes no mention of the documentary proof that led to the decision.  
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In a similar vein, Fatima Bibi, whose name was on the 2001 voting list, but who 
suddenly found herself listed as a D-voter during the 2016 election drive, was 
disappointed that she could not vote. The reason for the listing was probably her 
migration from a char to a river-bank area with her two daughters after the death of 
her husband. She said that while the new community has integrated her and her 
daughter like their own, she could not show the documentation to the government 
officials when they asked for her identity papers. She did not have any.  
On the other hand, Sudipta Mukherjee, the revenue circle officer in the state of Dhubri 
stated, ‘women claimants are more likely to be attended to first in the public offices. I 
personally don’t like watching a poor woman in my office area, so I always try to sort 
their problems out first. Plus in fact we have policies which make it mandatory for us 
to dispose cases of compensation and assistance where the claimant is a woman…even 
in the case of compensation for properties in joint ownership we prioritise cases where 
a woman is one of the co-owners and in IAY allocations the housing is always provided 
in the joint name of the husband and the wife’ (Revenue Circle Officer Dhubri, 
2016).While it is true that the State of Assam does prioritise support for women, it is 
also necessary to understand that the state support under the schemes discussed earlier 
is only possible when a woman is in fact recognised as a citizen of the nation. In the 
absence of identity documents and voting rights, the efficacy of the woman-centric 
schemes is highly questionable. If a woman is a non-citizen or a doubtful citizen they 
do not have the necessary status to ask for state assistance, and due to the general fear 
of being enumerated as a D-voter, detained, or pushed back across the border into the 
territory of Bangladesh (a highly invasive and violent process of literally pushing 
doubtful citizens across the international line of control), there is constant inhibition 
in regard to asking the state for assistance.  
Conclusion  
The current chapter discussed the influence of demography on the protection outcome; 
three elements of demography – ethnicity, religion and gender - were discussed to trace 
the occupancy of fragile areas. It was seen that minority groups are most likely to 
occupy the most vulnerable geographical areas due to their exclusion from the 
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mainland. The reasons for exclusion can be on the grounds of their non-tribal identity, 
which prevents them from buying land in tribal areas; continued poverty, which makes 
mainland areas out of their economic reach; and seclusion, due to a lack of identity 
documentation, which jeopardises their right to even seek state assistance. 
Despite a profound realisation that resulted in several affirmative policies and a 
Directorate for char area development, these areas have remained physically 
vulnerable and the occupants of these islands are socially and economically trapped 
due to their vulnerability. The lack of state support in these areas has created concentric 
circles of victimisation with climate change adding further parallel circles of 
entrapment, discrimination and structural persecution. The nuances of governance of 
the margins – a marginal population and the margins of the mainland – need to be 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
Climate change related migration is essentially an ethical issue which challenges our 
political cohesion, social limits to acceptance of the ‘other’, and commitment to the 
poorest of the poor who would either migrate or perish in the warming world. So how 
do we engage with Climate Change migration? At what level of governance should we 
aim to build capacity? And capacity in what areas are some of the necessary questions 
we need to ask. The finding of this thesis presents a reasonable caution against what 
new treaties, international orders, regional agreements and institutional arrangements 
can really achieve. Through the case study of Assam, I have come to show how 
bureaucratic redundancy, deliberate omissions, and methodical neglect by sub-state 
institutions determine the life and worth of a legal system.  
It was seen that the elite bureaucratic actors serving at the frontlines of climate fragility 
can increasingly perceive climate change as a reason for exacerbated out-migrations 
and forced displacements. This increased perception has led to dedicated institutional 
changes and revising of policy agendas to accommodate the needs of climate migrants. 
However, despite the growth in policy documentation, climate migrants continue to 
receive uncertain and inadequate protection from the state. The thesis tried to answer 
‘why there is an uncertainty, non-uniformity and inadequacy in climate migration 
governance. I concluded that the neglect and omissions in the every-day mundane 
practices of the street-level bureaucrats, coupled with bureaucratic redundancy 
determine the policy outcomes. The everyday discretion, disregard and discounting 
exercised by the street-level bureaucrats are complexly influenced by a subtle value-
judgement based on political and social subtext in which policies are implemented.  
During the development and writing of this thesis the international dialogue on climate 
change migration has substantially shifted its focus from the need to channelize 
humanitarian interventions (use of UNCHR, OCHA and IOM) to the glorification of 
migrants as dynamic actors (use of disaster mitigation and developmental strategies). 
However, the political sub-text and marginalisation in the climate vulnerable areas 
illustrates that the communities most vulnerable to climate change cannot simply walk 
away from their vulnerabilities. Instead there are ghettos of trapped or displaced 
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populations that are suffering from a chronic protection deficit because the state 
structures perceive them as ‘outsiders’ or ‘inconsequential’ due to their social, 
economic and political statuses. There is no dynamism or aspiration in climate-induced 
migrations. People of Assam (and elsewhere) are not migrating because they want to 
live in a better climate, but because the ecosystem that have traditionally sustained 
their livelihoods and helped them survive is changing and pushing them further 
towards poverty. And thus, there will always remain a certain sense of desperation in 
climate migration which would absolutely challenge our own personal 
humanitarianism and ethics as we take this debate further.  
9.1 Findings 
While determining the methodology for this research three predictions were made (See 
the conclusions to chapter 3). These predictions were expectations about how the 
government should respond to climate change migrations and were based on a 
thorough review of existing literature. In this section of my final chapter I revisit these 
predictions and analyse the real state of governance in the light of my findings. By 
doing so I appropriate the distance between law as is and law as ought to be. Thus, 
taking the opportunity to move the debate on climate migration forward towards how 
best the gap between agendas and implementation can be realistically bridged without 
the overwhelming desire to create new institutions. 
My first assumption was – the framing of climate change migration as a developmental 
issue rather than a border security issue by the central Indian government will 
positively influence the sub-national perception and engagement with climate 
migrations. This would mean that the state actors would disassociate themselves from 
the security narrative, which sees environmental migration as a source of conflict in 
Assam. But instead the state actors would associate climate migration with the 
development deficit in the State. 
Mirroring Central government’s perception, the elite actors in the Assam Secretariat 
have been pro-active in bringing institutional change which can respond to the 
complex synergies between development, climate change disasters, and migrations. 
There is a fully functional Assam State Disaster Management Authority (decentralised 
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up to District level). Assam is one of the few states in India which has created a new 
institution as per the mandate of the Disaster Management Act of 2005. There is a mix 
of bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic staff employed in ASDMA. All the non-
bureaucratic project officers of ASDMA are qualified developmental professionals 
with previous experience in non-governmental organisations, development support 
and welfare advocacy. The sub-state has also created Flood Early Warning System 
involving private partnership with members of public. The state has successfully 
collaborated with Indian Space Research Organisation to create Flood Hazard Index 
and visually present Flood devastation in the state by curating an Atlas of Flood 
Vulnerability.38 There are identifiable flood-zonation in every state district. The state 
is also one of the first states in India to achieve MGNREGA presence in every rural 
village. It has successfully bided for creation of two smart cities (Guwahati and Jorhat) 
in 2016 and already have the Guwahati Smart City Body fully constituted and staffed. 
The state has also revised its compensation policies to accommodate people displaced 
due to flood erosions. It has identified the beneficiary household in every districts and 
curated a list of compensation packages that since need to be approved by the state 
assembly. The state elite-actors have pushed for enhancing their knowledge base by 
studying ‘livelihood diversification options to promote in-suite adaptation to climate 
change’ 
Yet despite all these mammoth institutional changes which reflects the elite-perception 
of climate change and related displacements, the response to the citizenry has been 
limited and inadequate. Given that most of these changes occurred simultaneously in 
2011-2012 it was worth taking a note and asking why the progress has been so 
abysmal. I came to a conclusion that the framing of climate change migration as a 
development issue, rather than a border security issue, has a mixed influence on the 
elite bureaucratic actor’s perception and engagement at a sub-state level.  
While the sub-state actors share the central government’s concerns about framing 
climate migration as a sub-context to the larger development issue there is also an 
                                                             




added nuance of security complex. This security complex occurs due to Assam’s 
position as a border state and its continued identity struggle. The security narrative 
visibly affects performance of key development programs and is even used to escape 
accountability for responding to certain groups of people. For example, I discussed the 
Right to Freedom of Movement [Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution of India] as an 
enabling policy which allows all the Indian citizens and recognised foreigners a 
freedom to move within Indian territory without impunity. The sub-state recognises 
that the right is an essential human right and a basic condition which allows families 
to move out of their vulnerable geographical spaces into a more resilient environment. 
However, the bureaucratic redundancy and compartmentalisation at the street level 
colludes with the security narrative of ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrant’ and reduced some 
pockets of citizenry to ‘doubtful citizens’. Now because the right to freedom of 
movement is available only to those who are citizens or in ownership of alien visas, 
the ‘doubtful citizens’ lose their right to movement and are condemned to living in 
fragile ecosystems, until they could prove their status as citizens. 
It is however, well worth reminding the reader that this is a specific problem in the 
case of Assam due to enactment of Illegal Migration Determination (and Deportation) 
Act of 1986. The procedures under the IMDT Act mandate street-level election 
officers to enumerate and report people who are ‘allegedly migrants from Bangladesh’. 
Such allegation under the Act do not require a formal complaint procedure or even a 
physical/political or social proximity to the ‘alleged migrant’. The law under IMDT 
puts the onus of proof of citizenship upon the person whose citizenship is challenged. 
Once an election officer, following their mandate, declares a person to be doubtful, 
they cease to exist as citizens for the purpose of welfare programs. Even the most well-
meaning Election Officer or Block Development Officer cannot reverse this procedure 
of law without judicial intervention from the Foreigner’s Tribunal. The general 
duration for establishing citizenship rights under a Foreigner’s Tribunal is 8 years (and 
litigation expenses). Thus, while the elite actors in the state may convince themselves 
of their development-oriented approach towards a ‘dynamic climate migrants’ in 
reality the bureaucratic action is embroiled in a politically motivated legal tragedy 
which strips the ‘dynamism’ away from a migrant.   
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Similarly, once again taking the development approach the sub-state actors identify 
building of embankments, dams and reservoirs as a strategy to mitigate inundation thus 
reducing scenarios of temporary displacement, entrapment, and long-term migration 
caused due to repeat flooding. But, the absence of structural development in areas 
which are most fragile, such as the river-islands, is justified by asserting that those 
areas don’t need development, they are occupied by thieves, thugs and illegal migrants 
who should not be there at the first place. Such potent is the security narrative that 
even the most senior officials would rationalise lack of development by comparing 
communities worth (as a citizen) and the public expenditure of an otherwise poor state.  
The second assumption in the study was that the existing political rhetoric surrounding 
migration would negatively impact the protection of the communities that are 
perceived to be ‘outsiders’ or ‘non-Assamese’. 
 It was highly visible during my field research and while analysing the state data that 
the state has a morbid affair with the term ‘migration’ and associates it stanchly with 
‘illegal Bangladeshi migrations’. This reflected in bureaucratic actor’s reluctance to 
publicly speak to me about migration and migrant protection.  Even the most senior 
officials wanted anonymity while engaging in direct discussions on migration, 
irrespective of the fact that we were not really discussing the more contentious cross-
border migration. Senior officials preferred to use the term flood victims or 
displacement victims. These terms were also employed to describe people who engage 
in voluntary cyclic migrations, to avoid the social stigmatisation and political 
criminality associated with the term ‘migration’. It was a paradox which looked at its 
‘dynamic climate migrant’ as a ‘victim’. 
The political influence was highly potent in the relief process. The availability of relief 
is reserved based on political clout. I demonstrated that in relation to relief policies 
street-level actors hold strong political considerations and seek to strengthen their own 
political/power position in the society. The street-level actors claimed that sub-
standard relief can jeopardise the political interests of the parties with which they 
associate publicly. This also means that the areas that have limited political 
participation, or a low number of voters in general receive modest or no relief.  
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For example, the river-islands which face a continuous flux of involuntary migration 
do not attract any special provision for the protection of the char populations during 
or post-disasters. There is a relatively higher number of D-voters (doubtful citizens) in 
these geographical spaces and thus a relational lack of political presence. The only 
char with a designated shelters and relief camps was Majuli (which was made a district 
during the writing of this thesis). Majuli Island, as the heart of the political and cultural 
life of the Mishing community, is also one of the few chars with strong political 
representation.  
And while the state elite actors speak highly about the separation of powers, in a 
Montesquieu fashion, the theory is bargained in everyday administration. Sometimes 
due to matching political ideologies, sometimes due to the personal relationships and 
goodwill between the ruling government and the state actors; and sometimes because 
it is easier to ignore large numbers of flood victims than to respond to them.  
The final assumption of the study was based on the influence of demography. Since 
certain demographic characteristics, such as gender, age and membership of social 
groups, can lead to increased levels of vulnerability to climate change displacement 
and also strongly contribute to the inability to migrate out of collapsing ecosystems, I 
expected that the state would be aware of this differential vulnerability and would have 
differential policy outcomes aimed at protecting the most vulnerable.  
My analysis demonstrated that the state actors understood the variations in 
vulnerability based on demographic factors. There was an enhanced understanding of 
the gendered perspective of climate vulnerability. The district disaster management 
officials attributed their increased awareness of the gendered aspects of vulnerability 
to the presence of Mrs. Nandita Hazarika as their COO. It was also seen that the state 
has adopted pro-active strategies, such as the joint allotment of permanent land-tenures 
or housing benefits under the Indira Awas Yojana, or prioritisation of rehabilitation 
grants for women applicants etc., to protect vulnerable women. However, these 
policies are not necessarily implemented, as most women residing in the state do not 
have any identity papers to make a claim, prove their existence or even be represented 
in a democracy. Thus, the institutional structures eclipse the policies aimed at 
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benefitting women and instead produce abrupt and callous results on a continuous 
basis.  
Similarly, the lifestyle and demographic characteristics of the people who live on the 
Chars.  It was seen that despite the well-known and thoroughly documents physical 
vulnerability of these islands the schemes discussed in this study had a very minimal 
and inadequate implementation. Every officer interviewed for the study was able to 
perceive and understand the climate vulnerability of the river-islands but none of the 
officers was keen to prioritise project deliverance in the river-islands, as they found 
them hard to reach.  Similarly, no Deputy Commissioner or Senior secretarial officer 
from the Department of Revenue or Department of Disaster Management, ever 
attempted a planned relocation from these islands due to the fear that it might lead to 
massacres like the one witnessed in Nellie during 1983. Thus, physical vulnerability 
of the chars was an issue that goes beyond the state’s ability to respond in any 
meaningful way. 
9.2 Contribution of the Thesis and Recommendations  
The problem of climate change migration is inherently complex. There are differential 
definitions and attitudes towards the role climate that change plays in influencing 
migration. In turn this had led to a multiplicity of interpretations, perceptions, and 
responses about effective climate change governance at several levels. The research 
on the governance work on climate migration falls within a futurist ‘what ought to be’ 
paradigm, despite the strong scientific consensus regarding adaptive and survival 
migration due to climate change. Scholars have not developed a generalisable account 
of how governments tend to respond to wicked issues and why the solutions provided 
are non-uniform and inadequate despite the chronic nature of environmentally affected 
migration.  
The thesis has highlighted that the national and sub-national governments have a 
varied and fluctuating perceptions and responses towards climate change migration. 
The central government may frame the problem as a developmental issue, but the state 
governments would certainly add layers of complexity and nuances based on their 
regional and geographical statuses. By engaging with governments at the sub-national 
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level I provide new insights into the translation and functionality of the existing 
policies and I contribute towards understanding the socio-political context in which 
policies are implemented. I have argued that there is always a political and institutional 
sub-text that not only creates climate vulnerability but also negatively influences 
efforts to meaningfully respond to climate change related migration and forced 
displacement.  
The thesis sheds light on the State of Assam, which has been used in the security 
studies literature to exemplify ‘group-based violence due to environmental 
constraints’. While there is no strong evidence to suggest that the political violence in 
Assam is motivated by environmental or climatic change, this thesis has shown that 
the existing group-identity rhetoric and associated political struggles have negatively 
impacted the state’s ability to respond to climate migration.  
Methodologically, this thesis is one of the first to utilise implementation data on key 
welfare programmes and Geographical Information System mapping tools to locate 
the gap between the elite agenda framing and the actual agenda deliverance. I drew on 
datasets for livelihood security, infrastructural development, citizenship data, and 
socio-economic data to provide a holistic picture of the protection gaps. This was also 
the first time that the State government of Assam shared a full-record of its D-voter 
list and allowed an analysis into the demographic and geographical character of the 
data. The findings have an influential impact in review and re-scrutiny of the National 
Registration of Citizenship process in the State.39 By highlighting the marginalised 
situation of migrating women who often end up as unrecognised aliens or doubtful 
citizens due to a lack of documentary evidence I channelized media discussions on the 
validity of a flawed administrative process. I made a direct contribution by providing 
a sound bite to the most watched local News channel - Pratidin Times in April 2016 - 
contributing to a discussion panel on the NRC process in Assam, which was aired on 
27th December 2016 News 18/North-East. An indirect contribution also was made 
through several pre-air discussions with Aman Wadud, a lawyer-activist in Assam who 
                                                             
39 At the time of submission of this thesis the first list of NRC data was published by the state after a thorough 
internal scrutiny following my recommendations to the Chief Secretary.  The scrutiny however, led to a two years 
delay in first NRC publication. The final result of the NRC published register were not available at the time of 
submission and thus have not been incorporated in this work.  
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is actively working for the rights of D-voters. Wadud and I identified eleven D-voters 
in Karbi Anglong (although it was not my study area) and filed a collective judicial 
representation for the reinstatement of their citizenship rights in January 2017. The 
matter is sub-judices in the High Court at Guwahati.  
The work in this thesis is truly inter-disciplinary and aimed at not only broadening our 
understanding of climate migration governance, but also providing a sound public 
policy advice. Based on this study, the state Secretariat of Assam sought 
recommendations for synergising climate migration into the existing Disaster 
Management and Developmental paradigms of the state.   
9.3 Recommendations 
The state of Assam benefits from a small mitigation responsibility, a functional 
district-level disaster management institution, and the utilisation of GIS mapping 
techniques to map its flood-vulnerability. The state has shown a progressive awareness 
of the climate change and migration nexus at the secretarial level. The publication of 
studies conducted by ASDMA to understand livelihood diversification needs and 
climate vulnerability is indicative of this awareness.  
At this stage the state of Assam could establish an adaptation model of development 
that is resilient to future climate change while at the same time not increasing the 
carbon footprint of the state. Given that the state of Assam has already created an 
institution on disaster management with office bearers appointed up to the district 
level, specialising in disaster management and climate risk reduction studies, the state 
could utilise its existing setup in planning and strategising its response. 
The state officials instinctively know that the communities living in fragile areas 
engage in cyclic and non-permanent forms of migration to strengthen their household 
level resilience to climate change. This knowledge should be expressly recognised by 
including sustainable voluntary migrations as an adaptation option in the State Action 
Plan for Climate Change and the Disaster Management Plan of the State. 
The State Disaster Management Plan recognises the ‘all disaster-all department’ 
approach to hazard management. This approach must also be inculcated into the 
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district units, which benefit from an involved deputy-commissioner who is usually the 
line-manager for every state department at the District level. 
To ensure that the line-officials and street-level actors understand the synergy and their 
roles in maintaining it, I suggest the adoption of the technique of mess-mapping. The 
process of mess-mapping involves mapping the political and administrative 
bottlenecks, including identifying the departmental nexus and communication 
networks that need reinvigorating for more closed cooperation, in the implementation 
of a policy. Mess-mapping is a cross-sectoral mechanism involving an all department 
all officials strategy, which is similar to the state’s all department all disasters approach 
towards disaster management. 
Districts should take an inventory of the existing programme outcomes and the barriers 
to those outcomes by using the geographical information system and over-laying it 
with the tools of mess-mapping. This would help in understanding the developmental 
deficiency and the reasons for such constraints in each local area (essentially at the 
village level).  
For example, the mapping of employment generation under the MGNREGA policy 
using geographical information system would allow for clearly identifying the 
geographical impact of the programme and would help overlay and compare the 
programme’s impact in geographically vulnerable locations. By adding elements of 
census data to this mapping analysis the state officials would be able to clearly see if 
the areas with the least programme impacts are essentially the ones that are also 
geographically vulnerable and occupied by minority communities.  
As stated earlier, the State government has already made tremendous progress in 
mapping flood vulnerability, and in mapping the socio-economic data on scheduled 
tribes at village level. Both datasets were available on the open source Bhuvan 
software of Indian Space Research Organization and were used to generate maps in 
the current study. Overlapping this data with data on livelihood programmes, housing 
benefit programmes, and ex-gratia compensations would provide a highly visual and 
understandable picture for the state actors at all levels of governance.  
The process of mess-mapping should be aimed at answering the following questions:  
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1) Can a community adapt to climate change with in-situ adaptation measures? 
2) Can a community adapt to climate change with cyclic migration without the 
need for permanent relocation? 
3) Can a community adapt to climate change with permanent relocation to nearby 
areas? 
4) And finally, is there a chance that a community may become trapped in a 
collapsing ecosystem and may require planned rehabilitation? 
An analysis at the village level would provide a baseline for adaptation, migration and 
relocation needs. This would help government actors in determining whether climate 
change adaptation can be achieved in-situ or if certain forms of migration or relocation 
are necessary. Each of these scenarios could be used to identify needs. For example, 
in areas where in-situ adaptation is possible the village level assessment might show a 
greater need for structural development to mitigate flood effects; or in areas identified 
as collapsed ecosystems, the local administrators might find it necessary to plan 
assisted rehabilitation. The determination of needs would allow the opportunity to 
match appropriate policy programmes. For example, in areas requiring structural 
measures, the state could prioritise funding for structural dam and embankment works 
under the MGNREGA scheme.  
The next step in the process is solution mapping and accounting. In solution mapping 
the District Commissioner, with his team of Revenue Circle Officers, Block 
Development Officers, and the Village authorities must collaborate to identify 
solutions to the mess-map created earlier. The solutions should be identified by the 
street-level actors while an accountable time-line should be agreed at the district level 
for proper supervision. Once progress is made the data should be displayed using the 
technique of mess-mapping to clearly identify the progress and regularly monitor the 
barriers.  The process of mapping would not only allow the state officials to see and 
monitor their own progress but would also help them disengage with sub-national 
politics and be more focused towards targeted policy outcomes. The inanimation of 
mapping would provide a layer of detachment from animated factors, which clearly 
interfere with the current policy outcomes.  
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9.4 Future Research Avenues 
It is generally known that climate change is affecting hydro-metrological cycles across 
the world and forcing communities who are dependent on eco-system resources to use 
migration as an adaptive or survival strategy. In a changing global environment, forms 
of climate migration are inevitable. However, research has focused for too long on the 
need to establish a causal linkage and pressing for new policies. To me this is simply 
a push towards creating yet another institution with no guarantee of its functionality.  
We thus need to tie climate migration to development and welfare policy analysis and 
question the inadequacy and non-uniformity in development and welfare schemes, 
which force vulnerable communities to relocate to survive. Marrying public policy to 
the dialogue on climate migration is thus an essential future step. Understanding the 
constraints at the sub-national level of governance is essential to assess how any 
international agreement on climate migration would essentially be delivered in a local 
context.  
Second, research needs to focus on GIS mapping tools to identify geographical 
vulnerability and match these with data on development and welfare programmes. 
Often the reach of programmes into physically fragile ecosystem is limited – it is 
essential to explore the reasons for these limitations. Mapping the reach of 
governmental programmes is also important in terms of improving accountability and 
producing well-thought protection outcomes.  
Finally, we need to study institutional limitations in the context of climate migration. 
It is intuitively known that an exponential number of people are displaced annually 
due to hydro-metrological disasters. We need to understand how governments respond 
to them before we can confirm a policy-area gap and jump to establish new institutions. 
The absence of knowledge about sub-state perception and implementation gap would 
only lead us towards a non-targeted generic approach which might not be suitable at 
all for the problem in hand. A more nuanced understanding of administrative 
behaviour is thus critical for addressing the issue of climate change migration, forced 
displacement and development. 
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